Suchergebnisse

The first session of the 118th Congress was one of the least productive in the body's history. Only 22 bills were signed into law this year by the president — by far the lowest total since at least 1993, the first year for which the National Archives have data. (For comparison, the next least productive year during this timespan was in 2013, when 72 bills became law.)Despite the slow year, members nonetheless found time to introduce an abundance of bills relating to the threat of China, which was the focus of hearings in committees ranging from Financial Services to the Judiciary committee, and of legislation concerning everything from fentanyl distribution to TikTok. In 2023, members introduced 616 pieces of legislation that contain a variation of the word "China" — more than 3.5 for every day that Congress was in session on average. That's already more than any two-year congressional session, except for the 117th Congress (2021-2022; 860 bills) and the 116th (2019-2020; 620 bills), according to a search of the congressional record. One of the few "accomplishments" in Congress this year was the formation of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party — which was almost instantly dubbed the "tough on China committee" — in January.From that starting point, bills targeting China's presence in economic, technological, military, and other fields were introduced. To be sure, in line with other issues, none of these bills became law. But here are the four broad types of anti-China legislation introduced in Congress in 2023.The legislation targeting foreign purchase of land in the U.S.Members of Congress introduced at least nine bills aimed at restricting foreign ownership of agricultural land in the United States. As RS has explained, these efforts are not always logical, even if there are some legitimate national security concerns over China or other nations buying up farmland.Some of the proposed legislation is more targeted and looks to tackle these concerns, but others chose a broader approach. The harshest measure was introduced by Sens. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) and Katie Britt (R-Ala.) in their "Not One More Inch or Acre Act," which directed the president to take the actions necessary to "to prohibit the purchase of public or private real estate located in the United States by citizens and entities of the People's Republic of China."The bills that discourage diplomacy …One of the clear themes to emerge from this session of Congress is that many China hawks interpret diplomacy as a sign of weakness. One example is the bill introduced by Reps. Tom Tiffany (R-Wisc.) and Lance Gooden (R-Texas) calling on Biden to take the necessary actions to close the Chinese consulate in New York City. As Cornell University professor Jessica Chen Weiss noted when the Trump administration closed a Chinese consulate in Houston over allegations of espionage, "losing the consulate does not appear to be part of a coherent strategy to deter or compel China to alter its behavior," and could rather be interpreted as part of an effort to bolster fears of Beijing being an existential threat.… And the ones that increase the chances of warRep. Andy Ogles (R-Tenn.) and five co-sponsors introduced the "Defund China's Allies Act" to "prohibit the availability of foreign assistance to certain countries that do not recognize the sovereignty of Taiwan," aimed at 21 countries in Central America and the Caribbean. The bill argues that the "United States efforts to condemn these countries' willing diplomatic shift toward a genocidal government is undermined by an incomprehensible adherence to the so-called 'One China' policy, on terms dictated by the Chinese Communist Party," implicitly calling for an end to the policy that has maintained peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades.The bills that needlessly antagonize without accomplishing anything of substanceWhen it comes to relations with China, many members of Congress choose to "speak very loudly and carry no stick," as Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-Calif.) explained to RS in an interview earlier this year. "The question is: how do we do things that will actually help Taiwan's security without unnecessarily escalating or antagonizing the PRC?," she added. "Not the silly things like renaming an embassy or just saying all this stuff rhetorically. That doesn't actually help Taiwan, but does escalate the conflict with China."
Jacobs was likely referring to the bills introduced by Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), Reps. John Curtis (R-Utah), and Chris Pappas (D-N.H.) which would have renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, D.C. to the Taiwan Representative Office, because it "better reflects its status as Taiwan's de facto diplomatic mission to the United States."
That was only one of many bills that were purely symbolic and antagonizing, including one that demanded that Beijing "must be held financially liable for $16,000,000,000,000," because of its responsibility in the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic and a resolution that declared China to be the biggest threat to freedom in the world.
"Whereas it is the opinion of Congress that the Chinese Communist Party is the greatest threat to freedom and to the free world," reads the text, introduced by Rep. George Santos (R-N.Y.). "Be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That Congress agrees that the Chinese Communist Party is the greatest threat to freedom and to the free world." That's the entire resolution.
This year in Congress ended appropriately for a legislature that accomplished very little of substance: The Senate went home for the holidays without reaching an agreement on major legislation that seeks to fund Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan, and address border security, despite the spending package having the support of the White House and both party's leadership in the upper chamber.With 2024 being an election year in which partisan politics often take up an even larger role in Washington and Congress's two chambers still divided, the prospects for more legislation getting passed are not high. It is not realistic to expect much from Congress next year, but the overload of bills aimed at countering Beijing is one thing that is almost certain to continue.

International audience ; The case of Sorana Gurian (1913‑1956) allows to examine the situation of multiple exclusion in the 20th century European society: she is a Jewish woman, a stranger accused of espionage and collaboration and her body, disabled and affected by cancer, becomes the main culprit of this plural banishment. The author is a tragic figure: not only because of her life, but also due to the oblivion that her oeuvre fell into – yet original and contemporarily recognized – counting six volumes in French and Romanian and dozens of press publications. In the paper, I propose to read chosen literary chronicles commenting on two Gurian's editions published in Romania in 1945‑1946 – Zilele nu se întorc niciodată [Days that never return] and Întâmplări între amurg și noapte [Adventures between twilight and night]. These chronicles show the way in which the Other was perceived, in this case – a woman writer, a disabled woman or a Jewish woman in the 20th century. Such perspective aims to show the non‑ aesthetic conditions (gender, corporality, social class, political convictions, ethnic origin, etc.) which have determined Gurian's appearance and disappearance in the literary scene, and which still influence the way of perceiving her texts in Romania. At the end of this study, I reflect on the possibility of rehabilitating this figure in the history of European literature, that could renew the Romanian literary canon of the 20th century, in which women writers haven't still found their place. ; Le cas de Sorana Gurian (1913-1956) permet d'examiner la situation d'une multiple exclusion au sein de la société européenne du xxe siècle : elle est à la fois femme, juive et étrangère, accusée d'espionnage et de collaboration, et son corps, handicapé et touché par le cancer, devient le principal coupable de ce bannissement pluriel. L'auteure est une figure tragique : non seulement par sa vie, mais aussi par l'oubli dans lequel est tombée son œuvre – pourtant originale et reconnue à l'époque –, comptant six volumes en roumain et en français et des dizaines de publications dans la presse. Dans le présent article, je propose une lecture de quelques