Over seventy years ago it would have seemed inconceivable in the aftermath of a calamitous war that a complete reorientation of Japan into a pacifist society, modeled on Western principles of individual rights and democracy, would succeed in upending a deeply entrenched political order with roots dating back centuries. The post-war Japanese constitution lies at the heart of this transformation. Drafted, negotiated and promulgated a mere fourteen months after Japan's formal surrender, it has remained a model of stability amidst transformational changes in the domestic and international political landscape. In the seventy-plus years since its adoption, it has not been amended once.
Devotion to the written U.S. Constitution is a centuries-old American tradition. Both the left and the right avow their faith in the document, even and especially when contesting the constitutional claims of their opponents. For instance, when Tea Party supporters champion the second and tenth amendments, they're championing particular interpretations of them that their opponents read very differently. Regardless, both sides in constitutional debates virtually always look to the Constitution itself as the decisive arbiter. But should we really be looking to a 225-year old document as the final authority on contentious political and social issues? What if we decide that is acceptable to disobey much of what the Constitution says? Will it result in chaos?In On Constitutional Disobedience, leading constitutional scholar Louis Michael Seidman explains why constitutional disobedience may well produce a better politics and considers the shape that such disobedience might take. First, though, he stresses that is worth remembering the primary goals of the original Constitution's authors, many of which were unseemly both then and now. Should we really feel obligated to defend our electoral college or various other features that arguably lead to unjust results? Yet many of our political debates revolve around constitutional features that no one loves but which everyone feels obligated to defend. After walking through the various defenses put forth by proponents of the US Constitutional system, Seidman shows why none of them hold up. The solution, he claims, is to abandon our loyalty to many of the document's requirements and instead embrace the Constitution as a 'poetic' vision of a just society. Lest we worry that forsaking the Constitution will result in anarchy, we only need to remember Great Britain, which functions very effectively without a written
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This paper deals with the study of the justification of constitutional principles as a fundamental category of constitutional law. Legal principles are an important conception in the legal doctrine and the legal practice of democratic countries. Ukrainian legal doctrine studies legal principles in the two paradigms, namely fundamental principles and general principles. However, this approach does not result in the understanding of principles in constitutional law. That is why principles in constitutional law are an actual topic. The article aims to examine the fundamental concepts to find the justifications of constitutional principles. Hence, the author pays attention to the content of constitutional law and constitutionalism as principles-based categories. First, constitutional law is a fundamental part of the law in the legal system, and all the parts of the law are dependent on constitutional law. Second, the universal constitutional principles are the same for all legal systems. After all, constitutionalism doctrine consists of the limitation of power, and nowadays, this is expressed through the constitution and different constitution principles. The author uses comparative legal, phenomenological, and system-structural analysis as a valid methodology for this research. Finally, the research investigation contains the following conclusions that enable the author to prove the motivation of the science paper to study the outlined topic. First, constitutional law is the basis of the legal system, which embodies constitutional principles; constitutional law has the same effect on public law and private law. Second, constitutionalism is a source for finding constitutional principles. Third, the system of constitutional principles includes the following characteristics: universality and specificity. The system of constitutional principles is open and depends on the interpretation of constitutions. The paper aims to contribute to the growing research highlighting the current issues of constitutional principles. Keywords: principles, constitutional principles, constitutional law, constitutionalism, the system of constitutional principles.
