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Introduction. Dictators and Autocrats: A Global PhenomenonKlaus LarresAbstracts: 23 Dictators and Autocrats of Our TimesTHE NOTORIOUS THREE1. Joseph Stalin: Autocrat par excellence (The Soviet Union)Hiroaki Kuromiya 2. Adolf Hitler: From Democracy to Dictatorship (Germany)Eric Kurlander3. Mao Zedong: Communist Party Dictatorship (China)Covell F. MeyskensPATHBREAKING AUTOCRATS OF THE 20TH CENTURY4. Fidel Castro: From Grassroots Dictatorship to Communist Autocracy (Cuba)Lilian Guerra5. Augusto Pinochet: The Emergence of One-Man Rule (Chile)Patricio Silva6. Robert Mugabe: Ruthless Authoritarian who Preferred Democratic Clothing (Zimbabwe)Richard Bourne 7. Joseph Kabila: the Raïs of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DR Congo)Charles Tshimanga-Kashama 8. Hugo Chávez: Was he an Autocrat? (Venezuela)Gabriel Hetland9. Lee Kuan Yew: Autocracy, Elections, and Capitalism (Singapore)Michael Barr 21ST CENTURY AUTOCRATS -- THE MAJOR POWERS 10. Vladimir Putin: Russia's Neo-Patrimonial Façade Democracy (Russia)Allen J. Lynch11. Xi Jinping: The Rise of an Authoritarian Leader (China)Johnny Erling12. Narendra Modi: Elected Authoritarian (India)Ian Hall13. Donald J. Trump: The Authoritarian Style in American Politics (USA)Klaus Larres21ST CENTURY AUTOCRATS -- OTHER INFLUENTIAL AUTOCRATS14. Ali Hosseini Khamenei: Routinizing Revolution (Iran)Kjetil Selvik15. The Assad Dynasty: Quo Vadis Damascus? (Syria)Moshe Ma'oz16. Kim Jong un: Rise to Power and Leadership Style (North Korea)Rachel M. Lee17. Abd al Fattah al Sisi: The One and Only Egyptian Dictator (Egypt)Robert Springborg 18. Prayuth Chan-o-cha: From the Barracks to the Ballot Box (Thailand)Pasuth Thothaveesansuk19. Muhammad bin Salman Al-Saud: King in All But Name (Saudi Arabia)Christopher Davidson20. János Kádár and Viktor Orbán: From Communist to Post-Communist Autocracy (Hungary)Andras Bozoki 21. Recep Tayyip Erdogan: From Illiberal Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism (Turkey)Howard Eissenstat22. Rodrigo Duterte: Macho Populism and Authoritarian Practice (Philippines)Nicole Curato and Yvan Ysmael Yonaha23. Jair Bolsonaro: Beyond the Pale, Above the Fray (Brazil)Andre Pagliarini

"The far right is on the rise globally, with the rhetoric of anger and resentment emanating from personalities like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Rodrigo Duterte, and Viktor Orban captivating and mobilizing large numbers of people. Indeed, in a number of countries, the extreme right has already captured the government or is on the threshold of power. While the swift turn of events has shocked or surprised many in the North, the extreme right's seizure of power is not an uncommon event in the South. Deploying what he calls the "dialectic of revolution and counterrevolution" and harnessing the methods of comparative history and comparative sociology, Walden Bello's Counterrevolution is a bold, sweeping enterprise that seeks to deconstruct the challenge from the far right. Using as case studies Italy in the 1920's, Indonesia in the 1960s', Chile in the 1970's, and contemporary Thailand, India, and the Philippines, Bello lays bare the origins, dynamics, and consequences of counterrevolutionary movements. Reflections on the rise of the right in the United States, Europe, and Brazil round out this remarkable, timely study by one of the premier intellectuals of the South. Bello weds his well-known analytical scalpel to vigorous and clear writing to produce what reviewers have already dubbed one of the most profound, exciting, and controversial contributions to the study of social movements in years, one that bears comparison to the classic works of Barrington Moore, Jr., and Theda Skocpol. While he is well known for his progressive views, Bello, who was a recipient of the Right Livelihood Award (aka the Alternative Nobel Prize) and named the International Studies Association's Outstanding Public Scholar, is one of those rare analysts who does not let politics get in the way of clear-sighted analysis."-- Provided by publisher.