chroniques littéraires portant sur deux éditions de Gurian parues en Roumanie en 1945-1946 : Zilele nu se întorc niciodată [Les jours ne reviennent jamais] et Întâmplări între amurg și noapte [Aventures entre crépuscule et nuit], qui témoignent de la manière dont on percevait l'Autre, en l'occurrence une femme écrivain, une femme infirme ou bien une femme d'origine juive au xxe siècle. Cette perspective a pour but de montrer les conditionnements autres qu'esthétiques (genre, corporalité, classe sociale, convictions politiques, origine ethnique, etc.) qui ont déterminé l'apparition et la disparition de Gurian sur la scène littéraire, et qui influencent toujours la manière de percevoir ses textes en Roumanie. À la fin de cette étude, je réfléchis à la possibilité de réhabiliter cette figure dans l'histoire de la littérature européenne, ce qui pourrait permettre de rediscuter le canon littéraire roumain du xxe siècle, où les femmes écrivains ne trouvent toujours pas leur place. ; Przypadek Sorany Gurian (1913‑1956) pozwala zbadać sytuację wielokrotnego wykluczenia w xx‑wiecznym społeczeństwie europejskim: jest ona jednocześnie kobietą, Żydówką, obcą, oskarżoną o szpiegostwo i kolaborację, zaś jej ciało, niepełnosprawne i chore na raka, staje się głównym winowajcą tego mnogiego wygnania. Autorka jest postacią tragiczną nie tylko ze względu na jej życie, lecz również ze względu na zapomnienie, w jakie popadła jej oryginalna i uznana przez współczesnych twórczość, na którą składają się sześć wydań w językach francuskim i rumuńskim oraz dziesiątki publikacji w prasie. W niniejszym artykule odczytuję wybrane kroniki literackie komentujące dwa teksty opublikowane przez Gurian w Rumunii w latach 1945‑1946 – Zilele nu se întorc niciodată [Dni nigdy nie powracają] oraz Întâmplări între amurg și noapte [Zdarzenia między zmierzchem a nocą]. Kroniki te pokazują bowiem, w jaki sposób postrzegano Innego, w tym przypadku – pisarkę, niepełnosprawną kobietę czy Żydówkę w xx wieku. Ta perspektywa ma na celu wskazać uwarunkowania nie‑ estetyczne (płeć, cielesność, klasa społeczna, poglądy polityczne, pochodzenie etniczne itd.), które zdecydowały o pojawieniu i zniknięciu Gurian na scenie literackiej, a które ciągle określają postrzeganie jej tekstów w Rumunii. Na końcu tego studium zastanawiam się nad możliwością rehabilitacji tej postaci w historii literatury europejskiej, co mogłoby z kolei przyczynić się do odnowienia rumuńskiego kanonu literackiego xx wieku, w którym nadal nie ma miejsca dla pisarek. ; Cazul Soranei Gurian (1913‑1956) ilustrează situația unei excluderi din considerențe multiple în societatea europeană din secolul xx‑lea. Fiind femeie, evreică și străină, acuzată de spionaj și de colaborare, trupul său, cu handicap și atins de cancer, devine principalul vinovat al acestei exilări plurale. Autorea este un personaj tragic: nu numai din cauza vieții sale, ci și din cauza uitării în care a căzut opera sa, totuși originală și recunoscută de către contemporanii ei, compusă din șase volume în limba franceză și în română, precum și de zeci de publicații în presă. În acest articol, propun o lectură a unor cronici literare privind cele două ediții ale Soranei Gurian publicate în România în anii 1945‑1946 – Zilele nu se întorc niciodată și Aventuri între amurg și noapte. Aceste cronici reflectă modul în care se percepe Celălalt, în acest caz – o scriitoare, o femeie cu handicap, o evreică în contextul secolului xx. Această perspectivă are să identifice diferite condiționări (gen, corporalitate, clasă socială, convingeri politice, etnie șamd), care au determinat atît apariția, cît și dispariția lui Gurian de pe scenă literară și care încă înfluențează modul de percepere al textelor sale în România. La sfîrșitul acestui studiu, propun o reflecție asupra posibilității de reabilitare a acestei figuri în istoria literaturii europene, ceea ce ar putea conduce la rediscutarea canonului literar românesc al secolului xx, unde scriitoarele încă nu‑și găsesc locul.

Translation of a secret newsletter concerning an investigation of the Division of Espionage and Research at the War Department of the United States, containing a letter from American Navy Admiral William S. Sims to the American War Secretary Mr. John W. Weeks on the trip he made to inspect navy maneuvers in Panama on March 1923. In this letter the former discusses the strategic importance of seaports on the Pacific and that it depends on the latter's willingness to ensure or not the naval prevalence in the world. After giving some advice, he states that with the exception of the Acapulco, Guaymas, and the Magadalena Bay seaports located within his area of command and due to restrictions of the Limited Weapons Treatry, the rest of seaports do not offer any guarantees nor do they have the facilities for docking large ships. He suggests that it would be a good idea to find the way to take over the management of the Magdalena Bay, B.C. Report by Frank E. Hanna, Assistant Chief of the Diplomatic Secret Department, who under the command of W.E. Stweard, Chief of said Department, informs about former governor of Yucatan, Ricardez Broca, exiled in Belice who through the American Consul in that country, submitted Felipe Carrillo Puerto's personal record to the Secretary of State. Mr. Iñigo, translator at the Private Secretariat of the President states that he has his doubts on the authenticity of the documents. Major Joseph F. Cheston, former staff of the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police informs Fernando Torreblanca that Lt. Col. Gurrola has been handling a debt payoff for services in Laredo. Letter from the Assistant Chief Clerk, Col. J.J. Rogers of the Military News Department to the Branch Office of Military News in Fort Sam Houston, Texas, concerning the secret activities of Imperial Secret Agents Kato Iskawa and Dometti Komitte, who along with Australian News editor, Frederic Walther traveled to Manzanillo, Colima to start propaganda that promoted the Japanese migration to Latin American countries, especially to Mexico with the purpose of oil extraction in Baja California and Oaxaca. Mr. Cheston informs Fernando Torreblanca that he is submitting heliographic copies of confidential information. "Memorándum Convenido" encoded dispatch addressed to Mr. Elihu Root of the Department of State in Washington regarding a conversation held between Mr. George Kennon and Count Katsura, Japanese Prime Minister on July 27, 1905 and that was about matters related to the Phillipines, Korea, and peace sustainability in the Far East. "Japan sees hostile move in Pacific fleet maneuvers. Occupation of Hawaii protested". SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS. November 7, 1924. BECERRA ACOSTA, Manuel "The United States is friend of our nation. Mexico would play a crucial role in a Nippon-American war", EXCELSIOR, November 7, 1924. Mr. Cheston informs that England, France, and Belgium convened a conference in London to discuss their concerns about the war with the United States. / Traducción de un Boletín Secreto de Estudio de la División de Estudio y Espionaje del Departamento de Guerra de Estados Unidos, que contiene una carta del Almirante de la Marina Americana, William S. Sims al Secretario de Guerra de los Estados Unidos, Sr. John W. Weeks, en ocasión del viaje que hizo para inspeccionar las maniobras navales de Panamá, en marzo de 1923, en la que el primero hace aclaraciones sobre la importancia estratégica de los puertos del Pacífico y que de su actitud depende el asegurar o no su preponderancia naval en el mundo. Entre otras recomendaciones señala que, con excepción de los puertos de Acapulco, Guaymas y la Bahía de Magdalena que están en su radio de acción por el Tratado de Limitación de Armamentos, los demás no ofrecen seguridad ni tienen fondeaje para grandes calados; sugiere que se busque el control de la bahía de Magdalena, B.C. Informe de Frank E. Hanna, Sub-Jefe del Departamento Secreto Diplomático, por orden de W.E. Steward, Jefe de dicho Departamento, relativo al ex-Gobernador de Yucatán, Ricardez Broca, desterrado en Belice, quien por conducto del Cónsul americano en dicho país envió al Secretario de Estado el archivo personal de Felipe Carrillo Puerto. El Sr. Iñigo, Traductor de la Secretaría Particular de la Presidencia, anota sus dudas sobre la autenticidad de unos documentos. El Mayor Joseph F. Cheston, ex-miembro del Ejército Canadiense y de la Real Policía Montada del Canadá, informa a Fernando Torreblanca que el Tte.Corl. Gurrola ha estado gestionando el pago de una deuda