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PurposeIn Central Eastern Europe (CEE) the transition to market democracy significantly influenced the emerging corporate governance practice. The region, however, demonstrates much more diversity in corporate governance than expected in generally similar transition economies and the variables and their impacts only partially overlap with the variables of corporate governance in other regions. This research aims to focus on how to help discover and explain these similarities and differences.Design/methodology/approachThis paper is a review of the secondary literature. The review is carried out with the intention of providing an opportunity to map out new terrains or provide critiques of the direction of a research field. The majority of literature reviewed in the paper is published in refereed journals, but other resources like book chapters, conference papers, reports and in certain cases unpublished materials are added. The paper discusses the key topics and variables according to the requirements of a holistic approach to corporate governance.FindingsThe review of available literature indicates that much work has been done on a significant set of variables of corporate governance, both in the domestic (privatization and the legal environment primarily, institutions and market conditions secondarily) and the international (impact of foreign direct investment, European Union directives and expectations, globalization and global institutions like OECD and the WB) context, but this body of research has not been discussed comparatively, within the context of a holistic model. Existing literature in the first two decades after transition has devoted less attention to issues of hierarchy and institutions of corporate governance, although they have relevance to better understand the impact of the macro‐level factors on corporate governance practices and their differences in the region. The paper has indicated the importance of a systematic review of macro‐level factors, both internal and external from a national perspective, influencing corporate governance practices.Research limitations/implicationsA systematic review of the variables of corporate governance in CEE has been missing to date and the theoretical framework adequate for pursuing such research is emerging only recently. The further elaboration and application of a holistic approach is necessary to analyze the numerous aspects that influence and shape corporate governance structures and practices in transition economies and to understand the differences that prevail even after two decades of transition to market democracy.Originality/valueThe paper provides a comprehensive review of the literature on corporate governance practices and the factors influencing the emergence and impact of those codes in CEE. It argues for a holistic approach not applied before in the research of corporate governance in transition economies; and discusses the role of external and domestic macro‐level factors in explaining the differences in the emerging national practices. It emphasizes the importance of the holistic analysis in future research.

Zwischen 1998 und 2004 haben die Ausschüsse am Britischen Parlament 15 Online- Anhörungen (online consultations) durchgeführt. Die dabei gemachten Erfahrungen sind interessant vor dem Hintergrund von Bestrebungen, die Kommunikation zwischen Parlament und Öffentlichkeit zu intensivieren, die repräsentative Demokratie durch partizipative Elemente zu stärken und nicht zuletzt auch die Rolle des Parlaments gegenüber der Regierung aufzuwerten. In Studie I wurde untersucht, inwiefern die Einführung netzbasierter Kommunikationskanäle die Anhörungspraxis transformiert hat, wie Best Practice definiert wurde und wie groß die Resonanz in der Öffentlichkeit war. Dazu wurde auf der Grundlage von Evaluationsberichten und den Webpräsenzen (sofern noch verfügbar) ein Überblick über alle Online- Anhörungen erstellt. In Studie II wurden halbstrukturierte Interviews geführt, um zu erkunden, wie die Online-Anhörungen von beteiligten Abgeordneten retrospektiv bewertet wurden. Es zeigte sich, dass sich Online-Anhörungen von der bisherigen Anhörungspraxis in dreierlei Hinsicht unterschieden: durch die direkte Ansprache von Bürgern, durch ein interaktives Diskussionsformat sowie durch die Kooperation mit zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren (insbesondere zur Rekrutierung von Teilnehmern); dass Online-Anhörungen in die offiziellen Richtlinien zur Durchführung von Anhörungen aufgenommen wurden und dass sich in der Regel zwischen 50 und 100 Personen aktiv an den Online-Anhörungen beteiligten, wobei insgesamt zwischen 100 und 400 Stellungnahmen abgegeben wurden. Die befragten Abgeordneten glaubten, dass zukünftig noch mehr Bürger online gehört werden wollen und sahen sich deswegen in der Pflicht, schon jetzt mit diesem Instrument zu experimentieren. Darüber hinaus hätten die Online-Anhörungen schon jetzt dabei geholfen, dem Parlament und den behandelten Themen mehr Aufmerksamkeit in der Öffentlichkeit zu verleihen, die eigene Informationsgrundlage zu validieren, und die eigene Politik durch Zitieren von BürgerÄußerungen aus den Online-Anhörungen überzeugender darzustellen. ; At the British parliament 15 online consultations were carried out by committees and all-party groups between 1998 and 2004. These exercises are interesting against the background of efforts to intensify communication between parliament and the public, to strengthen representative democracy through participatory politics, and to give more weight to parliament relative to government. Study I investigated to what degree the new communication medium has transformed the consultation practice, how best practice was defined and how big the response from the public was. Evaluation reports and websites (if still available) were analyzed to yield a comparative overview of all online consultations. Study II employed interviews to find out how members of parliament assessed their experience with online consultations. The results show that online consultations differed from traditional consultation practices in at least three ways: they addressed citizens directly, they were characterized by an interactive discussion format, and there was some cooperation with civil society organisations (especially for the purpose of recruiting participants). Further, online consultations were incorporated into official guidelines for committee work. On average, about 50 to 100 people participated actively in the online consultations, contributing between 100 and 400 messages. Members of parliament thought that in the future more people would want to be consulted online, which would justify early experimentation with online consultations early. However, they also said that they had profited already from online consultations in direct ways: Online consultations helped to raise awareness of the topic and the parliament in general, to validate their own informational basis, and to convey their own policy in a more convincing way by the use of quotes from messages by citizens.

