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CD-ROM ; The 2003 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform radically changes the way the European Union (EU) supports its agricultural sector by decoupling direct payments. Production is no longer required to get the payment attached to Single Farm Payment (SFP) entitlements. However, the new scheme maintains a specific link between payments and hectares; in addition, SFP entitlements can be exchanged among farmers. These features question the way SFP entitlements should be regarded, hence modelled, i.e., as lump-sum transfers, area payments or… something else. We develop a microeconomic analytical framework which shows that the answer crucially depends on the total number of entitlements which are initially made available relative to the number of hectares, more specifically the number of cultivated hectares in a zero support regime, the number of cultivated hectares in a policy support regime trough per-hectare direct aids, and the number of cultivated or idled hectares in a policy regime where support is granted through direct aids per hectare and production is not required. ; Le découplage des paiements directs adopté lors de la réforme de la Politique Agricole Commune (PAC) de 2003 modifie radicalement la façon dont l'Union Européenne (UE) soutient son secteur agricole. Il n'y a plus d'obligation de production pour pouvoir prétendre au bénéfice de l'aide attachée aux Droits au Paiement Unique (DPU). Malgré cela, le nouveau dispositif maintient un lien spécifique entre les paiements et la terre ; de plus, les DPU peuvent être échangés entre agriculteurs. Etant donné ces caractéristiques, la question de la modélisation des DPU se pose : sont-ils des transferts forfaitaires, des aides à la surface ou… autre chose ? Le cadre analytique microéconomique proposé ici montre que la réponse dépend fondamentalement du rapport entre le nombre total de droits mis en circulation à l'initialisation du dispositif et, premièrement, le nombre d'hectares qui seraient cultivés en l'absence de tout soutien, deuxièmement, le ...

International audience ; Walls that divide are meant to be broken down. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the legacy of the East-West division can still be seen in the city's architecture, economy and overall culture. This paper examines Berlin's spatial and political history from the wall's beginnings to the long-term repercussions still being felt today. ; Les murs entre les hommes sont faits pour être détruits. Celui de Berlin, qui exprimait le refus de toute liberté migratoire dans les pays communistes, n'a pas manqué pas à la règle. Mais il laisse dans l'histoire architecturale, économique, comportementale, des traces visibles et son héritage géopolitique n'a pas fini d'exercer des effets.

International audience ; Walls that divide are meant to be broken down. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the legacy of the East-West division can still be seen in the city's architecture, economy and overall culture. This paper examines Berlin's spatial and political history from the wall's beginnings to the long-term repercussions still being felt today. ; Les murs entre les hommes sont faits pour être détruits. Celui de Berlin, qui exprimait le refus de toute liberté migratoire dans les pays communistes, n'a pas manqué pas à la règle. Mais il laisse dans l'histoire architecturale, économique, comportementale, des traces visibles et son héritage géopolitique n'a pas fini d'exercer des effets.

Over the last thirty years, the Italians have tried almost everything, nothing has resulted as expected, the country is stagnated, and this is the only dish on the menu that had not been tasted yet. Economic growth was flat since 2000, and after the Great Recession and the pandemic, the per capita GDP is 5% lower than fifteen years ago. Public debt amounts to about 150% of GDP (the second in Europe, only after Greece, which is a much smaller economy).This permanent turmoil is in sharp contrast with the more than forty years of political stability and economic growth since the establishment of the Italian Republic at the end of World War II. In the first edition of my textbook Political Institutions in Europe, the author of the chapter on Italy, Gianfranco Pasquino, summarized that period as one with unstable governments (one-year average duration), lasting coalitions (always around the Christian-democrats), repeated presidents of the Council (up to De Gasperi eight times, Andreotti seven, Fanfani six…), and stagnated policies. After the Cold War and the dissolution of both the Christian-democracy and the Communist Party, there have been sustained attempts to force alternations in government via political polarization. Five electoral reforms replaced the previous proportional representation system with mixed systems including single-member districts by plurality rule and a "majority bonus" to the largest party. The results