"This book examines the law and its practice in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The objective is to understand the logic of the legal system in the UAE through a rounded analysis of its laws in context. It thus presents an understanding of the system on its own terms beyond the accepted Western model. The book shows how Emirati law differs from conventional rule of law. The first section of the book deals with the imperial, international, and cultural background of the Emirati legal system and its influences on some of the elements of the legal system today. It maps the state's international legal obligations according to core human rights treaties showing how universal interpretations of rights may differ from Emirati interpretations of rights. This logic is further illustrated through an overview of the legal system, in federal, local and free zones, and how the UAE's diversity of legal sources from Islamic and colonial law provides a legal adaptability. The second section of the book deals mainly with the contemporary system of rule of law in the UAE but at times makes a detour to the British administration to show how imperial execution of power during the British administration created forerunners visible today.Finally, the debut of the UAE on the international scene contributed to interest in human rights investigations having manifestations in UAE law"--
In Vieth v. Jubelirer, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court determined that, at least for the moment, partisan gerrymandering is nonjusticiable. Yet, strikingly, all nine members of the Court also agreed that, justiciable or not, partisan gerrymanders raise a constitutional question, and some gerrymanders are unconstitutional. However, the Court gave little attention to just why gerrymandering might be unconstitutional. The justices bounced back and forth between justiciability and the standards for proving gerrymandering without considering what constitutional harm gerrymandering poses. This Article considers the question of why partisan gerrymandering might be unconstitutional. It finds four constitutional arguments against gerrymandering in judicial opinions and the academic literature: (i) vote dilution in violation of the equal protection clause; (ii) burdening of political association in violation of the first amendment; (iii) frustration of the competitiveness necessary for democratic elections; and (iv) excessive pursuit of partisan or individual legislator self-interest. The Article contends that the first three arguments are likely to fail, in part because the theories they rely on are ultimately in tension with the use of districting to elect legislators. The fourth argument comes closest to capturing the constitutional harm posed by gerrymandering while remaining consistent with the use of districting. Of course, the fourth argument implicates the manageability concern that gives force to the argument against justiciability. Yet, the experience with Shaw v. Reno claims alleging excessive use of race in districting, suggests that the excessive partisanship/self-interest theory of partisan gerrymandering may also be judicially manageable - if the Court concludes that the harm posed by gerrymandering is serious enough to justify judicial intervention.
Using numerous topical examples and a clear structure, this third edition textbook provides an accessible, discursive and scholarly treatment of the key contemporary issues in UK public law. Drawing upon their extensive teaching and research experience, Roger Masterman and Colin Murray offer an engaging account of the key topics which make up a constitutional and administrative, or public, law syllabus. Controversial issues and broader debates are highlighted throughout the text, allowing the reader to develop a strong understanding of both the application of key topics in the field and the socio-political context in which the constitution has developed. This fully revised edition includes detailed analysis of recent significant cases, the constitutional implications of the Covid-19 pandemic and a dedicated chapter on the consequences of Brexit.
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Imagine an individual whose friend has allowed him to stay in a bedroom of his trailer home. This individual brings his most treasured and personal possessions along with him. Two police officers, after receiving information of potential criminal activity from an informant, enter the trailer without a warrant. Instead of obtaining a warrant, the officers solicit the consent of a third party and ransack the bedroom-leaving it in complete disarray. They find no evidence of the alleged criminal wrongdoing and seize no property. Although the police do not arrest the individual, they have humiliated him and have invaded his privacy. These state agents acted without a warrant, without the individual's consent, and in the absence of recognized exigent circumstances. The United States Supreme Court has held that this particular type of police conduct does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; thus, no Section 1983 claim may be brought against these state officers. Certain state supreme courts, however, have reached a different conclusion, finding similar conduct to violate comparable provisions of their respective state constitutions. These decisions notwithstanding, Section 1983 remains unavailable because, as a federal remedy, it does not extend to violations of state law. Thus, without a direct claim under the state constitution for damages. or a state provision comparable to Section 1983, the plaintiff will go uncompensated for his loss, and he will not have his rights vindicated. Furthermore, the government will go.unpunished for egregious acts that were in direct violation of the state constitution. As a result, the government will be undeterred from future unconstitutional conduct. A direct cause of action for a constitutional. violation will remedy the gap in an individual's ability to seek redress for breaches of constitutional provisions. The concept of a "constitutional tort'' first entered the American legal landscape in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in ...