This article is aims to explores the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe, with a specific focus on the gaining power bond between Hungary and Poland within the European Union (EU). It examines the factors driving the rise of populism in the region, including economic disparities, historical legacies, and immigration concerns. The article discusses the definition of populism, its characteristics, and its prevalence in contemporary global politics.The rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe is analyzed within the context of post-communist transitions, economic challenges, and the refugee crisis. The article highlights the role of populist politicians in promoting anti-immigrant and Eurosceptic views, as well as their criticism of liberal democratic values and EU institutions. It emphasizes the complex interplay between global trends and local factors in fueling the populist surge in the region.The qualitative comparative analysis applies to investigates the gaining power bond between Hungary and Poland is examined, focusing on the shared opposition to EU policies and the development of a strategic alliance. The article discusses how Hungary's Fidesz party, led by Viktor Orbán, and Poland's Law and Justice party, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski have challenged EU initiatives and prioritized national sovereignty and conservative social values (Balcer and Vegh, 2022). It highlights the tensions and divisions caused by this bond within the EU, as well as the measures taken by the EU to address concerns regarding democratic norms and the rule of law.The article concludes by underscoring the significance of the Hungary-Poland bond and its implications for the EU's unity and stability. It emphasizes the need for EU leaders to navigate these challenges, uphold liberal values, and find ways to bridge divides in order to maintain cohesion and influence in the region. The future of the power bond and its impact on European politics will shape the trajectory of democracy and integration in Central and Eastern Europe.

In the article, the author analyzes the «pre-elections» that took place in Hungary in September – October 2021, in other words, the «primaries» of the opposition. Such an attempt of being elected to the Parliament in Central European countries was applied for the first time since the change of the system and its result, judging by the subsequent emotions of the participants, cannot yet be considered unambiguous. There is no such norm in the Constitution of the country, however, instead of creating an electoral coalition, as, for example, in the neighboring Czech Republic, Hungarian opposition politicians decided to go further, in a certain sense, binding themselves to the model of the American electoral system. The essence of the vote, as it was explained by the participants of the event, was not to disperse the opposition forces, but to gather them into one fist in order to defeat the FIDESZ / KDNP coalition that had already won three times subsequently before the spring of 2022. The outcome of first primaries in history of Hungary is interesting by the fact that in the end, the victory was by a politician of a new generation who took part in this event, but did not bind himself to signing program documents, and who only recently created his own political movement. The question of how consistent his former candidates for the post of prime Minister from the opposition will be in the remaining six months is also interesting. One way or another, Hungary's political system is being tested by a new electoral mechanism, which is designed to consolidate the main political forces of this country. No less interesting in this regard is the line of conduct of the ruling party and Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who did not interfere in the new political process taking place in full view of the whole country.