have been, paraphrasing Pasquino: slightly less unstable governments (lasting on average 18 months, but remember that Germany had only three chancellors in forty years); changing coalitions with many alternations (about eight, plus two national unity cabinets); repeated presidents of the Council (Berlusconi four times, Prodi two…); and extremely stagnated policies, despite government alternations, because they now largely depend on the European Union. Against some expectations, new parties proliferated. The most significant electoral reform has been the most recent one, used for the first time in this election: an unprecedented cut of the number of seats in both chambers of Parliament (by 37 percent), which has reduced the number of parties and attenuated fragmentation.In this context, the emphasis on the fascist precedents of the current largest party, Brothers of Italy, is largely biased. In the early 1990s, in parallel to the dissolution of the Communist party, the Social Movement with fascist roots also experienced a "perestroika." It first formed the National Alliance, which won the popular vote in the South, merged with Berlusconi's party, and after being in government for a while with Giorgia Meloni as a minister, a group split to form the minor Brothers of Italy, which became the only opposition to Mario Draghi's government. Accusing Meloni of fascist origins is as distracting as it would be accusing the former president of the Council Massimo D'Alema, at the time leader of the Party of the Italian Communists, of being the heir of Stalinism. While D'Alema furtherly evolved and became Vice-president of the Socialist International, the Brothers of Italy became a member of the European Conservative Group (which was founded by the British Tories), a more pro-EU alignment than the Identity Group that includes the Italian League, the French Le Pen, and the Alternative for Germany.Meanwhile, the European Union is reinforcing its fiscal and financial resources. Italy is prepared to receive the largest amount of loans and donations from the EU's programs for recovery and investments. The intended amount is a programs' percentage double the size of the Italian population and economy's share in the EU (as similarly happens with Spain, but the latter is a smaller economy). At some moment, Meloni hinted at renegotiating the conditional reforms on the judiciary, the tax code, or the anti-trust and competition rules. The size and interdependence of the Italian economy in Europe may give her some leverage, as the country is too big for the EU to let it fail. On this basis, the new Italian government could threaten the EU. But the EU is right now also menacing by being stern on that kind of attitude with its firmness on Hungary.This unbalanced game of mutual threats reflects the general political situation in Europe: the Union is already sufficiently strong to nullify many sovereign powers of the states, but not yet enough to establish the EU as the prevailing institutional level in all respects. Perhaps things must go still worse to go better. Worse with the useless politicking in the states to go better with a European more effective union.President of the Republic Sergio Mattarella was aware of this risk when he prevented the League's Matteo Salvini from becoming president of the Council after the last election and appointed the European leader Draghi. He could still try something of the sort.

Вниманию читателя предлагается перевод обзорной статьи по трем монографическим сборникам, вышедшим в Великобритании в 2007 г. и представляющим большой интерес для исследователей, занимающихся проблемами социально-экономической трансформации постсоциалистических странTOSS: Lane, D. (Ed.), The Transformation of State Socialism: System Change, Capitalism or something else? (Basingstoke Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). VOCIP: Lane, D., & Myant, M. (Eds.), Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). BVOC: Bob Hancke, Martin Rhodes, and Mark Thatcher (Eds.), Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contradictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). While the excitement of investors in the opportunities in all parts of what used to be the Soviet block has been growing rapidly, the interest of the global academic industry in the region can hardly compare to the hype of 'transition' times at the end of the last century. Yet, those who have not left with the tide have no reason to regret. The area is rife with underresearched problems and yet-to-be-resolved puzzles. The post-transition economies and societies of the early 2000s are very different from what the 'transitologists' analyzed ten years ago. This time, however, we seem to be dealing with social and economic structures, which are there to stay and shape the developments for some time to come. The three edited volumes under review bring together a set of contributions that is largely representative of a new generation of