por servicios prestados en Laredo. Carta del Ayudante en Jefe del Estado Mayor, Corl. J.J. Rogers del Departamento de Noticias Militares a la Oficina Sucursal de Noticias Militares en Fort Sam Houston, Texas, relativa a las actividades de los Agentes Secretos Imperiales, Kato Iskawa y Dometti Komitte, quienes acompañados del redactor de noticias australiano Frederick Walther fueron a Manzanillo, Col. e iniciaron propaganda en favor de la emigración japonesa a los países latinoamericanos, particularmente a México, y que entre otros fines tienen el de ver la probabilidad de explotación petrolera en Baja California y en Oaxaca. El Sr. Cheston informa a Fernando Torreblanca que le remite copias heliográficas de información confidencial. Despacho codificado de "Memorándum Convenido", dirigido al Sr. Elihu Root del Departamento de Estado en Washington, en que se detalla una conversación entre el Sr. George Kennon y el Conde Katsura, Primer Ministro de Japón, sostenida el 27 de julio de 1905, en la que se trataron asuntos sobre las Islas Filipinas, Korea y al mantenimiento de la paz en el Lejano Oriente. "Japan sees hostile move in Pacific fleet maneuvers. Occupation of Hawaii protested". SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS. 7 de noviembre de 1924. BECERRA ACOSTA, Manuel "Estados Unidos son amigos de nuestra patria. En una guerra Nipona-Americana, México jugaría un importante papel", EXCELSIOR, 7 de noviembre de 1924. El Sr. Cheston informa que Inglaterra, Francia y Bélgica convocarán a una conferencia en Londres para tratar sus dudas de guerra con Estados Unidos.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in its case-law formulated a thesis telling that the rule of law requires the state to provide the legislator with both a right and an obligation to prohibit acts which result in injuring or endangering the interests of persons, society or the state. The international agreements ratified by the Seimas, the membership in the European Union and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development as well create legal obligations relating liability for corruption in private sector for our country. Thus, appropriate legal liability (including liability for corruption in private sector) might be only conditionally regarded as the issue of discretion of the Seimas. In case the acts in question are sufficiently harmful and (or) the criminalisation thereof is connected with the implementation of the obligations of Lithuania, their inclusion into the Criminal Code of the Republic in Lithuania and active prosecution in respect of them is the duty of the Republic of Lithuania. The research paper aims to evaluate the regulation of liability for corruption in private sector in Lithuanian legal system. It must be noted that it examines not only the issues of criminal liability for corruption in private sector. Taking into account the fact that the standards for the application of criminal liability are particularly high (including inter alia the presumption of innocence), the research question was set on whether the existing legal regulation (labour law) provides possibilities to protect from employees displaying unacceptable standards of behaviour. Legal requirements relating the legal liability for corruption in private sector are provided for in a few international and supranational legal acts, i.e. (a) Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA of 22 July 2003 on combating corruption in the private sector; (b) United Nations Convention against Corruption of 31 October 2005 (c) Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 27 January 1999; (d) Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption of 15 May 2003; (e) Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions of 18 September 2014 (this Convention has not entered into force yet). Regrettably, these few international instruments are as well rather limited: for example, the Framework Decision requires criminalisation of only active and passive bribery in private sector, and the scope of application thereof fails to include not only any unilateral acts of corruption, but as well the corruption acts related to the aspiration to receive other benefit rather than remuneration, whereas the only one universal instrument of international law, the United Nations Convention against Corruption, requires the contracting states only to consider the criminalisation of corruption in private sector rather than the criminalisation itself. All three documents mentioning active and passive bribery in private sector (including Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption besides the two already referred) are applied in restricted scope, i.e. only in cases when a bribe is given for acts or refraining from acting, in breach of the duties. This means that criminal liability is not applied in case the bribe is taken or even forced to give for proper performance of duties. However, Lithuania fails to proper implement event the limited duties formulated in the mentioned documents. Although in accordance with these three mentioned documents the subject of corruption in private sector is considered to be any employee in the private sector, Article 230(3) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania provides that criminal liability for active and passive bribery may arise only in cases when an employee holds administrative powers or is entitled to act on behalf of the legal person or other organisation, or provides public services. As according to the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania most of employees in private companies are not held "persons to be treated as public servants", therefore, they might be held liable only for a restricted number of criminal activities – fraud, commercial espionage or disclosure of a commercial secret. Even upon the evidence of existence of dangerous acts, they may not be held liable for active and passive bribery or embezzlement. Due to the settled case-law which links the status of the "persons to be treated as public servants" with the exceptional importance of the company where they work for the public interest, even the majority of directors of companies and other persons acting on behalf of them may not be prosecuted for the mentioned acts. A part of corruption activities of the companies connected to their relations with clients, users and partners are standard ones, another part of corruption activities differ according to the field of activities of companies. Most of corruption activities of private companies occur either in the field of supply chain (production, distribution, marketing), or the purchasing field. These usually include active and private bribery, fraud, unfair commercial activities, misleading advertising or similar activities, subject to criminal or economic sanctions. Meanwhile, in the field of provision of legal services, pharmacy, healthcare, education, etc. possible corruption activities are of specific nature, and the prevention is provided for in special laws and codes of behaviour. Neither international, nor European Union legal acts regulate liability for corruption in labour relations, therefore, this issue is regulated only in national legislation. The main sanctions in labour law applicable in respect of an employee for corruption activities are the suspension of the performance of the labour agreement (a provisional measure) and termination of labour contract on the initiative of the employer upon the fault of the employee (Article 58 of the Labour Code). Besides, in respect of employees who act as directors a measure of revocation may be applied, and indeed, this measure is an important one for the protection of the company from a corrupted director. As well, particular sanctions for failure to execute the duties or improper execution thereof might be established in the internal documents of a company. These may include a warning, termination of additional payments or bonuses, etc. Due to the open list of measures applicable in labour relations, the liability for corruption activities in labour relations is broader in scope than criminal liability. On the other hand, rather short time-limits for the termination of the labour agreement on the initiative of the employer in case of fault of an employee and its weak deterrence weakens the effectiveness of this sanction. The problem of application of short time limits is not acute when the revocation of an employee is applied; however, the latter instrument is possible only in respect of heads of a legal person.