Both populism and conspiracy theories are gaining attention as they tend to saturate everyday political rhetoric. Earlier research notices how populist and conspiratorial rhetoric intertwine, yet they rarely focus on them as explanations for current social change, and even more, as arguments against it, in defence of an 'authentic' way of life. Both populism and conspiracy theories are often pathologized, while their explanatory aspects are neglected. This thesis aims to fill these gaps: it is interested in how right-wing populism and conspiratorial rhetoric used by them highlight the difference between an 'authentic', organically evolved society and unwanted, dangerous changes in it. Therefore, it does not only explain social change: it claims that 1. it is an attack on the 'authenticity' of a given society and 2. this attack is planned by conspirators 3. who are in fact 'the elite', acting against 'the people'. As case study, this thesis analyses speeches held by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, between 2015 and 2020, three in each year, held publicly and translated to English on official government websites. The research question is, how epistemic work is found in the data, using the methodological toolkit of epistemic governance and membership categorization analysis (MCA), built in the framework of World Society Theory and the Bordieuan field theory. The thesis is interested in how basic assumptions on our world appear in the data, how actors in the political field are re-arranged, and how certain qualities are attached to them. Findings show how the issue of European immigration after 2015 and the influence of the European Union was understood as an attack on the 'authenticity' of Hungary and Europe and constructed as a global conspiracy against national sovereignty. Also, by utilizing MCA, the thesis reflects on how populism re-arranges actors of the political field compared to how it is understood in liberal democracies.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has significantly reshaped debates on the globalorder, democratic politics and the liberal mode of governing societies. Somehave compared the virus to the "ultimate empty signifier", which alloweddifficult ideological groups to fill it with their own securitizations, creating inan instant a plethora of political otherings. For IR realists, the suddencollapse of cross-border movement and other privileges of the globalizedliberal elite came as a vindication of their long-cherished argument: thenation state remains the key actor in international politics, and the post-national world had largely been a utopian liberal illusion. Right-wingnationalist populists have been saying the same thing but in a differentlanguage and were apt to make COVID-19 instrumental to their purposes.Thus, Viktor Orbán quickly linked it to the agenda of migration and used thestate of exception as a pretext to further limit the democratic process inHungary. However, as students of populism have also stressed, the populistresponse to the pandemic has been far from uniform. In a yet broaderperspective, while some democratic governments enacted draconianmeasures in response to the pandemic, suspending basic individualfreedoms, some dictatorships like Belarus experienced a sudden "flow ofliberalism", refusing to cut down on both economic activity and cross-border movement. This special issue focuses on comparing the liberal andilliberal reactions (both domestic and international) to the pandemic,looking into how it has affected the democratic and non-democratic formsof governance; examining where the responses have been similar oroverlapping, i.e. where COVID-19 has practically blurred or erased theborder between liberal and illiberal politics; looking into how different typesof regimes and political groupings have borrowed new elements and stylesof politics, e.g. in which circumstances populist or autocratic politicianssuddenly seemed more liberal than their liberal and democraticcounterparts; and investigating the ramifications of these changes for theliberal components of the globalized international order.

International audience ; The construction of the figure of the alien is one contributory element in the genesis of a European geopolitical territory. The article develops this hypothesis through three topics of reflection: (1) the Schengen Area and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially in the case of Hungary; (2) the representation of citizenship in the United Kingdom, which, at least for the moment, is within the EU but outside the Schengen Area; and (3) the internal debates in Switzerland on the country's membership of the Schengen Area. These examples put into perspective what might otherwise be seen as a straightforward tendency toward the emergence of a "European people," since they show that the notion of the European citizen is still quite vague. The article also examines the EU's external border, which is a more complex matter than that outlined by security fences and shipwreck sites. Bilateral border management agreements with countries beyond the European Union, such as the Eastern Partnership and agreements with African states, suggest that the border is both an ideological operation and a frontline.Outline The Schengen Area: A geopolitical entity? Establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European frontier The improvisation of summer 2015 On the geopolitical uses of a crisis: Viktor Orbán on the campaign trail European gods Different geopolitical representations of citizenship Between Europe and sovereignty: The great divide of the Swiss Fortress Europe? The external border of the European Union Conclusion: What prospects for a geopolitical entity under construction? ; La construction de la figure de l'étranger est un élément de la genèse d'un territoire géopolitique européen. L'article aborde cette hypothèse à travers trois sujets de réflexion : (1) la limite Schengen et l'impact de la crise des réfugiés, notamment dans le cas hongrois ; (2) la représentation de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni qui est, à ce jour, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et hors Schengen ; et (3) les débats ...

International audience ; The construction of the figure of the alien is one contributory element in the genesis of a European geopolitical territory. The article develops this hypothesis through three topics of reflection: (1) the Schengen Area and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially in the case of Hungary; (2) the representation of citizenship in the United Kingdom, which, at least for the moment, is within the EU but outside the Schengen Area; and (3) the internal debates in Switzerland on the country's membership of the Schengen Area. These examples put into perspective what might otherwise be seen as a straightforward tendency toward the emergence of a "European people," since they show that the notion of the European citizen is still quite vague. The article also examines the EU's external border, which is a more complex matter than that outlined by security fences and shipwreck sites. Bilateral border management agreements with countries beyond the European Union, such as the Eastern Partnership and agreements with African states, suggest that the border is both an ideological operation and a frontline.Outline The Schengen Area: A geopolitical entity? Establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European frontier The improvisation of summer 2015 On the geopolitical uses of a crisis: Viktor Orbán on the campaign trail European gods Different geopolitical representations of citizenship Between Europe and sovereignty: The great divide of the Swiss Fortress Europe? The external border of the European Union Conclusion: What prospects for a geopolitical entity under construction? ; La construction de la figure de l'étranger est un élément de la genèse d'un territoire géopolitique européen. L'article aborde cette hypothèse à travers trois sujets de réflexion : (1) la limite Schengen et l'impact de la crise des réfugiés, notamment dans le cas hongrois ; (2) la représentation de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni qui est, à ce jour, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et hors Schengen ; et (3) les débats ...