scholarship on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. A number of important and interesting post-transition research agendas were opened. These include the study of variation and sources of social inequality and human suffering, investigation of class formation and its link to democracy consolidation, political economy of dependent internationalization in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and the study of political capitalism, state-led capitalism, and predatory regimes in the former Soviet Union. While the focus of the volumes is broader (most notably that of BVOC), this article discusses their contributions to our understanding of politics and political economy of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. For students of post-communist developments, TOSS and VOCIP also offer chapters on Cuba, North Korea, China, and other (post-) communist countries in Africa and East Asia. Offering the state of the art of the 'varieties of capitalism' (VoC) approach, BVOC provides a useful theoretical companion to individual analyses in the other two books. Economic systems differ, the argument goes, and there are a number of ways how an economy can be competitive in the environment of globalization. Mutually interlinked institutional subsystems shape trajectories of political economic evolution, often reinforce each other, and a proper mix of institutional 'complementarities' can provide distinctive 'comparative institutional advantages' for competitive strategies of firms. The core ideas of the approach not only offered analytical tools that have become a leading paradigm in the comparative political economy of Western societies, but also provided rationale for saving European capitalisms from the ideological attack seeing no alternative to the Anglo-Saxon model of capitalism. While the 'liberal market economy' (LME) variety, typically represented by the US and the UK, is superior in providing advantages to 'radical innovators', the 'coordinated market economies (CME), of which Germany is the leading example, can compete with products relying on 'incremental innovation'. VOCIP in particular uses the VoC approach as its major theoretical reference. Surprisingly, however, almost all of its contributors conclude that the approach is not very helpful in analyzing the region. The decision of the editors to employ the VoC framework as the underlying reference point only to demonstrate its limited utility indicates how strong the appeal of the approach is. Its application in CEE, however, not only produced interesting insights on political-economic diversity in the region, but also pointed out to its limits and research directions to follow. I first discuss the substantive findings on human, political, and economic developments in the region. Second, I deal with the analyses of class formation. I point out that they offer interesting insights on the link between class formation and democratic consolidation. While the process of democratic consolidation is hampered by a lack of an autonomous capitalist class in Russia, intricacies of working class formation have negative repercussions for the democratic processes in CEE. Third, I discuss accounts of hybrid and statist regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Then, I deal with varieties of capitalist development in CEE. In the final sections, I elaborate on what I see as missing links in the studies and identify agenda for future research. Particular attention is given to the opportunities and limits of the varieties of capitalism approach.

U radu se opisuju savremene promene u braku, partnerstvu i porodici u evropskim populacijama, a zatim se prikazuje njihova evolucija od poslednjih dekada XX veka pa do danas, kao i različiti oblici i tipovi u kojima se ispoljava pluralitet savremenih partnerskih zajednica. Drugi cilj ovog priloga jeste da pruži jedan širi teorijsko-hipotetički, eksplanatorni okvir za razumevanje onoga što se zbiva u stanovništvu (na pojavnoj ravni), ali sada u kontekstu savremenih društava. Tu se uvode tri varijable: makro (paradigma modernizacije, odnosno socijetalnih, tj. strukturalnih i kulturnih promena), mikro (paradigma: resursi-ograničenja-ponašanje) i mezo (razlike u društvenom i demografskom razvitku država severne, zapadne, južne i centralne i istočne Evrope (bivših socijalističkih zemalja u tranziciji). U radu je dato i oprezno predviđanje šta se u budućnosti može očekivati u vezi sa: empirijski dokumentovanom raznolikošću životnih aranžmana evropske populacije Zapada, ali i Istoka, kao i relevantnim demografskim posledicama. Na makronivou (paradigma struktura/kultura) odgovori zavise od brzine kojom će se odvijati dva glavna društvena procesa: 1) razvitak "evropskog društva" i 2) rađanje "svetskog" (globalnog) društva. Većina autora izvodi zaključak o konvergenciji društvenog i demografskog razvitka na prostoru Zapadne, ali ne i Istočne Evrope (a posebno Balkana). Ovaj zaključak se tiče čak i država