Studying the experience of reforming the armed forces of the Republic of Poland (RP) in accordance with NATO standards is extremely relevant, given the path that the RP has taken from the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to its integration into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. After all,Ukraineis also trying to introduce NATO standards, and in accordance with the Concept for the Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the fulfillment of the tasks of reforming and developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine includes:- formation of cyber security and cyber defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;- the creation of the necessary material and technical reserves for an adequate response, along with other components of the security and defense sector, to all challenges and threats.An assessment of the state's military security, as well as the experience gained from the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the antiterrorist operation, conducted as part of a comprehensive review of the security and defense sector, revealed a number of problems in the functioning of the defense forces in the context of existing and potential threats.The purpose of the article is to study the experience of theRepublic ofPoland, to counter cyber threats, the possibility of using this experience inUkraine.Since no one can say with confidence that his networks are fully protected and can withstand multi-vector cyber attacks, cyber security has become a priority for the development of the modern army. TheRussian Federationis constantly increasing the number of operations with cyber espionage and is increasingly trying to influence public opinion in our country, not disdaining the use of fake news and outright propaganda. The main purpose of these operations is to loosen the situation inside the country, creating chaos and panic as the basis for promoting their own interests.The conclusion that we have to do for ourselves is the need to increase investment in cyber security so that the defense forces are able to resist cyber attacks and provide the necessary level of cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure.In the future, it is advisable to conduct an analysis of measures to ensure the cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure under the state of emergency and martial law, as stipulated by the law "On the Basic Principles of Ukraine's Cyber security", which were carried out from 14:00 on November 26 from November 201 to 14:00 December 26, 2018 that is, during the imposition of martial law in Ukraine. ; Изучение опыта реформирования вооруженных сил Республики Польша (РП) в соответствии со стандартами НАТО является чрезвычайно актуальным, учитывая путь, который прошла РП от распада Организации Варшавского Договора до ее интегрирования в структуры Североатлантического альянса. Ведь Украина тоже пытается внедрять стандарты НАТО, а в соответствии с Концепцией развития сектора безопасности и обороны Украины, выполнение задач реформирования и развития Вооруженных Сил Украины предусматривает:- формирование подразделений обеспечения кибербезопасности и киберзащиты Вооруженных Сил Украины;- создание необходимых материально-технических запасов для адекватного реагирования вместе с другими составляющими сектора безопасности и обороны на все вызовы и угрозы.Проведенное в рамках комплексного обзора сектора безопасности и обороны оценки состояния военной безопасности государства, а также приобретенный опыт участия Вооруженных Сил Украины в антитеррористической операции, выявили ряд проблем функционирования сил обороны в условиях существующих и потенциальных угроз.Целью статьи является изучение опыта Республики Польша, по противодействию кибернетическим угрозам, возможности использования этого опыта в Украине.Поскольку никто не может с уверенностью утверждать, что его сети полностью защищены и могут противостоять многовекторным кибератакам, кибернетическая безопасность стала приоритетом развития современной армии. Российская Федерация постоянно увеличивает количество операций с кибершпионажа и все больше пытается повлиять на общественное мнение в нашей стране, не гнушаясь использованием фейковых новостей и откровенной пропаганды. Основной целью этих операций является расшатывание ситуации внутри страны, создание хаоса и паники как основы для продвижения собственных интересов.Вывод, который мы должны сделать для себя ‑ это необходимость увеличения инвестирования в кибербезопасность, чтобы силы обороны были способны противодействовать кибератакам и обеспечивать необходимый уровень киберзащиты критической информационной инфраструктуры.В дальнейшем целесообразно провести анализ мероприятий по обеспечению киберзащиты критической информационной инфраструктуры в условиях чрезвычайного и военного положения, как это предусмотрено законом "Об основных принципах обеспечения кибербезопасности Украины", которые были осуществлены в период с 14 часов 00 минут 26 ноября 2018 до 14 часов 00 минут 26 декабря 2018 ‑ то есть во время введения военного положения в Украине. ; Вивчення досвіду реформування збройних сил Республіки Польща (РП) відповідно до стандартів НАТО є надзвичайно актуальним, зважаючи на шлях, що пройшла РП від розпаду Організації Варшавського Договору до її інтегрування в структури Північноатлантичного альянсу. Адже Україна теж намагається впроваджувати стандарти НАТО, а відповідно до Концепції розвитку сектору безпеки і оборони України виконання завдань реформування та розвитку Збройних Сил України передбачає:формування підрозділів забезпечення кібербезпеки та кіберзахисту Збройних Сил України;створення необхідних матеріально-технічних запасів для адекватного реагування разом з іншими складовими сектору безпеки і оборони на усі виклики і загрози.Проведене в рамках комплексного огляду сектору безпеки і оборони оцінювання стану воєнної безпеки держави, а також набутий досвід участі Збройних Сил України в антитерористичній операції виявили низку проблем функціонування сил оборони в умовах наявних і потенційних загроз.Метою статті є вивчення досвіду Республіки Польща (РП), щодо протидії кібернетичним загрозам, можливості використання цього досвіду в Україні.Оскільки ніхто не може з упевненістю стверджувати, що його мережі повністю захищені та можуть протистояти багатовекторним кібератакам, кібернетична безпека стала пріоритетом розвитку сучасної армії. Російська Федерація постійно збільшує кількість операцій з кібершпіонажу та все більше намагається вплинути на громадську думку в нашій країні, не гребуючи використанням фейкових новин та відвертої пропаганди. Основною метою цих операцій є розхитування ситуації всередині країни, створення хаосу та паніки як підґрунтя для просування власних інтересів.Висновок, який ми маємо зробити для себе – це збільшення інвестування в кібербезпеку, щоб сили оборони мали спроможності протидіяти кібератакам і забезпечувати необхідний рівень кіберзахисту критичної інформаційної інфраструктури.Надалі доцільно провести аналіз заходів із забезпечення кіберзахисту критичної інформаційної інфраструктури в умовах надзвичайного і воєнного стану, як це передбачено законом "Про основні засади забезпечення кібербезпеки України", які були здійсненні в період із 14 години 00 хвилин 26 листопада 2018 року до 14 години 00 хвилин 26 грудня 2018 року – тобто в час введення воєнного стану в Україні.

