Access to energy resources has become one of the main challenges of energy security in the modern world. Due to the growing political instability of countries exporting energy resources, the energy security category should be perceived in a special way. Energy security is expressed, first of all, in stable access to energy resources at an acceptable price. The aim of the article is to determine to what extent the strategy of diversifying the sources of crude oil imports to Poland and Belarus is implemented in practice, and to what extent the implementation of this strategy is conducive to building energy security for both these countries. It seems that despite the similar geological and geographical conditions, as well as the common historical infrastructure heritage, Poland and Belarus shape their energy policy differently. The conducted analysis has an empirical dimension, as the REES index is used to measure the concentration of imports and the short-term risk for the security of crude oil supplies. The article shows that a properly implemented diversification strategy significantly improves the country's energy security, which is possible due to the use of alternative directions for oil imports to the Russian one.
Energy security is a sine qua non condition for functioning and development of the economy of individual countries. The presented analysis concerns the issues of energy security of Poland, Belarus and Ukraine from the perspective of importers and transit countries of crude oil in the infrastructural dimension. The aim of the article is to answer the question: which direction to develop the strategic transmission infrastructure in the transit countries in order to ensure energy security? Literature research on the subject and a comparative analysis shows that from the perspective of these countries, one of the most important determinant of their energy security is the strategic transmission infrastructure that allows for the diversification of the supplier's sources and directions. However, the implementation of this strategy requires coordinated and consistent political actions as part of an international strategy.
Dotychczasowy model relacji polsko-ukraińskich dobiega końca, a nowy znajduje się w fazie in statu nascendi. Zasadnicza sprzeczność podstawowych interesów Kijowa i Warszawy spro-wadza się do tego, że podczas gdy Ukraina szuka sposobów na integrację i potrzebuje silnej Europy oraz ipso facto wzmocnienia wspólnoty europejskiej, Polska pod rządami koalicji skupionej wokół PiS kroczy coraz śmielej w stronę eurosceptycyzmu i podważania spójności Unii Europejskiej, chociaż wahadło europejskiej polityki po wyborach w Austrii, Holandii, a zwłaszcza we Francji w 2017 r. ponownie wychyla się w stronę centrum. Dzisiejsza Polska, odwracając się plecami od europejskiego twardego jądra, a zatem od Niemiec i Francji, przestaje być także atrakcyjnym partnerem dla Ukrainy, która z kolei widząc słabnącą pozycję Polski, zacieśnia związki z Berlinem.
The previous model of the Polish-Ukrainian relations has come to an end, while the new one is in the phase of statu nascendi. The fundamental contradiction of the basic interests of Kiev and Warsaw has worked out and is still relevant up to date. While Ukraine is looking for ways to integrate with the EU and needs a strong Europe, putting on Paris and Berlin, and thus ipso facto focusing on strengthening the European community, Poland has entered the path of euro-skepticism and quasi-Jagiellonian policy. The concept of a good change has triggered the most serious reorientation in foreign policy of Poland over the last quarter of a century. The amazement of the outside observers, also in Ukraine, might be aroused by the fact that Polish Eastern policy has been pursued by the same circle of experts under the previous government of the PO–PSL coalition as well as under the current government of the PiS-led united right. After several years of the right-wing rule the Ukrainian analysts see the growing degradation process of Poland's significance in Europe, its increasing confrontational tendencies towards countries outside the European Union, including relations with Ukraine. Primarily, it is a political dimension, though, it can be perceived also as a symbolic dimension and symbols mean a lot in politics. Key words: Poland; Ukraine; European Union; NATO; United States of America; Russian Federation; Intermarium; Germany.