Južnoevropskog regiona, s obzirom da je neizvesno kojim će se pravcima i brzinom odvijati njihovo uključivanje u Evropsku uniju. U vezi sa trendom opadajućeg fertiliteta, može se očekivati nastavak tendencije i u budućnosti, na čitavom evropskom prostoru, a podržavaće ga socijetalne promene (post)modernizacije, individualizacije i racionalnog ponašanja, tako da će u većini slučajeva roditelji zadovoljavati svoje potrebe sa samo jednim detetom. Nasuprot, porodične forme i životni stilovi stanovništva odražavaće verovatno i u buduće razlike između država severa i zapada Evrope sa jedne, juga sa druge i Centralne i Istočne Evrope (bivših socijalističkih zemalja) sa treće strane. Bračna spremnost, stilovi partnerstva, kao i težnja ka formiranju porodice zavisiće od individualnih odluka, koje će proizlaziti iz ličnih resursa i ograničavajućih faktora (na makro, mezo i mikro planu). Na agregatnom nivou stanovništava, rezultat će biti polarizacija između ne-porodičnih i porodičnih domaćinstava. Društveni uslovi pozne modernosti (povećanje rizika, nesigurnosti radnog mesta, kriza države blagostanja) kao i globalizacije verovatno će doprineti pojačavanju te polarizacije. Isti zaključak se može izvesti i za grupu bivših socijalističkih država Centralne i Istočne Evrope (i Balkana), čiji je sada ključni problem dovršavanje procesa transformacije ka tržišnoj privredi. ; This paper describes contemporary changes in marriage, relationships and family in European populations, and then their evolution from the last decade of the twentieth century till present day, as well as various forms and types, in which plurality of contemporary partnership unions is revealed. The other goal of this supplement was to provide a wider theoretical-hypothetical, explanatory framework for understanding what is happening in population (on appearance level) but now in the context of contemporary societies. Three variables are introduced: macro (paradigm of modernization, namely social, i.e. structural and cultural changes), micro (paradigm: resources-limitations-behavior) and mezzo (differences in social and demographic development of countries of North, Western, South and Central and Eastern Europe (former socialistic countries in transition). Cautious predictions on what could be expected in future concerning: empirical documented differences of living arrangements of European populations of the West, but also of the East, as well as relative demographic consequences. On the macro level (paradigm structure/culture) the responses depend on the rate the two main social processes will develop: 1) development of "European society", and 2) the birth of "world" (global) society. Most of the authors conclude on the convergence of social and demographic development on the territory of Western, but not Eastern Europe (and especially the Balkans). This conclusion concerns even the countries of the South European region, considering that it is uncertain in which direction and speed will their integration into the European Union develop. With regards to the trend of decreasing fertility, a continuance of existing secular tendencies may be expected in future as well, even on the whole European territory, and that it will be supported by social changes of (post) modernization, individualization and rational behavior, so that it will become a general model. For now it is evident that convergence of social and demographic development may be demonstrated on the territory of Western but not Eastern Europe as well (and especially of the Balkans). The later is also valid when the Southern European region is in question, considering that it is uncertain in which direction and at what speed will their integration into the European Union develop. With regards to the trend of decreasing fertility, a continuance of tendencies may be expected in future as well, on the whole European territory, and that it will be supported by social changes of (post) modernization, individualization and rational behavior, so that in most cases parents will satisfy their needs with only one child. On the contrary, family forms and life styles will probably reflect differences between countries of the North and Western Europe in future as well on the one hand, and Southern on the other hand, and Central and Eastern Europe (former socialistic countries) on the third hand. Readiness for marriage, partnership styles, as well as aspirations to forming families will depend on individual decisions, which will result from personal resources and limiting factors (macro, mezzo and micro). On the aggregate level of population, the result will be polarization between non-family and family households. Social conditions of foregoing modernization (increase of risks, job uncertainty, country prosperity crisis) as well as globalization will probably contribute to increasing the polarization process. The same conclusion may be derived for the group of former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (and the Balkans) as well, whose key problem now is finishing the process of transformation towards market economy.