Studying the experience of reforming the armed forces of the Republic of Poland (RP) in accordance with NATO standards is extremely relevant, given the path that the RP has taken from the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization to its integration into the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance. After all,Ukraineis also trying to introduce NATO standards, and in accordance with the Concept for the Development of the Security and Defense Sector of Ukraine, the fulfillment of the tasks of reforming and developing the Armed Forces of Ukraine includes:- formation of cyber security and cyber defense units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine;- the creation of the necessary material and technical reserves for an adequate response, along with other components of the security and defense sector, to all challenges and threats.An assessment of the state's military security, as well as the experience gained from the participation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the antiterrorist operation, conducted as part of a comprehensive review of the security and defense sector, revealed a number of problems in the functioning of the defense forces in the context of existing and potential threats.The purpose of the article is to study the experience of theRepublic ofPoland, to counter cyber threats, the possibility of using this experience inUkraine.Since no one can say with confidence that his networks are fully protected and can withstand multi-vector cyber attacks, cyber security has become a priority for the development of the modern army. TheRussian Federationis constantly increasing the number of operations with cyber espionage and is increasingly trying to influence public opinion in our country, not disdaining the use of fake news and outright propaganda. The main purpose of these operations is to loosen the situation inside the country, creating chaos and panic as the basis for promoting their own interests.The conclusion that we have to do for ourselves is the need to increase investment in cyber security so that the defense forces are able to resist cyber attacks and provide the necessary level of cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure.In the future, it is advisable to conduct an analysis of measures to ensure the cyber defense of the critical information infrastructure under the state of emergency and martial law, as stipulated by the law "On the Basic Principles of Ukraine's Cyber security", which were carried out from 14:00 on November 26 from November 201 to 14:00 December 26, 2018 that is, during the imposition of martial law in Ukraine. ; Изучение опыта реформирования вооруженных сил Республики Польша (РП) в соответствии со стандартами НАТО является чрезвычайно актуальным, учитывая путь, который прошла РП от распада Организации Варшавского Договора до ее интегрирования в структуры Североатлантического альянса. Ведь Украина тоже пытается внедрять стандарты НАТО, а в соответствии с Концепцией развития сектора безопасности и обороны Украины, выполнение задач реформирования и развития Вооруженных Сил Украины предусматривает:- формирование подразделений обеспечения кибербезопасности и киберзащиты Вооруженных Сил Украины;- создание необходимых материально-технических запасов для адекватного реагирования вместе с другими составляющими сектора безопасности и обороны на все вызовы и угрозы.Проведенное в рамках комплексного обзора сектора безопасности и обороны оценки состояния военной безопасности государства, а также приобретенный опыт участия Вооруженных Сил Украины в антитеррористической операции, выявили ряд проблем функционирования сил обороны в условиях существующих и потенциальных угроз.Целью статьи является изучение опыта Республики Польша, по противодействию кибернетическим угрозам, возможности использования этого опыта в Украине.Поскольку никто не может с уверенностью утверждать, что его сети полностью защищены и могут противостоять многовекторным кибератакам, кибернетическая безопасность стала приоритетом развития современной армии. Российская Федерация постоянно увеличивает количество операций с кибершпионажа и все больше пытается повлиять на общественное мнение в нашей стране, не гнушаясь использованием фейковых новостей и откровенной пропаганды. Основной целью этих операций является расшатывание ситуации внутри страны, создание хаоса и паники как основы для продвижения собственных интересов.Вывод, который мы должны сделать для себя ‑ это необходимость увеличения инвестирования в кибербезопасность, чтобы силы обороны были способны противодействовать кибератакам и обеспечивать необходимый уровень киберзащиты критической информационной инфраструктуры.В дальнейшем целесообразно провести анализ мероприятий по обеспечению киберзащиты критической информационной инфраструктуры в условиях чрезвычайного и военного положения, как это предусмотрено законом "Об основных принципах обеспечения кибербезопасности Украины", которые были осуществлены в период с 14 часов 00 минут 26 ноября 2018 до 14 часов 00 минут 26 декабря 2018 ‑ то есть во время введения военного положения в Украине. ; Вивчення досвіду реформування збройних сил Республіки Польща (РП) відповідно до стандартів НАТО є надзвичайно актуальним, зважаючи на шлях, що пройшла РП від розпаду Організації Варшавського Договору до її інтегрування в структури Північноатлантичного альянсу. Адже Україна теж намагається впроваджувати стандарти НАТО, а відповідно до Концепції розвитку сектору безпеки і оборони України виконання завдань реформування та розвитку Збройних Сил України передбачає:формування підрозділів забезпечення кібербезпеки та кіберзахисту Збройних Сил України;створення необхідних матеріально-технічних запасів для адекватного реагування разом з іншими складовими сектору безпеки і оборони на усі виклики і загрози.Проведене в рамках комплексного огляду сектору безпеки і оборони оцінювання стану воєнної безпеки держави, а також набутий досвід участі Збройних Сил України в антитерористичній операції виявили низку проблем функціонування сил оборони в умовах наявних і потенційних загроз.Метою статті є вивчення досвіду Республіки Польща (РП), щодо протидії кібернетичним загрозам, можливості використання цього досвіду в Україні.Оскільки ніхто не може з упевненістю стверджувати, що його мережі повністю захищені та можуть протистояти багатовекторним кібератакам, кібернетична безпека стала пріоритетом розвитку сучасної армії. Російська Федерація постійно збільшує кількість операцій з кібершпіонажу та все більше намагається вплинути на громадську думку в нашій країні, не гребуючи використанням фейкових новин та відвертої пропаганди. Основною метою цих операцій є розхитування ситуації всередині країни, створення хаосу та паніки як підґрунтя для просування власних інтересів.Висновок, який ми маємо зробити для себе – це збільшення інвестування в кібербезпеку, щоб сили оборони мали спроможності протидіяти кібератакам і забезпечувати необхідний рівень кіберзахисту критичної інформаційної інфраструктури.Надалі доцільно провести аналіз заходів із забезпечення кіберзахисту критичної інформаційної інфраструктури в умовах надзвичайного і воєнного стану, як це передбачено законом "Про основні засади забезпечення кібербезпеки України", які були здійсненні в період із 14 години 00 хвилин 26 листопада 2018 року до 14 години 00 хвилин 26 грудня 2018 року – тобто в час введення воєнного стану в Україні.