The election of populist far-right party Law and Justice in 2015 marked a shocking break in Polish politics. A period of stability was brutally interrupted as Jaroslaw Kaczynski and his allies took over public media and launched a controversial 'reform' of the judiciary.How was this illiberal turn possible after years of democratic development? Jaroslaw Kuisz, one of Poland's leading liberal thinkers, digs deep into Polish history to propose an original analysis of the crisis. He reveals how centuries of statelessness have left Poles with a 'post-traumatic' attitude to sovereignty, making them wary of powerful foreign blocks, be it the EU, the Soviet Union or present-day Russia. This is a phenomenon populists have proved adept at exploiting. Providing a brilliant account of Europe's largest illiberal democracy, The new politics of Poland shines a light on the broader situation in East and Central Europe, offering valuable lessons for other countries experiencing the rise of populist right-wing movements

Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky had an unusually packed travel schedule this week, with stops in Argentina, the United States, and Norway. His message was clear: If Ukraine has any chance of pushing Russia out of all of its territory, it will only come from sustained Western support.
But Zelensky's requests for aid earned a much different response than they did at Christmas time last year, when confidence in Kyiv's military was at a historic high. This time around, the Ukrainian leader found himself shadow-boxing with right-wing skeptics of Ukraine aid at every turn.
In Buenos Aires, where Zelensky attended the Sunday inauguration of President Javier Milei, news cameras caught the frustrated leader in "an intense-looking conversation" with Viktor Orban, Hungary's prime minister and the primary obstacle for Kyiv's bid to join the European Union.
Back in Washington on Tuesday, Zelensky faced down Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.), the primary obstacle for any future U.S. aid to Ukraine. Johnson ripped into President Joe Biden's approach to the war after meeting with Zelensky.
"What the Biden administration seems to be asking for is billions of additional dollars with no appropriate oversight, no clear strategy to win and with none of the answers that I think the American people are owed," Johnson argued.
Johnson and his GOP allies have now made clear that President Joe Biden will have to make significant compromises in order to secure new funding. Their primary ask is a series of new border control measures that most Democrats view as over the line, leaving little room for compromise.
Even Biden — who has long promised to support Ukraine "as long as it takes" — could only muster a pledge to arm Kyiv "as long as we can."
In Oslo, Zelensky got a friendlier reception on Wednesday from Nordic leaders, who promised new bilateral aid packages. Later that day, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez — who currently chairs the EU Council — said Kyiv could enter into official negotiations to join the EU as soon as this year.
But this upbeat moment proved fleeting. In a speech at an EU summit, Orban made clear that, whatever argument he may have gotten from Zelensky in Buenos Aires, there is little chance that he will change his mind on Ukraine's accession bid.
The idea that the EU should start membership talks with Kyiv is "absurd, ridiculous, and not serious," he argued. "Our stance is clear. We do not support Ukraine's quick EU entry," Orban later wrote on Facebook.
On a more promising note for Ukraine, Orban has been more open to horse trading when it comes to aid. After days of back-and-forth, the EU agreed Wednesday that it would release funding for Hungary that had previously been withheld due to alleged democratic backsliding.
An Orban aide said Hungary would be open to relenting on Ukraine aid if that money comes through. If Budapest holds to the deal, the EU could announce a roughly $55 billion aid package for Kyiv as soon as Friday.
The timing could scarcely be more important for Ukraine. As its forces struggle against Russian soldiers at home, recent Dutch elections have created the possibility that far-right firebrand Geert Wilders could be the next prime minister of the Netherlands.
Wilders, whose party opposes aid to Ukraine and wants to hold a referendum to leave the EU, has so far failed to form a coalition but is considered to be in the strongest position to lead the country's next government. If Wilders wins out in the end, Kyiv would likely be among the biggest losers.
Even if Wilders loses, all signs now point to a delay in U.S. funding until at least early January, setting Kyiv up for a difficult winter. Conscious of the diplomatic headwinds, Zelensky struck a defiant tone in a Thursday address to the EU, which he delivered via video link from Kyiv.
"This day will go down in our history. Whether it's good or bad for us, history will capture everything," he said. "It's very important that Europe doesn't fall back into indecision today."
In other diplomatic news related to the war in Ukraine:
— The U.S. declassified an intelligence report claiming that Russia has suffered over 300,000 casualties in Ukraine, though the report does not distinguish between deaths and injuries, according to the New York Times. The report, which argues that Russian President Vladimir Putin's short-term goal is to reduce Western support for Ukraine, highlights the destructive impact that the conflict has had on Russia's army. The decision to release the report suggests a shift in the Biden administration's PR strategy, which has deemphasized the argument that the war is a "low cost" way to deliver Moscow a strategic loss — a line that some see as confirmation that the U.S. is pursuing a proxy war with Russia and has perverse incentives to extend it.
— Lawmakers from across Europe called on the U.S. Congress to pass aid for Ukraine, arguing that American support is "critical and urgent," according to Reuters. "A Putin victory would embolden our enemies around the world: they are watching and hoping we grow tired," wrote the group, led by French MP and former foreign policy analyst Benjamin Haddad. "Ukrainians are fighting so we don't have to."
— Putin held a major news conference on Thursday where he reiterated his goals for the war — "denazification, demilitarization and [Ukraine's] neutral status" — and revealed that Russia has 617,000 soldiers in Ukraine, according to the BBC. The Russian leader played down his military's middling performance and alleged that Western "freebies" for Ukraine "are gradually running out." Notably, he suggested that there has been some progress in talks for a U.S.-Russia prisoner exchange that could bring home ex-Marine Paul Whelan and Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich. "On the whole we're speaking in a language which we both understand," Putin said. "I hope we find a solution."
U.S. State Department news:In a Monday press conference, State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller said the U.S. is "deeply concerned" for the well-being of Alexei Navalny, a prominent Russian dissident who recently disappeared from a Russian penal colony, according to his lawyers. "We have communicated to the Russian Government that they are responsible for what happens to Mr. Navalny while he is in their custody, and they will be held accountable by the international community," Miller said.