Over the last decade, media and politicians have been praising the great economic and democratic progress of the former state socialist countries in East Central Europe. At the same time, however, there have been occasional news about a growing income gap, high female unemployment rates, highly restrictive abortion legislation etc. in those countries. This contradiction caught my attention. In my thesis, I wanted to get to the bottom of it. Thus, the main questions at the beginning of my work were the following: What changed after the implosion of state socialism in the countries of East Central Europe? And how? What were the gendered implications of these changes? What role have the European Union and the possibility of gaining EU membership been playing in the transformation processes – especially regarding the power relations between men and women? I decided to restrict my research to seven former state socialist countries in East Central Europe that are currently candidates for membership in the European Union: Poland, Czechoslovakia, respectively the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania. To approach the questions standing at the beginning of my work, I went way back to early socialist theorists, protagonists, and movements and their ideas and goals. I was particularly interested in women and gender issues in these theories and ideas. The next step was trying to grasp the state socialist reality. From this vantage point, I could finally analyse the changes and transformation processes that have been taking place since the implosion of state socialism. I decided to use a feminist approach with gender as a central category of analysis. This is a very fruitful way to discover and reveal social interconnections, causes and outcomes of economic, political, and social processes, as well as crucial patterns that have been influencing and/or directing the processes in the East Central European countries under consideration over the last decades. Since the topic of my thesis is in the realm of international politics, I am taking a look at the encounters of feminist approaches and international relations at the beginning of my work. After that I am giving an overview of the main approaches to researching and theorizing the transformation processes in the former state socialist countries of East Central Europe, followed by an explanation of the approach I am taking. Then I am developing a theoretical framework that I am eventually applying to analyse the processes and changes taking place in those seven East Central European countries I have chosen for my work. In the final chapters of my thesis I am dealing with global influences on East Central Europe, namely international economic and monetary organizations/institutions and their role in East Central Europe before and after the implosion of state socialism as well as the European Union's role in the transformation processes. Finally, a summary of the central results of my research, a few closing thoughts, and a glimpse ahead are concluding my work. Zusammenfassung: Am Anfang meiner Arbeit stand ein Widerspruch: einerseits wurde in Medien und Politik immer wieder der große wirtschaftliche und demokratiepolitische Fortschritt der Länder Mittel- und Osteuropas (MOE) seit dem Ende des Staatsozialismus gepriesen. Andererseits gab es aber auch vereinzelt Berichte über eine wachsende Schere zwischen Arm und Reich, über hohe Frauen-Arbeitslosenraten, über eine drastische Verschärfung von Abtreibungsgesetzen etc. Dieser Widerspruch machte mich neugierig. In Form meiner Diplomarbeit wollte ich ihm auf den Grund gehen. Zentrale Fragen am Beginn meiner Arbeit waren daher folgende: Welche Mechanismen waren bzw. sind während der Transformationsprozesse seit der Implosion des Staatssozialismus in MOE im Gange? Wie sehen die vergeschlechtlichten Implikationen dieser Prozesse und Entwicklungen aus? Welche Rolle spielt die Europäische Union bzw. das Anstreben der EU-Mitgliedschaft während der Transformationsprozesse – vor allem hinsichtlich der Machtverhältnisse zwischen den Geschlechtern? Den theoretischen Rahmen meiner Arbeit bildet das Konzept des Gender-Regimes. Dieses beschreibt die "formelle und informelle Organisation der politischen Machtzentren entlang der Geschlechterdifferenz." Ich konzentriere meine Analyse auf die drei Sphären Arbeit, Politik und Reproduktion. Dies erscheint mir für meine Arbeit am fruchtbarsten, da sich in allen diesen drei Sphären Macht manifestiert und sie gleichzeitig durch komplexe Wechselbeziehungen eng miteinander verknüpft sind. Ich habe einen feministischen Forschungsansatz mit Gender und Geschlecht als zentrale Kategorien der Untersuchung gewählt. Der Blick aus der Geschlechterperspektive ist besonders aufschlussreich, da dadurch viele bis dahin unsichtbare oder als selbstverständlich bzw. 