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The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009.

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The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European Election Study data (2004 and 2009). As the results show, economic voting was only detected in Hungary (2004 and 2009) and Slovakia (2004). The analysis indicates that, in general, almost all Prime ministers' parties bear a greater degree of economic accountability; meanwhile, perceptions of EU economic responsibility had no influence on the popularity of government parties in 2009. ; The article presents economic voting theory and its application to the study of electoral behaviour in four Central European countries. The theoretical part describes the reward-punishment model of economic voting and its predictions for electoral behaviour in countries with coalition governance and in internationally open economies during the global economic crisis. The analytical part investigates the existence and features of economic voting (as a P-function) in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Hypotheses about the existence of economic voting in these countries, the higher economic accountability of more responsible coalition partners, and the lower level of economic voting under the perceived influence of the EU on the domestic economy are tested using OLS and binary logistic analysis of European ...

Municipal size and institutional design are important factors influencing representation at a local level. However, this has not been studied with regard to the long-term perspective. The article focuses on the effect of the center/periphery on the representation of units within an amalgamated municipality in local elections. The analysis is based on data from 2,298 amalgamated municipalities over three sets of elections (2006, 2010, 2014) in the Czech Republic. The article uses multilevel binomial logistic regression to estimate the effect of different types of intra-municipal (settlement) units in terms of central/periphery relations on their representation. Thanks to these unique data, the article presents information about the representation of differently disadvantaged units from the long-term perspective. The results show that political and cultural-economic centers of amalgamated municipalities, as well as settlement units of a bigger relative size, have a greater chance of being represented in the municipal council compared with political and cultural-economic peripheries and smaller units.

This article focuses on a comparative analysis of the organization of contemporary Czech parliamentary parties. It emphasizes the structural and functional differences between the new parties—ANO (meaning "yes" in Czech) and Dawn of Direct Democracy—and older parties. The theoretical section presents the basic organizational types – in particular, the concept of the business-firm party. The following organizational aspects of parties are then compared: membership, form of funding, the role played by ground organizations, the position and composition of top party bodies, the role played by the party leader, and media resources. This analysis reveals that ANO and Dawn have a more exclusive membership than older parties and have centralized more power into the hands of the party leader, who is supported both by formal statutes and by informal structures. In the case of ANO, the central leadership dominates over lower-level ground organizations; Dawn forgoes them altogether. Its missing institutional base accelerated Dawn's implosion in 2015. ANO is characterised by a high degree of professionalism and control over key media, both of which were missing in the case of Dawn.

This article focuses on a comparative analysis of the organization of contemporary Czech parliamentary parties. It emphasizes the structural and functional differences between the new parties—ANO (meaning "yes" in Czech) and Dawn of Direct Democracy—and older parties. The theoretical section presents the basic organizational types – in particular, the concept of the business-firm party. The following organizational aspects of parties are then compared: membership, form of funding, the role played by ground organizations, the position and composition of top party bodies, the role played by the party leader, and media resources. This analysis reveals that ANO and Dawn have a more exclusive membership than older parties and have centralized more power into the hands of the party leader, who is supported both by formal statutes and by informal structures. In the case of ANO, the central leadership dominates over lower-level ground organizations; Dawn forgoes them altogether. Its missing institutional base accelerated Dawn's implosion in 2015. ANO is characterised by a high degree of professionalism and control over key media, both of which were missing in the case of Dawn. ; This article focuses on a comparative analysis of the organization of contemporary Czech parliamentary parties. It emphasizes the structural and functional differences between the new parties—ANO (meaning "yes" in Czech) and Dawn of Direct Democracy—and older parties. The theoretical section presents the basic organizational types – in particular, the concept of the business-firm party. The following organizational aspects of parties are then compared: membership, form of funding, the role played by ground organizations, the position and composition of top party bodies, the role played by the party leader, and media resources. This analysis reveals that ANO and Dawn have a more exclusive membership than older parties and have centralized more power into the hands of the party leader, who is supported both by formal statutes and by informal ...

The article presented is theoretically grounded in the office-seeking approach to the study of coalitions. It takes the most influential theories of portfolio distribution in the executive and legislature (voting weights, proportionality, formateur) and tests it on the data pertaining to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 2010. We follow the distribution of portfolios in the government, in the presidium of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in the presidiums of permanent parliamentary committees. The approach based on voting weights seems best for studying portfolio distribution in the Czech Republic, although it is not entirely satisfactory. In the theoretical discussion of the results, we also point out that the voting weights approach is somewhat less rigorous than others. At the same time, we show that even ostensibly exact approaches to the study of coalitions can lead to arbitrariness on the part of the researcher, as theoretical assumptions about portfolio distribution operate with decimal numbers, whereas in reality one operates with natural numbers.