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We consider a monopoly producing a good whose demand grows over time. Whatever the price policy which is adopted, the monopolist invests in order to meet the resulting demand growth. She can only invest in indivisible factory units. We identify the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal sequence of investment time points the monopoly selects through time. We show that this sequence satisfies the constant cycle property observed under capacity expansion for an exogenous increase in demand (Manne, 1961).

This thesis centres around the issue of R&D, investment and growth: it is mainly concerned with the rationale which shapes the optimal investment pattern defined by a firm over time in a growing economy. We start considering the economy as a whole in order to evaluate how its actual functioning (interaction between research labs, risk of failure in innovating, patent laws and so on) shapes firms' specific investment policies. More precisely, we focus on the R&D process as it really develops in the market, and examine what is the optimal investment policy for firms involved in research and whether the selected investment policy in turn sustains the growth path of the economy. After analysing how the economic environment may affect firms' investment plans, we propose to identify the decision mechanism, as it develops inside the firm, through which an investment policy is defined over time. Thus, we move to an in-depth analysis of the process through which a profit-maximizing entity selects a specific investment policy when it is required to expand its production plant in order to satisfy a growing economy. ; Cette thèse porte sur les questions de recherche et développements, d'investissement et de croissance : elle concerne principalement les raisons qui définissent au cours du temps l'investissement optimal dans une économie en croissance. Dans un premier temps, on considère l'économie dans sa globalité pour évaluer dans quelle mesure son fonctionnement actuel (interaction entre les laboratoires de recherches, risques d'échecs de innovations, licences, etc…) détermine les politiques d'investissement spécifiques des firmes. Plus précisément, l'analyse porte sur le processus de R and D qui se développe sur le marché et sur la politique d'investissement optimal pour des firmes impliquées dans la recherche. A son tour est analysée si la politique d'investissement sélectionnée soutient la croissance de l'économie. Dans un second temps, suite à l'analyse des effets de l'environnement économique sur les plans d investissement des firmes, nous proposons d'identifier le mécanisme décisionnel qui se développe à l'intérieur de la firme à partir duquel une politique d'investissement est définie dans le temps. Ainsi, nous présentons une analyse détaillée du processus à partir duquel une entité poursuivant la maximisation de son profit sélectionne une politique d'investissement particulière lorsqu'elle doit accroître sa production dans le but de satisfaire à l'économie en croissance. ; (ECON 3)--UCL, 2005

This thesis centres around the issue of R&D, investment and growth: it is mainly concerned with the rationale which shapes the optimal investment pattern defined by a firm over time in a growing economy. We start considering the economy as a whole in order to evaluate how its actual functioning (interaction between research labs, risk of failure in innovating, patent laws and so on) shapes firms' specific investment policies. More precisely, we focus on the R&D process as it really develops in the market, and examine what is the optimal investment policy for firms involved in research and whether the selected investment policy in turn sustains the growth path of the economy. After analysing how the economic environment may affect firms' investment plans, we propose to identify the decision mechanism, as it develops inside the firm, through which an investment policy is defined over time. Thus, we move to an in-depth analysis of the process through which a profit-maximizing entity selects a specific investment policy when it is required to expand its production plant in order to satisfy a growing economy. ; Cette thèse porte sur les questions de recherche et développements, d'investissement et de croissance : elle concerne principalement les raisons qui définissent au cours du temps l'investissement optimal dans une économie en croissance. Dans un premier temps, on considère l'économie dans sa globalité pour évaluer dans quelle mesure son fonctionnement actuel (interaction entre les laboratoires de recherches, risques d'échecs de innovations, licences, etc…) détermine les politiques d'investissement spécifiques des firmes. Plus précisément, l'analyse porte sur le processus de R and D qui se développe sur le marché et sur la politique d'investissement optimal pour des firmes impliquées dans la recherche. A son tour est analysée si la politique d'investissement sélectionnée soutient la croissance de l'économie. Dans un second temps, suite à l'analyse des effets de l'environnement économique sur les plans d investissement des firmes, nous proposons d'identifier le mécanisme décisionnel qui se développe à l'intérieur de la firme à partir duquel une politique d'investissement est définie dans le temps. Ainsi, nous présentons une analyse détaillée du processus à partir duquel une entité poursuivant la maximisation de son profit sélectionne une politique d'investissement particulière lorsqu'elle doit accroître sa production dans le but de satisfaire à l'économie en croissance. ; (ECON 3)--UCL, 2005