'natürlich' hingenommene Entwicklungen und Prozesse aufgezeigt und kritisch hinterfragt werden können. Meine Analyse umfasst ein breites Bild: Nach der Beschäftigung mit theoretischen marxistischen/sozialistischen Schriften in Hinblick auf Geschlechterverhältnis und Emanzipation, wende ich mich der staatssozialistischen Realität zu. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf sechs bzw. sieben MOE-Ländern, und zwar Ungarn, Polen, Tschechoslowakei bzw. Tschechien und Slowakei, Slowenien, Bulgarien und Rumänien. Mit diesem wichtigen Backgroundwissen untersuche ich schließlich die Entwicklungen und Prozesse nach der Implosion des Staatssozialismus in eben diesen MOEL, die heute alle auch Beitrittskandidatenländer für die EU sind. Dabei stoße ich trotz der großen Heterogenität zwischen und innerhalb dieser Länder auf zahlreiche Parallelen und ähnliche Tendenzen, was die Transformationsprozesse und ihre vergeschlechtlichten Implikationen angeht. Die Transformationsprozesse nach der Implosion des Staatssozialismus haben gravierende Konsequenzen für alle Menschen in MOE – und darüber hinaus – (gehabt). Diese Konsequenzen weisen eindeutig geschlechtsspezifische Unterschiede auf. Geschlechterungleichheit, ein patriarchales Grundmuster und männliche Dominanz finden sich in allen drei von mir untersuchten Sphären – Arbeit, Politik, Reproduktion. Der Systemwechsel hat nichts an der vergeschlechtlichten Machtverteilung bzw. dem Machtungleichgewicht zwischen Männern und Frauen verändert – nur die Konfigurationen sind anders geworden: Arbeitswelt und Politik sind nach wie vor auf den männlichen Alltag und auf männliche Lebensentwürfe zugeschnitten und ausgerichtet, und diese schließen Reproduktion nach wie vor aus. Diese bleibt fast ausschließlich Frauensache. Unter den neuen marktwirtschaftlichen Verhältnissen wird reproduktive Arbeit noch mehr privatisiert und feminisiert als zur Zeit des Staatssozialismus. Der Frauenanteil bei den Arbeitslosen, v.a. den Langzeitarbeitslosen ist sehr hoch. Frauen müssen sich bestenfalls anpassen, um Eingang vor allem in höhere Positionen in Wirtschaft und Politik zu finden, die zum einen besser bezahlt sind und zum anderen mit mehr Macht ausgestattet sind. Aufgrund ihrer Mehrfachbelastung fehlen vielen Frauen dafür aber die nötige Zeit, Energie und im Hinblick auf formelle politische Institutionen nicht zuletzt auch die finanziellen Mittel (z.B. um einen erfolgreichen Wahlkampf zu führen). Neben strukturellen Hindernissen spielen geschlechterspezifische Rollenbilder, Vorurteile und Clichés eine bedeutende Rolle. Deren Wurzeln liegen zum Teil in der vor-staatssozialistischen Zeit, zum Teil wurden sie durch den Staatssozialismus geprägt, und auch globale, v.a. westliche Einflüsse spielen hier mit hinein. Die nach der "Wende" drastisch gesunkene quantitative Repräsentation von Frauen in formellen politischen Institutionen hat negative Auswirkungen auf ihre qualitative Repräsentation in der Politik. Was etwa Reproduktion betrifft, so fällen nach wie vor Männer in Politik und Wirtschaft Entscheidungen, welche die Reproduktionsfreiheit von Frauen direkt und indirekt einschränken – direkt z.b. durch strengere Abtreibungsgesetze, indirekt z.b. durch arbeitsmarkt- und/oder sozialpolitische Maßnahmen und Regelungen. Eingeschränkte Reproduktionsfreiheit – z.b. durch erschwerten Zugang zu Abtreibung, zu wenige Kinderbetreuungsplätze etc. – hindert Frauen an gleicher Teilnahme wie Männer in Wirtschaft und Politik. Eine zentrale Schlussfolgerung aus meiner Analyse ist daher die, dass die Grundlagen vergeschlechtlichter Machtungleichheit selbst einen Systemwechsel überstehen (können). Solange Frauen und spezielle weibliche Anliegen, die vor allem an deren biologische Reproduktionsfähigkeit geknüpft sind, nicht als gleichwertig anerkannt werden, solange Machtsphären wie institutionalisierte Politik und Wirtschaft diese nicht inkludieren, solange Reproduktion nicht als gesamtgesellschaftliche Aufgabe und Verantwortung betrachtet wird, solange wird sich an der herrschenden Machtverteilung nichts ändern. Die EU bzw. die EU-Beitrittsbestrebungen haben bisher durch den Fokus auf wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Entwicklung und Reformen, bei gleichzeitiger Nichtberücksichtigung oder Vernachlässigung von sozialen Themen und Anliegen das ihre zu den oben beschriebenen Entwicklungen beigetragen. Dennoch werden an die künftige EU-Mitgliedschaft bezüglich Geschlechtergleichstellung gewisse Hoffnungen geknüpft. EU-Gleichbehandlungsrichtlinien und Aktionsprogramme zur Gewährleistung von Chancengleichheit für Frauen sollen die Gender- und Gleichstellungsthematik in MOE aufwerten und Druck auf die zukünftigen/neuen Mitgliedsstaaten ausüben. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Frauen in den derzeitigen EU-Staaten mit vergleichbaren bzw. zum Teil sehr ähnlichen Problemen zu kämpfen haben wie jene in MOE, liegt vor der demnächst 25 Mitgliedsstaaten zählenden EU und ihren BürgerInnen noch eine große Aufgabe.

