Search results

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- I. David Wong's Pluralistic Moral Relativism -- 1. The Strategy and Style of Wong's Approach: Working Out a Defensible Relativism -- 2. The Three Main Theses of Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- 3. Wong's Defense of Pluralistic Relativism -- 4. Wong's Moral Relativism and Chinese Philosophy -- II. Central Issues between Wong and His Critics -- 1. A Morality of Humanity Over and Above Moralities of Social Groups? -- 2. Can a Metaethics that Is Naturalistic, Pluralistic, and Relativistic Accommodate a Normative Morality that Is Non-Naturalistic, Monistic, or Universalistic Morality? -- 3. The Principle of Humanity vs. the Principle of Charity: Interpretation of Confucianism -- 4. Naturalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy -- 5. Naturalism, Relativism, and Realism -- 6. Speaker Relativism or Patient Relativism? -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Critical Essays -- 2. Human Morality, Naturalism, and Accommodation -- I. Wong's Pluralistic Relativism -- II. The Universal Element in Morality -- III. Relativism -- IV. Accommodation -- V. Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- 3. Naturalism and Pluralistic Relativism -- I. Introduction -- II. Individuating Moralities -- III. From Moral Ambivalence to Pluralistic Relativism? -- IV. Value Monism and Universalism Revisited -- V. Should Wong Allow Non-Naturalistic Moralities to be Adequate? -- VI. Moralities as Practiced Versus Ideal Moralities -- VII. A Problem for Wong's Reciprocity Constraint -- VIII. Wong's Use of Xunzi: A Separate Naturalistic Project? -- Acknowledgment -- Notes -- References -- 4. Principle of Humanity vs. Principle of Charity -- I. The Argument -- II. The Rival Principles of Humanity and Charity in Radical Translation -- III. The Role of Comparative Philosophy in the Argument -- IV. Xunzi and Sage Authority.

The research describes the core sociological approaches to the theoretical interpretation of interrelated key issues of modern sociology of morality — the sources of the significance of multiple regulatory orders, the relations of morality and power, the role of morality as a universal intermediary in potential conflicts among regulatory systems (in particular, between state and non-state laws, professional ethics, religion, corporate codes of conduct, etc.). Based on the critical scrutiny of classical and modern approaches to the sources of norms and relations between multiple regulatory systems, in particular law and morality, the author outlines perspective directions of the theoretical interpretation of the relationship between morality and law. Using the reconstructed reasoning against the thesis of moral relativism in the social sciences recently offered by S. Lukes, the research studies the possibility of describing "moral" and "conventional" as analytically different dimensions of social norms, as well as the prospects of using the concept of "participating reactive mindsets" as a theoretical interpretation of the general source of moral emotions and judgments.

Moral relativism is a tragedy and cognitive relativism is a farce – so Gellner argues. First the tragedy: moral relativism is consistent and compelling given moral diversity and contention worldwide. Then the farce: cognitive relativism is self-contradictory and logically false; it is also absurd in view of hard science, which gets testable, cumulative, applicable results that yield high tech; and it is insidious – where logical consistency and empirical accuracy are a dead letter, mummery rules.

Moral relativism is often regarded as both fatally flawed and incompatible with liberalism. This book aims to show why such criticism is misconceived. First, it argues that relativism provides a plausible account of moral justification. Drawing on the contemporary relativist and universalist analyses of thinkers such as Harman, Nagel and Habermas, it develops an alternative account of 'coherence relativism'. Turning to liberalism, the book argues that moral relativism is not only consistent …

Frontmatter -- Preface -- Table of Contents -- Are Philosophers′ Actions Realist or Constructivist? -- On the Non-Dualizing Rhetoric. Some Preliminary Remarks -- Ist der Konstruktivismus selbstwidersprüchlich? -- Die Wahrheitsspieler. Strategische Kommunikation als Spiel -- Who Wants to Be a Non-Dualist and Why? -- Jean Piaget und die Erfindung von Radikalem Konstruktivismus und Kybernetik Zweiter Ordnung -- Two Ways of Exploring the World -- The Truth of Social Constructivism -- The Objectivity of Epistemic Values and the Argument from Immersion -- Epistemological Realism, Representation, and Intentionality -- Angelina's Truth: Genetic Knowledge, Preventive Medicine, and the Reality of the Possible -- Neither Realism nor Anti-Realism: How to approach the Anthropocene? -- Ein Bild – ohne Betrachter – hielt uns gefangen. Wittgensteins ambivalenter Abschied vom Realismus -- Relativisms and Their Opposites -- When Paul Met Ludwig: Wittgensteinian Comments on Boghossian's Antirelativism -- Fighting Relativism: Wittgenstein and Kuhn -- Wissenschaftstheoretische Überlegungen jenseits von Realismus, Relativismus und Konstruktivismus -- Realism without Foundation -- Constructed Reality -- Ontological Relativism as Transcendental Nominalism -- Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious Beings -- What is the Thing Whose Measure is Money? -- Relativism about Morality -- Slavery and Justice: Williams and Wiggins -- A Plurality of True Moralities? Tracing 'Truth' in Moral Relativism -- Zum Wert von Vertrauen -- Die Erfindung der Sein-Sollen-Dichotomie -- Wird die Moral von uns geschaffen? -- The Sociology of the Supernatural: Wittgenstein's Lecture on Ethics -- Can We Piece Together a Coherent Account of the "Person" from the Writings of Wittgenstein? -- Wittgensteins Philosophieren zwischen Kodex und Strategie: Logik, Schach und Farbausdrücke -- Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard and the Significance of Silence -- Zweifeln können und zweifeln wollen: Über Gewissheit §217–231 -- Rules and Privacy: Remarks on Philosophical Investigations §202 -- Index of names -- Index of subjects