The current model of Polish-Ukrainian relations is drawing to an end, while the new one is in the statu nascendi stage. The fundamental contradiction between the basic interests of Kiev and Warsaw consists in the fact that while Ukraine is seeking ways of integrating with the EU and needs a strong Europe as well as ipso facto strengthening the European community, Poland under the rule of the PiS-led coalition is heading towards Euro-skepticism and undermining cohesion of the European Union, even though after elections in Austria, the Netherlands and France in 2017 in particular, pendulum of the European policy is leaning towards the centre again. The present-day Poland, by turning its back on the European hard core, i.e. Germany and France, ceases to be an attractive partner for Ukraine, which in its turn is strengthening ties with Berlin due to Poland's faltering position.Key words: Poland; Ukraine; European Union; NATO; United States of America; Russian Federation; Intermarium; Germany. ; Dotychczasowy model relacji polsko-ukraińskich dobiega końca, a nowy znajduje się w fazie in statu nascendi. Zasadnicza sprzeczność podstawowych interesów Kijowa i Warszawy sprowadza się do tego, że podczas gdy Ukraina szuka sposobów na integrację i potrzebuje silnej Europy oraz ipso facto wzmocnienia wspólnoty europejskiej, Polska pod rządami koalicji skupionej wokół PiS kroczy coraz śmielej w stronę eurosceptycyzmu i podważania spójności Unii Europejskiej, chociaż wahadło europejskiej polityki po wyborach w Austrii, Holandii, a zwłaszcza we Francji w 2017 r. ponownie wychyla się w stronę centrum. Dzisiejsza Polska, odwracając się plecami od europejskiego twardego jądra, a zatem od Niemiec i Francji, przestaje być także atrakcyjnym partnerem dla Ukrainy, która z kolei widząc słabnącą pozycję Polski zacieśnia związki z Berlinem.Słowa kluczowe: Polska; Ukraina; Unia Europejska; NATO; Stany Zjednoczone Ameryki; Federacja Rosyjska; Międzymorze; Republika Federalna Niemiec. ; Існуюча модель польсько-українських відносин добігає кінця, натомість нова знаходиться на стадії in statu nascendi. Головна суперечність основних інтересів Києва та Варшави спроваджується до того, що в той час, коли Україна знаходиться в пошуку способів на інтеграцію і потребує сильної Європи, а також ipso facto зміцнення європейської спільноти, Польща під правлінням коаліції, сконцентрованої навколо ПіС, йде щораз сміливіше у бік євроскептицизму і підриву єдності Європейського Союзу, хоча і важіль європейської політики після виборів в Австрії, Нідерландах, а особливо у Франції 2017 року знову перехиляється до центру. Сьогоднішня Польща, відвертаючись від європейського твердого ядра, від Німеччини і Франції, перестає також бути привабливим партнером для України, яка, своєю чергою, помічаючи послаблення позиції Польщі, зміцнює зв'язки з Берліном.Ключові слова: Польща; Україна; Європейський Союз; НАТО; Сполучені Штати Америки; Російська Федерація; Міжмор'я; Федеративна Республіка Німеччини.
In the past few centuries, the Vatican diplomacy has, along with the French and Russian ones, gainedthe reputation of one of the best in the world. Despite shifting the stress to strictly religious matters andnew interest the Vatican diplomacy has shown in the problems such as international security, ecology,demography, still focuses on the relationships with traditionally Catholic European countries: Italy exdefinitione, Spain and Poland, Germany with its two sides of Christianity, protestant Great Britain and theeldest daughter of the Church – secular France. At the time of exploratory talks, informal meetings and,finally, negotiations with governments, Vatican diplomats were partners highly regarded for theirprofessionalism, precision, word economy and discretion. self-restraint and compromise.In the first years of John Paul II's pontificate the Vatican Secretariat undoubtedly appreciated thequalified successes achieved by the most expert diplomats of Paul VI. The political sense of the Polishpope and especially his absolute conviction that it was necessary to break with the post-Yalta order inEurope and the world, which he perceived as a moral disaster, meant that the Vatican Eastern policy didnot end with the collapse of the USSR and the 1989 Spring of Nations but merely reached a differentstage. Vatican's Eastern policy in 1958 – 2010 was pursued during the postwar subjugation of Central andEastern European by communism, as well as during the political and systemic transformation, whichbegan the great disruption of democracy and independence initiated by the Spring of Peoples 89.Key words: Vatican diplomacy; Poland; Germany. ; В останні кілька століть дипломатія Ватикану, поряд з французькою та російською, отримала репутацію однієї з найкращих у світі. Незважаючи на зосередження уваги на суто релігійних питаннях у статті показано і новий інтерес дипломатів Ватикану такі, як міжнародна безпека, екологія, демографія, а також зосереджена на відносинах з традиційно католицькими країнами Європи: Італія екс definitione, Іспанії та Польщі, Німеччини з її двома сторонами християнства, протестантська Великобританія і старша дочка Церкви - світська Франція. Під час попередніх переговорів, неформальних зустрічей і, нарешті, переговори з урядами, Ватиканських дипломатів партнери високо цінують за їх професіоналізм, точність, слово економіки і розсудливість, стриманість і компроміс.У перші роки понтифікату Івана Павла II Секретаріат Ватикану, безперечно, оцінили за успіхи, досягнуті найдосвідченішими дипломатами Павла VI. Політичний сенс Папи і, передусім, його абсолютна впевненість були необхідними для того, щоб порвати з пост-Ялтинським порядком у Європі та світі, який сприймали як моральну катастрофу. Це означало, що Східна політика Ватикану не закінчується крахом СРСР і навесні 1989 року досягає лише іншого етапу. Східна політика Ватикану 1958-2010 років переслідував в післявоєнний період ціль викорінення з Центральної та Східної Європи комунізму, а також під час політичної і системної трансформації, яка почалася поширенням демократії і незалежністю, котрі стали поштовхом до «весна народів».Ключові слова: дипломатія Ватикану; Німеччина; Польща.