AbstractWe propose a model of international oligopoly with two countries, two vertically-differentiated goods, and heterogeneous consumers in terms of their willingness to pay for quality. Various sources of pollution are taken into account: consumption, production and the transportation of goods between the two countries. Green persuaded consumers display consumption home bias: they derive additional satisfaction when consuming a domestic good because buying locally abates transportation pollution. We investigate whether consumption home bias effectively curbs global emissions. Finally, we uncover the environmental role played by the globalization of markets.

We study the effects of integration of asymmetric complements when they are vertically differentiated. While confirming the standard effects of integration, namely the internalization of the double marginalization externality and the reduction of competition, we point out a new positive quality effect, due to an increase in the average quality of the goods on sale. We also characterize the conditions under which integration turns out to be optimal for both firms' and consumers. We thus provide valuable directions for competition agencies when considering the joint ownership in vertically differentiated markets.

This note is concerned with the effects of joint ownership of complements when they are vertically differentiated. We provide strong arguments for the positive nature of network integration among firms, while showing at the same time that, in some circumstances, anti-competitive consequences can be observed under acquisition.

In this paper we adopt a vertical differentiation model to study the effect of deregulation in the airline industry. In particular, we focus on the entry of low cost companies, which succeed in providing essential flight services at relatively cheap prices. We argue that the entry of very aggressive rivals pushed traditional carriers to react by forming strategic alliances and exploit economies of densities trough hub-and-spoke systems. We verify that a strategic alliance is profitable if the gain in terms of economies of density is sufficiently high and consumers' utility is not significantly decreased by the indirect connection.

AbstractIn a vertically differentiated setting, we consider a two-stage game between a clean firm and a dirty producer with quality competition at the first stage and price competition at the second stage under the assumption that consumers have relative preferences for quality. The equilibrium configuration changes depending on the consumers' dispersion and the relative preferences: either both producers are active at equilibrium, or the green producer is the only firm active in the market, the brown competitor being out. We analyze how the equilibrium changes when preferences are country specific (developed vs. developing countries). Finally, we show that whatever the market configuration at equilibrium, there can be a pollution damage reduction compared to the standard case without relative preferences. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce in the literature of green consumerism the notion of (possibly country-specific) relative preferences.

We analyze the effects, on nonredistributive taxation and on migrations, of wage differentials existing between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained abroad, including the cost of migration. The government in each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the largest possible amount of public good. We first assume that the income of citizens are identical across countries. Then, we assume that wages differ from one country to the other. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wage and any different relative size of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set of parameters, size and wage differential.

We analyze the effects, on nonredistributive taxation and on migrations, of wage differentials existing between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident compares the post-tax amount of money at home with the one obtained abroad, including the cost of migration. The government in each country maximizes the tax product in order to provide the largest possible amount of public good. We first assume that the income of citizens are identical across countries. Then, we assume that wages differ from one country to the other. We prove the existence of an equilibrium for any configuration of wage and any different relative size of the countries (regions). Then, we compute and characterize the equilibrium for any set of parameters, size and wage differential.

Our empirical analysis focuses on the effect of regional policies on migration attraction factors in Europe. We employ a regression discontinuity design to assess the causal relationship between the reception of large amounts of public funds and migration flows in the EU-15 regions. In highlysubsidized regions, we find a large increase in the share of foreign citizens from less-developed countries when compared to low-subsidized regions with similar pre-treatment characteristics. The analysis shows that such an increase is due to the positive impact of the European regional policy on job market opportunities as well as the improvement of public goods supply