Raširenost vladajućih normi u društvu u kontekstu rata, okupacije, anarhije i preuzimanja vlasti od strane kriminalnih snaga uništava stare, ali postavlja nove norme, koje takođe mogu biti odbačene. Anomija se može opisati kao nukleus društva, kao vrsta "pulsirajuće moralne destrukcije" koju niko ne kontroliše, ali koja paradoksalno proizvodi socijalni red. Anomija se ne rađa iz ništavila, iz praznine; ona je produkt interaktivne dinamike koja nastaje kada se pojedinci udruže, djelujući kao pogonsko gorivo koje potiče pojedince da se sretnu. Émile Durkheim se fokusira na to kako međuljudska interakcija stvara promjene u društvu, pri čemu često pokazuje različite patološke karakteristike koje dovode do frustracije i konflikta. Individualna potraga za sopstvenim oslobađanjem od zajednice dovodi do gubitka osjećaja pripadnosti, a time i otuđenja. Kada se stare društvene mreže pokidaju, postaje nemoguće održati stare norme i vrijednosti. Pojedinac više nije ograničen moralnim načelima i autoritetom. Umjesto toga, može da razvije obrazac po kojem konstantno prevazilazi sve granice jer se kolaps prijašnje socijalne kontrole poklapa sa razvojem sistema koji zahtijeva konstantan porast individualnih potreba. Produkt takve interakcije je stanje društva u kojem postoji nesigurnost po pitanju vrijednosti, ciljeva i normi. Durkheim ovakvo stanje naziva "anomijom". Durkheim analizira devijacije normi (kao i individualni i društveni odgovor/reakciju na devijacije normi, kao što je kazna) kao sastavni dio problema solidarnosti i socijalne kohezije. Moralni red u društvu prema Durkheimu ima fundamentalnu vrijednost zato što su pojedinci integrisani u zajednicu koja ih kontroliše. Durkheim vidi integraciju kao način da se pojedinac veže za zajednicu kroz zajednički stav, solidarnost i rituale. On vidi kontrolu kao silu koja opčinjava i veže pojedinca za norme kroz pravni sistem, zakone i sankcije. Durkheim definiše odstupanje od norme kao čin koji vrijeđa jaku i jasnu kolektivnu svijest. Zbog toga su djela antisocijalna ako krše norme i vrijednosti koje su inače važan segment društvenog jedinstva. Rad obavještajnih i operativnih policijskih i graničnih snaga u oblasti Baltičkog mora (Švedskoj, Finskoj, Estoniji, Litvaniji i Letoniji) karakterističan je po ritualima konstantnog stvaranja normi od samog početka dana: od jutarnje kafe i prve razmjene informacija sa obavještajnom službom do operativnih radnji kao što su nadzor ili kontrola pojedinaca ili automobila. Ove interakcije se odlikuju jakom željom da se očuva postojeći društveni red. Što se tiče prijetnje postojećim normama postoje i normativni rituali. Na primjer, u ovakvim interakcijama, konstruišu se "Rusi koji odbacuju norme", oni nisu fizički prisutni u određenoj situaciji, ali su važni u tim vezama kao neki nevidljivi sveti objekti. Stvaranje kategorije "Rus koji odbacuje norme" u kojoj su Rusija/Rusi iskorišteni za dramatizaciju "drugih" je vidljivo u empirijskom materijalu kada akteri u studiji opisuju (1) Ruse kriminalce, (2) ruske špijune i (3) ruskuvojnu okupaciju. ; Resolution of the prevailing norms in a society in the context of war, occupation, anarchy,and takeover by criminal forces dispels the old norms but also sets new norms, which in turn can bequickly dispelled. Anomie can be understood as the core of society, as a kind of "pulsating moral destructiveness" that no one really can control but that paradoxically produces social order. Anomie does not arise from nothing, from the void; it is the product of the interactive dynamics that arise when individuals come together, acting as a propellant to lead individuals to meet. Émile Durkheim's attention goes to how interpersonal interaction is creating changes in society, often showing thevarious pathological features that can lead to frustration and conflict. The individual's quest toliberate himself from the collective as a result has a rootlessness and isolation. When the old network dissolves, it becomes impossible to maintain the old norms and values. The individual is no longer limited by the rules of morality and authority. Instead, the individual may develop a pattern of constantly exceeding all limits because the collapse of the former social control coincides with the development of the system that requires constant growth of individual needs. The product of such interactions is a state of society where there is uncertainty about the values, goals, and norms. Durkheim refers to this state as "anomie". Durkheim analyzes deviation from the norm (as well as individual and societal response/reaction to the norm deviation, such as punishment) as an integral part of the issue of solidarity and social cohesion. The moral order in a society has a fundamental value according to Durkheim because individuals are both integrated with and controlled by the community. Durkheim saw integration as a way to tie the individual to the community through shared attitude, solidarity, and rituals. He saw control as a compelling force that binds the individual to the norms through the judicial system, laws, and sanctions. Durkheim defines a deviation from the normas an act that offends a strong and definite collective consciousness. Thus, the acts are antisocial inthat they violate norms and values that are important to the social unity. The work of intelligence and operational police and border guards in the Baltic Sea area (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) is characterized by the norm-creating and re-creating rituals from the first moments of theday: from the morning coffee and the first information exchange with an intelligence partner to operational actions in the form of surveillance or control of individuals and/or cars. These interactions are characterized by a strong desire to preserve the prevailing social order. In relation tothe threat to the prevailing norms, there also are normative rituals. For example, in these interactions,"norm-dissolving Russians" are constructed who are not physically present in the situation but whoare important in the relationship as invisible sacred objects. The making of the category "norm-dissolving Russian" in which Russia/Russians are used to dramatize the "other" is made visible in the empirical material when actors in the study describe (1) criminal Russians, (2) Russian espionage, and (3) Russian military invasion. ; II International Scientific Conference. "Social Deviations", Centar modernih znanja, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (20171013-20171014). "Društvo i anomija. Sociološka analiza obavještajnog i operativnog policijskog rada i rada granične službe u oblasti Baltičkog mora" (Society and anomie. Sociological analysis of intelligence and operational police and border guard work in the Baltic Sea area). (Plenary session).

