Search results

Recent advances in game theory and experimental social science provide insights for the study of corruption and abuse of power in local politics. We survey the evidence from theoretical and experimental research and illustrate findings and problems with two examples from a survey among local politicians and officials in Sweden. The most simplified theoretical models, such as the prisoner's dilemma, fail to capture the distinction between group loyal behavior at different levels. There are several grey zones between pro-social behavior and corruption. These grey zones can be considered corruption danger zones. While Sweden is typically seen as a non-corrupt society, there are several situations where local politicians and officials must make choices in these corruption danger zones. Both formal institutions and informal norms influence these choices, and the views among politicians can vary substantially regarding what behavior is considered acceptable. Communication, openness and public debate can help the fight against corruption. Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.