Im Jahr 2012 hat die Europäische Union den Friedensnobelpreis erhalten. Dennoch kämpft sie seit einigen Jahren mit multiplen Krisen, etwa mit der "Euro-Krise", der "Flüchtlingskrise", dem "Brexit" und der zunehmenden Spaltung der Wertegemeinschaft. Angesichts ihrer Parallelität und Wechselbeziehungen haben sich die Krisenszenarien inzwischen zu einer Situation verdichtet, in der das europäische Integrationsprojekt als solches auf dem Prüfstand steht. Insbesondere mit der Eurozone und dem Schengenraum sind zwei Kernprojekte der EU gefährdet, die in besonderer Weise für das Zusammenwachsen Europas stehen. Im Rahmen der 25. Würzburger Europarechtstage (19./20. Juli 2019) wurden diese rechtlich anspruchsvollen Themenkomplexe eingehend betrachtet und Wege aus der Polykrise sowie konstruktive Leitlinien für eine Erneuerung der EU diskutiert. Die Referate renommierter Referentinnen und Referenten aus der Wissenschaft und Praxis werden in dem Sammelband dokumentiert. Mit Beiträgen von Prof. Dr. Markus Ludwigs; Prof. Dr. Stefanie Schmahl; Prof. Dr. Frank Hoffmeister; Prof. Dr. Frank Schorkopf; Prof. Dr. Martin Nettesheim; Prof. Dr. Rudolf Streinz; Prof. Dr. Katja Ziegler; Prof. Dr. Ulrich Häde; Dr. Rolf Strauch; Dr. Nathalie Lauer; Juliana Dahl

This article analyses the effectiveness and prospects of the Eastern Partnership in the context of its ten-year implementation and the results of the Brussels Summit of 2017. The paper focuses on the current stage of the progress of the EaP partner states and the internal challenges of their development. A significant part of the article is devoted to Russia's influence on the Europeanisation process of the Eastern European countries and the weak incentives from the EU towards these countries. The Normative Power concept was used to analyse the EU-Eastern European countries bi- and multilateral relations within the Eastern Partnership co-operation, taking into consideration that the EU norms and regulations' implementation in Eastern Europe do not guarantee political normalisation in these countries. We conclude that after ten years of functioning, the Eastern Partnership has little capacity to influence political elite, domestic and regional processes in Eastern Europe, because depoliticised functional approach and the EU long-term incentives are not enough for the partners.

Defense Date: 27/03/2009 ; Examining Board: Derek Beach (University of Aarhus), Adrienne Héritier (EUI/RSCAS) (Supervisor), Jonas Tallberg (University of Stockholm), Jacques Ziller (University of Pavia, formerly EUI, Law Department) ; This study examines the impact of the decision-making rules, procedures and practices of the European Union on the ability of small Member States to influence Treaty negotiation outcomes, and assesses the causality of this influence in Treaty-revision. Within Treatymaking processes, actor influence is here expected to vary according to the institutional preconditions, and small states are presumed to benefit from particular type of decisionmaking rules to the disadvantage of others. The fundamental aim of the study is therefore to investigate the conditions under which small state influence increases in European Union Treaty-negotiations. To explain this puzzle, a distinction is made between two types of Treaty-making processes, those of the Intergovernmental Conferences and the Convention, which allows for subsequent comparisons between the decision-making rules of unanimity and restricted consensus. In order to empirically test the underlying hypotheses, explicit units of observation are chosen from the IGCs of Amsterdam, Nice and 2003-04, and the Convention on the Future of the EU. In-depth comparisons are made between four small Member States – Belgium, Denmark, Finland and Ireland – and their de facto influence is process-traced through three substantial issues of the institutional reform: the composition of the Commission, the extension of qualified majority voting and the reform of Council Presidency. The empirical analysis focuses on both informal and formal levels of decisionmaking dynamics, and a further analytical distinction is made between bargaining and deliberation modes of conflict-resolution. Drawing initially on theories of rational choice institutionalism (RCI) and liberal intergovernmentalism (LI), the unanimity rule as applied in the IGCs is expected to strengthen the formal position of an individual small state by providing, respectively, a veto-right for each negotiator and promoting asymmetric interdependency. The empirical findings confirm the major underlying hypothesis concerning the correlation between the adopted decision-making rules and the small states' impact on distributional outcomes in the EU Treaty-amending negotiations on the one hand, and the superiority of the unanimity rule for small states on the other. Yet, a couple of additional key success factors – other than can be explained exclusively along the conjectures of RCI or LI schools – are also identified in the study.