With the pendulum of war swinging in Russia's favor and the Western alliance only now clearing the way for more aid to Ukraine, many have been waiting for the Institute for the Study of War to offer its take on who is to blame and what is to be done. ISW has been one of the most referenced think tanks in mainstream media reporting on the war in Ukraine and has played a prominent role in creating and sustaining war optimism in the West in 2022 and 2023. Its daily battlefield reports have repeatedly played up Ukrainian victories and emphasized Russian failures and losses, almost always uncritically reproducing the version received from Kyiv.Such reporting is unsurprising when we consider the specific nature of ISW as a think tank. Funded by important military contractors in America's military industrial complex such as General Dynamics, DynCorps International, and CACI International, ISW is also a creation of the "Kagan industrial complex." It was founded by Kimberly Kagan, the wife of military historian Frederick Kagan, who in turn is the brother of Robert Kagan — co-founder of the infamous neo-conservative think tank the Project for a New American Century. It would be remiss not to mention that Robert Kagan is married to none other than Victoria Nuland, who was until recently heading up the U.S. State Department's policy on Ukraine and Europe.Given the hawkish and neoconservative ideological bent of ISW's leadership, one would not expect their stance on the war in Ukraine to change even in the light of new developments. Yet, its recent report "Denying Russia's Only Strategy for Success" is a remarkable double down. Not only does it present the recent deterioration of Ukraine's military prospects as a Kremlin disinformation campaign, it is also a manifesto for military escalation.Instead of examining where the Western alliance has come up short, or any concession of Russia's resilience and adaptation to the challenge of war, the ISW report is squarely focused on the apparent superpowers the Kremlin enjoys in the domain of "perception manipulation." It claims the Kremlin "floods Western discourse with false and irrelevant narratives" to condition Western publics to "freely reason to a conclusion that Russia's prevailing in Ukraine is inevitable." Reviewing the references the report is based on, it is clear the authors have no direct proof of Kremlin activity. Their work mostly relies on other ISW reports and cites tweets by Elon Musk and David Sacks or cherry-picked media articles as evidence of Westerners being duped by Russia. Unpacking the central thesis of Russian disinformation, the report goes on to claim that the West has a vast superiority over Russia in terms of resources and technology and that all that is needed to defeat Vladimir Putin is "strategic clarity." As ISW are experts in military history, it seems incredible they have forgotten the numerous historical examples of countries with superior GDP being defeated by economically and technically inferior opponents. Sidestepping such inconvenient points, the ISW report focuses on the West's loss of clarity — be it the genuine divisions and fear within NATO or distractions caused by other issues. The blame for this is placed squarely on the Kremlin, implying that Russia has almost superhuman capacities to control Western perception. Unsurprisingly, the report urges Westerners (referred to as "we" and "us" throughout the text) to blow this Kremlin-induced fog from their minds. In other words, if only the West can eradicate "defeatism," return to its core "values" and "virtues" and understand the true nature of the Russian threat is in its disinformation capacities, then the rest will be simple. The Western alliance will bridge its "need gap" and produce a "surge" in support to Ukraine to ruin Putin's dream of a Russian victory. Once again, there is not a single sentence here that refers to the real war-making capacities of NATO or Ukraine. Where do the munitions come from? What about the manpower? Which NATO members are ready to step up their commitment? The ISW report fits into the previous track record of poor quality military analysis from neo-conservative think tanks on the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. One must conclude that the purpose of this ISW report is in fact to boost the morale of analysts overwhelmed by pessimistic questions about the war's new trajectory. Indeed, the ISW report dismisses talk of peace as "surrender" to Putin. It also rejects those concerned about escalation and a NATO-Russia war and explicitly saying that the West must escalate to resist Putin's aggression. Failure to resist is tantamount to surrender.The discourse of discrediting previous Western diplomacy with Russia as cowardly and failed appeasement is well-established and repeated in the report. ISW goes one step further by calling for the rejection of all "Russian premises" in understanding the conflict in Ukraine. This is a sure way to ensure there can be no basis for any negotiations with Russia.This brings us to the crucial final part of the report where, having "debunked" a spectrum of points as merely part of the Kremlin's grand perception manipulation campaign, the authors outline the logical next step in the war: a new escalation. The first part is to "deny Russia's sanctuaries," by which the authors mean encouraging Ukraine to have free rein in attacking targets inside the Russian Federation. Second, they call for NATO to support new forms of asymmetric warfare to catch Russia off guard and somehow offset their increasing dominance on the frontlines. Finally, the report vaguely calls for the West to "target Russia's capability globally," which appears to advocate espionage, political and economic warfare, and perhaps even terrorism. In summary, the report advocates blowing up various targets connected to Russia in the hope this derails their summer offensive in Ukraine. ISW has issued a clear call for the West to fearlessly up the ante against Russia. In reading it, one recalls the strong influence ISW has had up to this point in shaping perceptions of the war in Ukraine. What is striking is the way the group has revealed its own hand as a crucial agent not in supplying objective and accurate military reports but in waging information warfare. One could even say that ISW itself "floods Western discourse" to condition U.S. public opinion to "freely conclude" that it is necessary to escalate against Russia. Although deeper research is needed, it would seem likely that ISW is far more successful in spreading discourses on the war than any Kremlin agency. Indeed, Russia has no equivalent to ISW's global influence and reach in the information domain. The Kremlin's presentation of its war aims or ability to contest key points has been clearly weak in the West. Despite all the ISW claims, it appears that Russia has long given up on serious "perception manipulation" in the West in favor of hard power. As a debacle looms for the Western alliance in Ukraine, the Institute for the Study of War is offering a Plan B of escalation to solve the current situation. With the anniversary of NATO this month, we can expect their arguments will be heard in various meetings across the Western world. One only hopes the counter-argument for restraint can be made without being shouted down as a Kremlin propaganda tactic.