International audience ; The construction of the figure of the alien is one contributory element in the genesis of a European geopolitical territory. The article develops this hypothesis through three topics of reflection: (1) the Schengen Area and the impact of the refugee crisis, especially in the case of Hungary; (2) the representation of citizenship in the United Kingdom, which, at least for the moment, is within the EU but outside the Schengen Area; and (3) the internal debates in Switzerland on the country's membership of the Schengen Area. These examples put into perspective what might otherwise be seen as a straightforward tendency toward the emergence of a "European people," since they show that the notion of the European citizen is still quite vague. The article also examines the EU's external border, which is a more complex matter than that outlined by security fences and shipwreck sites. Bilateral border management agreements with countries beyond the European Union, such as the Eastern Partnership and agreements with African states, suggest that the border is both an ideological operation and a frontline.Outline The Schengen Area: A geopolitical entity? Establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of the European frontier The improvisation of summer 2015 On the geopolitical uses of a crisis: Viktor Orbán on the campaign trail European gods Different geopolitical representations of citizenship Between Europe and sovereignty: The great divide of the Swiss Fortress Europe? The external border of the European Union Conclusion: What prospects for a geopolitical entity under construction? ; La construction de la figure de l'étranger est un élément de la genèse d'un territoire géopolitique européen. L'article aborde cette hypothèse à travers trois sujets de réflexion : (1) la limite Schengen et l'impact de la crise des réfugiés, notamment dans le cas hongrois ; (2) la représentation de la citoyenneté au Royaume-Uni qui est, à ce jour, dans l'Union européenne (UE) et hors Schengen ; et (3) les débats internes à la Suisse sur l'appartenance du pays à l'espace Schengen. Ces exemples relativisent ce qui pourrait être décrit comme une évolution linéaire vers l'apparition d'un peuple européen car la notion de citoyen européen est encore bien floue. L'article étudie également la frontière externe de l'UE qui est un objet plus complexe que celui que dessinent les grillages et les lieux de naufrages. Les accords bilatéraux de gestion de la frontière avec des pays situés au-delà de l'Union européenne, Partenariat oriental et accords avec les États africains, suggèrent l'idée que celle-ci est une marche idéologique autant qu'une ligne de front.

