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In: Federico Caffè lectures
4.5 ConclusionAppendix; 5 Access pricing rules for developing countries; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 About the optimality of the market structure; 5.3 Structural separation and pricing of access to an independently owned infrastructure; Competitive usage; Examples; Market power of users; Additional problems with Ramsey pricing; Regulatory capture; Risk of expropriation; 5.4 One-way access with vertical integration; Competitive users; Example; Example; Case b; A noncompetitive entrant; 5.5 Two-way access; 5.6 Conclusion; 6 Universal service obligationsin LDCs; 6.1 Introduction; 6.2 The basic setting.
In: Federico Caffe` lectures
In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcement capabilities and discusses the delicate issue of access pricing in view of LDC's specificities. In the final chapter he proposes a theory of separation of powers which reveals one of the many vicious circles of underdevelopment made explicit by the economics of information. Based on organization theory and history, and using simple empirical tests wherever possible, Professor Laffont offers a comprehensive evaluation of the different ways to organize the regulatory institutions and opens up a rich new research agenda for development studies
Englisch
Cambridge University Press
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