The processes of globalization and integration of economy ofUkraineto outer economic space provoke an origin in the country of a number of the crisis phenomena and destabilizing factors that negatively influence on socio-economic development of country. Among them distinguish economic activity of subjects of menage and shadow of economy.At the same time, a world economy is characterized by a double structure that shows up in legal and illegal sectors. The basic structural components of legal sector of economy are certain in the article, namely: legal trading in legal commodities; legal migration of labour force; legal motion of raw material and informative resources, capital assets, and also illegal sector of economy : contraband goods; illegal migration and trading in people; contraband goods of sources of raw materials; international "white-washing"; economic espionage and trade. On the basis of компаративного analysis the legal analysis of criminal legislation, the results of that allow to assert that in Ukraine responsibility increases for corruption abuses and set limitations for persons, that accomplished them, is conducted, and also in relation to their amnesty. The basic factors of origin of such important component are considered in the structure of shadow economy as shadow employment that renders direct influence on the indexes of socio-economic development of country. The basic ways of детінізації of economy and counteraction are outlined corruptions in a country, the scales of that attained critical in recent year. To that end providing of motivational normatively-legal environment, that would assist the conduct of legal economic activity, appears near-term; reduction of tax pressure is on small and midsize businesses; reduction of scales of протиправної employment. On the basis of empiric researches with the use of programmatic packages of MS Excel, Statistiсa 8,0 and CurveExpert5,0 astudy of dynamics of criminal realizations is undertaken in the most widespread corruption crimes taken into account in 2013 - 2017 and tendencies in relation to motion of crimes in the most widespread corruption crimes, criminal realizations after that are closed in 2013-2017 and part of crimes, realization is certain after that closed 2013-2017 On the basis of економіко-математичних calculations diagnostics of level of тінізації of economy of Ukraine is conducted in 2010-2018 Investigational and systematized basic problem construction effective system anticorruption legislation in Ukraine, in particular, in part establishment responsibility at such family. With the aim of search of methods of estimation of volumes of shadow economy and ways of her детінізації it is suggested to conduct research of tendencies of shadow economy in Ukraine by means of model of Солоу, essence of that consists in consideration of shadow economy as single unit of the economic phenomenon (without structural elements) and in the adequate enough reflection of major macroeconomic aspects of тінізації of process of production. ; Процеси глобалізації та інтеграції економіки України до світового економічного простору провокують виникнення в країні цілої низки кризових явищ та дестабілізуючих факторів, які негативно впливають на соціально-економічний розвиток країни. Серед них виділяють іллегальну економічну діяльність суб'єктів господарювання й тінізацію економіки.Водночас, світове господарство характеризується подвійною структурою, яка проявляється у легальному та нелегальному секторах. У статті визначено основні структурні компоненти легального сектора економіки, а саме: легальна торгівля легальними товарами; легальна міграція робочої сили; легальний рух сировинних та інформаційних ресурсів, капітальних активів, а також нелегального сектора економіки: контрабанда; нелегальна міграція та торгівля людьми; контрабанда сировинних ресурсів; міжнародне «відмивання» грошей; економічний шпіонаж та торгове «піратство».На основі компаративного аналізу проведено правовий аналіз кримінального законодавства, результати якого дозволяють стверджувати, що в Україні посилено відповідальність за корупційні зловживання та встановлені обмеження для осіб, які їх вчинили, а також щодо їх амністії. Розглянуто основні фактори виникнення такої важливої компоненти у структурі тіньової економіки як тіньова зайнятість, яка чинить безпосередній вплив на показники соціально-економічного розвитку країни. Окреслено основні шляхи детінізації економіки та протидії корупції в країні, масштаби яких в останні роки досягнули критичного рівня.З цією метою першочерговим виявляється забезпечення мотиваційного нормативно-правового середовища, яке б сприяло веденню легальної господарської діяльності; зменшення податкового тиску на малий та середній бізнес; скорочення масштабів протиправної зайнятості. На основі емпіричних досліджень з використанням програмних пакетів MS Excel, Statistiсa 8,0 та CurveExpert 5,0 проведено дослідження динаміки кримінальних проваджень у найбільш поширених корупційних злочинах, облікованих у 2013 – 2017 рр. й тенденцій щодо руху злочинів у найбільш поширених корупційних злочинах, кримінальні провадження за якими закрито у 2013–2017 рр. та визначено частку злочинів, провадження за якими закрито 2013–2017 рр. На основі економіко-математичних розрахунків проведено діагностику рівня тінізації економіки України у 2010–2018 рр. Досліджено й систематизовано основні проблеми побудови дієвої системи антикорупційного законодавства в Україні, зокрема, в частині встановлення відповідальності за такого роду злочини. Висвітлено стан та тенденції впливу глобалізації на становлення України як незалежного суб'єкта міжнародної економічної діяльності.З метою пошуку методів оцінки обсягів тіньової економіки та шляхів її детінізації запропоновано проводити дослідження тенденцій тіньової економіки в Україні за допомогою моделі Солоу, сутність якої полягає у розгляді тіньової економіки як єдиного цілого економічного явища (без структурних елементів) та у достатньо адекватному відображенні найважливіших макроекономічних аспектів тінізації процесу виробництва. ; Процессы глобализации и интеграции экономики Украины к мировому экономическому пространству провоцируют возникновение в стране целого ряда кризисных явлений и дестабилизирующих факторов, которые негативно влияют на социально-экономическое развитие страны. Среди них выделяют иллегальную экономическую деятельность субъектов ведения хозяйства и тенизацию экономики. В то же время, мировое хозяйство характеризуется двойной структурой, которая проявляется в легальном и нелегальном секторах. В статье определены основные структурные компоненты легального сектора экономики, а именно: легальная торговля легальными товарами; легальная миграция рабочей силы; легальное движение сырьевых и информационных ресурсов, капитальных активов, а также нелегального сектора экономики: контрабанда; нелегальная миграция и торговля людьми; контрабанда сырьевых ресурсов; международное «отмывание» денег; экономический шпионаж и торговое «пиратство». На основе компаративного анализа проведен правовой анализ криминального законодательства, результаты которого позволяют утверждать, что в Украине усилена ответственность за коррупционные злоупотребления и установленные ограничения для лиц, которые их совершили, а также относительно их амнистии. Рассмотрены основные факторы возникновения такой важной компоненты в структуре теневой экономики как теневая занятость, которая оказывает непосредственное влияние на показатели социально-экономического развития страны. Очерчены основные пути детенизации экономики и противодействия коррупции в стране, масштабы которых в последние годы достигли критического уровня. С этой целью первоочередным оказывается обеспечение мотивационной нормативно-правовой среды, которая бы способствовала ведению легальной хозяйственной деятельности; уменьшению налогового давления на малый и средний бизнес; сокращению масштабов противоправной занятости. На основе эмпирических исследований с использованием программных пакетов MS Excel, Statistiсa 8,0 и CurveExpert 5,0 проведено исследование динамики криминальных осуществлений в наиболее распространенных коррупционных преступлениях, учтенных в 2013 – 2017 гг. и тенденций относительно движения преступлений в наиболее распространенных коррупционных преступлениях, криминальные осуществления за которыми закрыты в 2013 – 2017 гг. и определена часть преступлений, осуществления за которыми закрыто 2013 – 2017 гг. На основе экономико-математических расчетов проведена диагностика уровня тенизации экономики Украины в 2010-2018 гг. Исследовано и систематизированы основные проблемы построения действенной системы антикоррупционного законодательства в Украине, в частности установления ответственности при таком роде деятельности. Отражено состояние и тенденции влияния глобализации на становление Украины как независимого субъекта международной экономической деятельности. С целью поиска методов оценки объемов теневой экономики и путей ее детенизации предложено проводить исследование тенденций теневой экономики в Украине с помощью модели Солоу, сущность которой заключается в рассмотрении теневой экономики как единого целого экономического явления (без структурных элементов) и в достаточно адекватном отражении важнейших макроэкономических аспектов тенизации процесса производства.