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THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS TEN PROPOSITIONS ABOUT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION THAT BEAR IMPORTANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THIS NEW ERA. 1) THE AMERICAN PUBLIC DOES NOT PAY MUCH ATTENTION TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS MOST OF THE TIME, BUT SEEMS READY TO CARE IF THERE IS A REASON TO DO SO. 2) THE PUBLIC UNDERTAKES A SENSIBLE COST-BENEFIT ACCOUNTING WHEN EVALUATING FOREIGN AFFAIRS. 3) THE PUBLIC'S ATTITUDES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ARE SET BY THE OBJECTIVE CONTENT OF THE ISSUE AND BY THE POSITION OF MAJOR POLICYMAKERS. 4) THE "CNN EFFECT" IS VASTLY EXAGGERATED. 5) FOREIGN POLICY HAS BECOME LESS IMPORTANT IN JUDGING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PRESIDENT. 6) THE ADVANTAGE TO A PRESIDENT OF A SUCCESS IN A MINOR FOREIGN POLICY VENTURE IS MARGINAL. 7) IF THEY ARE NOT BEING KILLED, AMERICAN TROOPS CAN REMAIN IN PEACEKEEPING VENTURES VIRTUALLY INDEFINITELY WITH LITTLE PUBLIC CRITICISM. 8) A VENTURE DEEMED OF SMALL IMPORTANCE IS BEST SOLD AS INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL WORK THAT CAN BE SHRUGGED OFF IF IT GOES WRONG. 9) A DANGER IN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IS THAT AMERICANS MIGHT BE TAKEN HOSTAGE. 10) NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF ROGUE STATES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM REMAIN POTENTIALLY ATTENTION ARRESTING CONCERNS.

Suggests that in its actual workings, liberty is essential to democracy. However, equality and fraternity are not-and the notion that they are a necessary aspect of democracy can be dangerous since it can lead minorities to despair and desperation. (Original abstract-amended)

An assessment of three journalistic issues that arise from an evaluation of the massive array of data generated by US polling agencies during the crisis leading to the 1991 Gulf war. (1) It is clear (but hardly surprising) that question wording made a great deal of difference, such that there was essentially no real answer to the question of how many Americans supported the war. (2) Although there was no general trend toward increased or decreased support for war, some published reports generated news by stressing the few data series that did change. (3) Sometimes data points were selectively pulled from a series to suggest there was a trend toward increased war suppport, when the full series suggested no such trend; some overnight polls conducted after dramatic events seemed to have tapped a notably hawkish trend that did not exist in the full array of data. 3 Tables, 12 References. AA

THE AUTHOR OF THIS ARTICLE DEFENDS HIS PROPOSITION THAT WAR BETWEEN DEVELOPED NATIONS IS RAPIDLY BECOMING OBSOLETE. HE EXPANDS ON THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE CASE OF EUROPE. HE ALSO FURTHER EXPLAINS HIS COMPARISONS OF THE DISAPPEARANCE OF DUELING AND SLAVERY TO THE GRADUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF WAR AS A CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISM.

The long peace in the developed world seems due mainly to changing attitudes toward war: where war was once often casually seen as beneficial, noble, & glorious, or at least as necessary or inevitable, the conviction has now become widespread that war would be intolerably costly, unwise, futile, & foolish. Nuclear weapons do not seem to have been necessary for this to come about. Like slavery & dueling, war can die out, & it can do so without notable changes in human nature, in the nation-state, or in the international system. Though war persists in the Third World, countries there may eventually be infected by the developed world's aversion to it. AA