The eastern policy of the Holy See in the years 1978 -1989/1990: the ideas and values in action
The history and the beginnings of Vatican diplomacy, its high prestige in the field of international relations. The text discusses the features, modes of action, the hierarchy and the number of the Vatican diplomats. The beginnings of the difficult collaboration of the Holy See with the East, inaugurated by John XXII and Paul VI, continued by John Paul II. After a Pole was chosen as the bishop of Rome there was an intensification of the Vatican's eastern policy. John Paul II openly fought for and frequently spoke about respecting human rights and the increase of the freedom of the Church, not only in Poland, but also in the entire eastern bloc. We should mention the fact that during the events of December 1980 and the period of tension in Poland, John Paul II submitted a letter to Leonid Brezhnev expressing his concern about the fate of Europe and Poland. The bishop of Rome also established a collaboration with the Hungarian episcopate at that time. Despite initial difficulties, he also did so with Czechoslovakia. By making pilgrimages to his fatherland and by meeting general Jaruzelski, the Pope made vigorous attempts to normalize all diplomatic relations between the Vatican and Poland. This normalization eventually happened on 17 July 1989. In the second half of the 1980s Mikhail Gorbachev played a considerable role in the warming of the relations between the Vatican and Moscow due to his policy of reconstruction (perestroika). The extension of the dialogue between the Vatican and Moscow was facilitated by the visit made by the Soviet leader to the Pope in December 1989, and especially by the declaration made during that visit that there was a will to bring about a turning point in the religious policy and a will to confer an official status to the relations between the Soviet Union and the Vatican. The Polish Pope's political sense, and especially his belief about the necessity of making a break with the post-Yalta order in Europe and in the World, an order that was viewed as a moral catastrophe, entailed the idea that the Vatican's eastern policy did not reach its end with the Spring of the Nations of 1989 and the demise of the Soviet Union, but that it entered a new stage of its development. The diplomacy of the Vatican in the face of democratizational processes in Eastern Europe and the emergence of a new political map drawn up on the ruins of the USSR had very little time to spare to adapt its activities to the dynamically changing reality. In the new political reality in the eastern part of the continent there came to the fore the question of restoring or establishing by the Holy See of diplomatic relations both with the countries with a Catholic majority, such as Poland, Hungary and Lithuania, or with countries which were widely represented by Catholics, countries such as Belarus or the Ukraine, or with countries in which the Catholics were a religious minority, as in the case of the Russian Federation. The thusdefined longscale strategic goals of the Vatican toward the countries of the former Soviet Union and its satellite countries in Central and Eastern Europe were fulfilled, maybe with the exception of the Russian Federation alone, and, for other reasons, the Republic of Belarus. The diplomacy of the Vatican made a lasting contribution to the engineering of a new political order on the Old Continent based on the respect of rights and civic freedoms which are derived also from the Christian tradition.
This article discusses the evolution of the energy security of Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), in terms of natural gas supplies. Instead of framing energy dependencies on Russia in a descriptive way, this article shows the empirical validation of the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine, which includes the use of energy resources as tool in foreign policy. Therefore, the authors propose a three-element Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine indicator to measure the power of this doctrine using the yearly data for 1991–2021. Authors argue that the impact of this doctrine should be assessed through the lens of energy supply security and then measured by appropriate indicators. This approach might be seen as opposite to the mainstream publications which are mostly descriptive in this field. In the article, the authors provided clear evidence of the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine existence until the end of 2021, which was applied during the Russian-Ukrainian war. Actions taken by Russia over the years were aimed at making Central European countries dependent on natural gas supply, which would then prompt these countries to limit their aid to Ukraine during the conflict that began in 2022. In conclusion, Russia is able to pursue its political goals in the manner suggested by the Falin–Kvitsinsky doctrine as long as each Central European country tries to ensure its own energy security. However, the Falin-Kvitsky doctrine did not fully meet its objectives, as Central European countries, as a result of the Russian-Ukrainian war, were able to quickly take steps to diversify the sources and directions of natural gas supplies by taking comprehensive measures and strengthening cooperation.
The article discusses the impact of the gas infrastructure on the current energy security of Poland. In this context, the subject of the analysis is the natural gas as a low-emission intermediate fuel and the elements of the Polish gas infrastructure responsible for Poland's energy security. The main goal of the article is to try to answer the question: how to form Poland's current and future energy security in the field of gas infrastructure? The whole analysis has been conducted from the national and regional perspective.
