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Abstract. This paper argues that Foucault's proposed
positive program of practical critique in his later work, which he calls
'critical ontology,' provides a response to his critics. The
goal of critical ontology is to "separate out, from the contingency
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing or
thinking what we are, do, or think." However, it may be objected
that, since Foucault emphasizes going beyond contingencies, it appears
that he is guilty of committing a kind of genetic fallacy. I will defend
Foucault against such a charge by using concepts and practices in child
development as an illustration. The example of child development is
fitting for political theorizing because the development model of
childhood is now central to the practices and policies of healthcare
providers, social workers and educators. Such practices and policies aim
to enhance the abilities of individuals to be both citizens and autonomous
agents. Yet the effects of these policies on individuals are not always
positive. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of
critical ontology for practices grounded in the model of child
development.Résumé. Cet article cherche à
démontrer que le programme positif de critique pratique que
Foucault propose dans ses derniers ouvrages, et qu'il qualifie
d'une "ontologie critique," constitue une réponse
à ses détracteurs. Le but de cette ontologie critique est de
dégager "de la contingence qui nous a fait être ce que
nous sommes la possibilité de ne plus être, faire ou penser
ce que nous sommes, faisons ou pensons". Néanmoins, il est
possible d'objecter que Foucault commet une sorte d'erreur
génétique, puisqu'il insiste sur la
nécessité de dépasser les contingences. Je cherche
à defendre Foucault contre cette accusation en utilisant les
concepts et pratiques du développement des enfants comme
illustration. L'exemple du développement des enfants convient
à la théorie politique puisque le modèle
d'aménagement de l'enfance est maintenant au coeur des
pratiques et des politiques de ceux qui travaillent dans les secteurs de
la santé, de l'aide social, et de l'éducation.
Telles pratiques et politiques ont comme but d'accroître la
capacité des individus d'agir en même temps comme
citoyens et des êtres autonomes. Pourtant, les effets de ces
politiques sur des individus ne sont pas toujours
bénéfiques. L'article se conclut par une analyse des
implications d'une ontologie critique pour des pratiques
fondées sur le modèle du développement des
enfants.

Hélène Landemore and Ana Tanasoca have recently proposed two different approaches to deepening the deliberative dimension of democracy. InOpen Democracy(2020), Landemore introduces a novel paradigm of democracy—open democracy—which grants ordinary citizens access to an actual exercise of political power through innovative forms of democratic representation. InDeliberation Naturalized(2020), Tanasoca develops a naturalized normative theory of deliberative democracy which stresses the role of citizen deliberation in what she refers to as 'naturalistic' settings, i.e., the public sphere. Both texts invite us to stretch our imaginations of how contemporary democracy can be deepened in deliberative ways.

Can democracy secure environmental sustainability? This article proposes a basic, yet substantial organising principle – the 'dilemma of green democracy' – which maps out the possibility of realising green decision outcomes under democratic constraints. The dilemma posits that there is no logical or unconditional relationship between democratic decisions and environmental sustainability. More specifically, three plausible conditions for collective environmental decision making – robustness to pluralism, consensus preservation and green outcomes – are mutually inconsistent, meaning that they cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To construct a logically possible environmental-democratic institution, we must avoid the dilemma by relaxing at least one of the conditions. This article explores a number of escape routes from the dilemma, and discusses each proposal by drawing on democratic theory and empirical examples in environmental politics. It concludes that as long as the dilemma of green democracy is resolved, democracy can, at least in principle, secure environmental sustainability.