Some researchers have claimed that there has been a substantial increase in political tolerance among the US public since the 1950s, while others assert that this increase is illusory -- though more tolerant of leftists, the public has simply found other targets on which to vent its intolerance. Data from Samuel A. Stouffer's 1954 survey on civil liberties (Communism, Conformity, & Civil Liberties, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955) are reanalyzed after recalculating some of its measures to simulate the least-liked group question used in a study conducted twenty years later that arrived at different conclusions (Sullivan, John L., Piereson, James, & Marcus, George E., "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases, 1950's-1970's," American Political Science Review, 1982, 73, 781-794). In addition, extensive trend data from polls conducted between 1940 & 1985 are analyzed. It is concluded that this shift does primarily reflect greater tolerance of leftists, although tolerance has fluctuated greatly over this period, largely due to changes in perceptions regarding threats from putatively subversive groups, especially domestic communists. However, the public's grasp of & concern about civil liberties seems so minimal that it can be argued that it really has no tangibly measurable attitude on the subject one way or the other. In A Note on "Trends in Political Tolerance", John L. Sullivan & George E. Marcus explain why they used the content-controlled measurement strategy in their initial study, defend their conceptualizations of tolerance & threat, & show why it is difficult to adequately compare their results with those of other researchers. It is concluded that Mueller is persuasive in arguing that attitudes toward communists have changed over time, but less so regarding changes in the level & structure of overall political tolerance. 6 Tables, 56 References. K. Hyatt

Discusses the considerable fluctuations in measured tolerance that have occurred over the last half century, and concludes with some comments about the degree to which the public can be said to be whimsical in its approach to the issue of civil liberties. Although the public seems able to react to news events in a predictable manner, it may be most useful to conclude that no meaningfully measurable attitude on tolerance exists. (PFB)

AbstractNatural resource dependence, although commonly invoked in natural resource sociology, has often been ambiguously defined. Communities are frequently described as dependent on natural resource development, but limited attention has been paid to what that means. In the literature, resource dependence is often treated as over‐specialization in, or over‐reliance upon, the natural resource sectors. However, the logic of over‐specialization conceptually grounds dependence in poor economic outcomes. Thus, a one‐dimensional typology of dependence based on a threshold of the share of development in the natural resource sector—as commonly used—does not fully capture the concept and risks tautology. In this paper, I address this ambiguity by formally defining natural resource dependence as over‐specialization in the natural resource sectors. I then present an ideal typology, known as the Natural Resource Community Typology, and a corresponding classification scheme for rural communities in the United States. The typology integrates both extractive and non‐extractive natural resource activity and has two dimensions—the level of development and the level of economic prosperity—and six mutually exclusive categories—extractive specialized, extractive dependent, non‐extractive specialized, non‐extractive dependent, hybrid specialized, and hybrid dependent. I classify counties from 2000 to 2015 and find that while extractive dependence decreased over the study period, non‐extractive dependence increased.

Der Verfasser skizziert einleitend die Formulierung einer räumlichen Wirtschaftstheorie bei Palander. Er setzt sich im folgenden mit den in den Datenkranz einer betrieblichen Standortverlagerung eingehenden "historischen" Faktoren auseinander. Hierbei werden zwei grundlegende Anwendungsfälle unterschieden. Der erste Fall betrifft die Standortentscheidung eines Betriebes bei Neuansiedlung, der zweite die Standortentscheidung im Falle einer Betriebsverlagerung. Es wird deutlich, daß der Gütegrad hinsichtlich der Standortentscheidung in einem raumwirtschaftlichen Modell nicht zuletzt davon abhängig ist, ob das Modell von einer partiell-sukzessiven Standortwahl oder von einer simultanen Neubestimmung aller Standorte ausgeht. (ICE)

AbstractUnderstanding rural resident support for various forms of natural resource‐related economic development has been a common research topic in rural sociology. However, the vast majority of research has only evaluated support for one form of natural resource use at a time. The little research that has explored support for a wide variety of uses has found that residents are likely to support many of the suggested forms of development. We assessed rural resident support for seven forms of natural resource development: commercial logging, natural gas, mining, real estate, wind energy, tourism, and outdoor recreation. Using social exchange theory, this study examines the influence of perceived impacts of development, industry trust, and perceived industry power on general support for the seven forms of natural resource‐related economic development using a fixed effects generalized linear model among a sample of residents of rural Pennsylvania communities. Additionally, we use mixed logit discreet choice modeling to evaluate the drivers of relative support, meaning a stated preference for one form of development over other possible options. The drivers of general support and relative support were similar, with trust in industry and impacts to quality of life emerging as the primary drivers of both.