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Abstract This study traces the evolution of right–wing extremism, conceptualized as latent electoral support for extreme right–wing parties (i.e., vote intention), in six Western European countries (i.e., Belgium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, and Italy) between 1984 and 1993. Employing a pooled time–series cross–sectional research design, the author examines the relative strength of three popular explanations of contemporary rightwing extremism: the impact of economic conditions (unemployment and inflation), social developments (immigration), and political trends (public's dissatisfaction with the political regime). Evidence is presented in support of the last two explanations. Rising levels of immigration and public dissatisfaction with the political regime significantly facilitate right–wing extremism. Contrary to the initial hypothesis however, results suggest that a declining national economy (unemployment in particular) diminishes the electoral appeal of extreme right–wing parties.

This study traces the evolution of right-wing extremism, conceptualized as latent electoral support for extreme right-wing parties (i.e., vote intention), in six Western European countries (i.e., Belgium, France, the Netherlands, West Germany, Denmark, and Italy) between 1984 and 1993. Employing a pooled time-series cross-sectional research design, the author examines the relative strength of three popular explanations of contemporary right-wing extremism: the impact of economic conditions (unemployment and inflation), social developments (immigration), and political trends (public's dissatisfaction with the political regime). Evidence is presented in support of the last two explanations. Rising levels of immigration and public dissatisfaction with the political regime significantly facilitate right-wing extremism. Contrary to the initial hypothesis however, results suggest that a declining national economy (unemployment in particular) diminishes the electoral appeal of extreme right-wing parties. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

A reply to the critique by Arthur Miller et al of these authors' article (both 2001) focuses on three criticisms of the Multiple Values Model (MVM) of political tolerance: inability to replicate the original results; challenges to the suitability of the measurement protocol; & difficulties inherent in research on political tolerance. It is noted that the MVM data & statistical program were posted on a Web site for anyone who wanted to duplicate the results. Differences between the original findings & those of Miller et al are described as trivial, & their claim that females were said to be more tolerant than males is untrue. Their contention that free speech was the only value that demonstrated an influence on political tolerance is discussed, noting that the operationalization was designed to examine the degree to which people's commitment to civil liberties principles can be used to predict their decision to extend those liberties to offensive groups in specific cases. Consistent findings that affirm the validity of the value measures used in the MVM model are described, along with the importance of research on political tolerance. 10 References. J. Lindroth

While students of political tolerance often view tolerance decisions as a trade-off between opposing values (civil liberties vs other values), there have been few explicit attempts to formulate & test such a multiple-values model. With rare exception, researchers typically examine linkages between tolerance judgments & a single value constellation (civil liberties or general norms of democracy) without examining directly the way people rank competing values. In this way, we use data from a national telephone survey to test a model of how various value trade-off measures (eg, value conflict) influence citizens' initial tolerance decisions, as well as their willingness to stick to that judgment in the face of counter-arguments (ie, the pliability of the initial baseline judgment). We find that while value conflict is often associated with greater political forbearance of disliked groups (eg, the Klan, flag burners), greater conflict also makes individuals more susceptible to counter-arguments. We also find that when people are presented with roughly equal counter-arguments, the tolerant are much more willing to abandon their initial judgment than the intolerant. We conclude with a discussion of the broader implications of our findings for the study of political tolerance & political values. 2 Tables, 1 Figure, 1 Appendix, 42 References. Adapted from the source document.