Many political changes that have taken place across the world in the last decade have been connected with the spill-over of a new narrative in the public dimension. Among other things, this narrative has emphasized returning control over the public space to the people once again, revitalization of the democratic community, restraint on an expansion of judicial power over representational politics, and in many instances, a specific national approach to the questions of governance. These trends have gained the name "illiberal democracy", a description which Viktor Orban introduced into the language of political practice a few years later. Indeed, in many countries worldwide, from the United States of America (USA) during the presidency of Donald Trump, Central and Eastern Europe, to Turkey and Venezuela, it has been possible to observe changes which had the principal leitmotif to negate liberal democracy as the only possibility of organizing public space within the state. These trends are continuing, and there are no signs of them disappearing in the near future. The new dispensation in the USA under President Biden also does not guarantee an immediate return to the liberal internationalism of the 1990s. Political changes directed toward the constitutional space of the State have inspired researchers to consider the issues of new constitutionalism, new forms of democracy, and the rule of law beyond liberalism. This article is an attempt to transfer these considerations to the international level. The text aims to consider whether withdrawal from the liberal doctrine could also be observed on an international level and what these facts could mean for the intellectual project of constitutionalization of international law. Building upon reflections on constitutionalism and constitutionalization of international law, this text presents what has up until now been the mainstream understanding of international law as a liberal construct. This showcases the illiberal turn observed among certain countries as exemplified by the anti-liberal and realist language of their constitutional representatives. In this respect, this analysis is a modest contribution to the so far nascent field of sociology of international law. However, the main endeavor of this article is to unchain the notions of international liberalism and constitutionalization of international law as being popularly understood as two sides of the same coin. Consequently, the idea of political constitutionalism of international law is introduced. Seeing things from this perspective, this text focuses on the material rather than formal aspects of international law's constitutionalization. Within the stream of so called thick constitutionalism, there are a few elements listed with which the discussion about international law may continue to engage, if this law is to be considered as legitimate not only formally, but also substantially.

The goal of paper is to put into focus and explain essential features of the political development in Lithuania during second post-communist decade by means of its comparison with the analoguos processes in other Baltic States (Latvia and Estonia) and in those Central European countries with political systems which resemble most closely Lithuanian case (Poland and Hungary). In all these countries, second post-communist decade witnessed the rise of the new successful populist parties. The author argues that this populist rise is the proper context for the understanding of Rolandas Paksas' impeachment in Lithuania in 2003–2004. His Order and Justice party has to be classified together with the brothers Kaczynski's Law and Justice party and its even more radical allies in Poland, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz and Gábor Vona's Jobbik in Hungary, Juhan Part's Res Publica in Estonia and Einars Repše's New Era in Latvia. They were all right-wing populist parties, proclaiming in their anti-establishment rhetoric the war on corruption of the (ex-communist) elite and the coming of "new politics". While the rise of right-wing populism did not change the political system in the former bureaucratic authoritarian countries Estonia and Latvia, in Hungary and Poland the outcome was the breakup of the implicit ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact which was the foundation of the political stability in these former countries of national communism. The Kaczynski twins founded Rzecz Pospolita IV (4th Republic of Poland), grounded in the thorough and comprehensive lustration of the ex-communist cadres. Fidesz leader Victor Orban used the two thirds majority in the Hungarian parliament to promulgate a new constitution. Lithuania is unique in that the ex-communist and anti-communist elite pact was not abolished, but preserved and consolidated due to the collaboration of all, by this time, "established" and Left-of-centre populist parties during the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment of Paksas can be considered as the stress test of the young Lithuanian liberal democracy, just on the eve of the accession of Lithuania to the EU and NATO. An unhappy peculiarity of the stress tests is that they sometimes break or damage the items tested. As far as the success in impeaching R.Paksas prevented the transformation of liberal post-communism into populist post-communism in Lithuania, the test was a success. However, against the expectation of many observers of impeachment events, it did not enhance the quality of democracy of Lithuania. The legacy of impeachment are disequilibrium of the balance of power between government branches in favour of the Constitutional Court, strengthening of the Left-of-Centre populist political forces and the interference of secret services into Lithuanian politics with the self-assumed mission to safeguard Lithuanian democracy from the perils of populism.