Book reviewed in this article:Margaret Spufford. Small Books and Pleasant Histories: Popular Fiction and its Readership in Seventeenth‐Century England.Anne Kussmaul. Servants in Husbandry in Early Modern England.P. B. Munsche. Gentlemen and Poachers: The English Game Laws, 1671–1831.S. D. Chapman and S. Chassagne. European Textile Printers in the Eighteenth Century: A Study of Peel and Oberkampf.Enid Gauldie. The Scottish County Miller, 1700‐I900: A History of Water‐powered Meal Milling in Scotland.Chris Fisher. Custom, Work, and Market Capitalism: The Forest of Dean Colliers, 1788–1888.S. D. Chapman. Stanton and Staveley: A Business History.W. M. Mathew. The House of Gibbs and the Peruvian Guano Monopoly.J. E. King. Richard Marsden and the Preston Charrisrs, 1837–1848.J. A. Banks. Victorian Values: Secularism and the Size of Families.W. D. Rubinstein. Men of Property: The Very Wealthy in Britain since the Industrial Revolution.R. C. Michie. Money, Mania, and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth‐Century Scotland.Edgar Jones. Accountancy and the British Economy, 1840–1980: The Evolution of Ernst & Whinney.P. J. Waller. Democracy and Sectarianism: A Political and Social History of Liverpool, 1868–1939.W. J. Reader. Bowater: A History.Anthony Carew. The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 1900–39: The Invergordon Mutiny in Perspective.Philip S. Bagwell. The Railwaymen: The Histoy of the National Union of Raiwaymen. Vol. 2. The Beeching Era and After.Edgars Dunsdorfs. The Livonian Estates of Axel Oxenstjerna.C. Koninckx. The First and Second Charters of the Swedish East India Company (1731‐1766): A Contribution to the Maritime, Economic and Social Histmy of North‐Western Europe in its Relationship with the Far East (with a preface by K. GLAMANN).L. M. Cullen and F. Furet (Eds.). Ireland and France, 1600–1900: Towards a Comparative Study of Rural History.Hubert Watelet. Une Industrialisation sans developpement: Le bassin de M m et le Charbonnage du Grand‐Homu du milieu du XVIII siicle au milieu du XIX siicle.G. H. Kocks and J. M. G. van der Poel (Eds.). Landbouwkundige Beschrijvingen uit de Negenrien‐eeux.Jurgen Kocka. Die Angesrellren in der deutschen Geschichte, 1850–1980.Eduard Marz. Osterreichische Bankpoltik in der Zeit der groben Wende, z9z3‐z923: Am Beispiel der Creditanstalt fur Handel and Gewerbe.Angelo Massafra (Ed.). Problemi di sroria delle campagne meridionali nelleta moderna econrempmanea.Manuel Tunon de Lara (Ed.). Historiu de Espuiia, Vol. VIII, Revolucibn burguesa, oligurquiay constitutionism, 1834–1923.Martin Mccauley. The Soviet Union since 1917.Bruce R. Davidson. European Farming in Australia: An Economic History of Australian Farming.David J. Jeremy. Transatlantic Itulustrial Revolution: The Diffusion of Textile Technologies between Britain ond Anwrica, 1790–1830s.Peter J. Buckley and Brian R. Roberts. European Direct Investment in the USA before World War I.Charles E. Harvey. The Rio Tinto Company: An Economic History of a Leading International Mining Concern, 1873–1954.Ester Boserup. Population and Technology.

En las últimas décadas, las democracias contemporáneas en general y la democracia argentina en particular han atravesado profundas transformaciones, tales como el debilitamiento de las identidades políticas tradicionales, el incremento de la fluctuación electoral y la intensificación de la influencia de los medios masivos de comunicación en la dinámica política, entre otras. Todos estos cambios han tenido gran impacto sobre el vínculo entre representantes y representados, el cual descansa crecientemente en la acción de líderes de popularidad que se sostienen en la opinión pública y entablan una relación directa con la ciudadanía. Este trabajo se propone comparar y contrastar el rol de los liderazgos de Mauricio Macri y Luis Juez en la construcción del partido Propuesta Republicana (PRO) en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires (CABA) y el Partido Nuevo en la provincia de Córdoba, respectivamente. Ambos partidos políticos, surgidos recientemente, signaron las escenas locales: mientras que el Partido Nuevo logró terciar en un sistema tradicionalmente bipartidista, el PRO gobierna la CABA desde 2007. ¿Qué estrategias aplicaron Macri y Juez para atraer electores? ¿Cómo se vinculan con los partidos tradicionales? ¿Qué canales y redes jugaron en el armado de sus espacios políticos? ; In recent decades, contemporary democracies in general and the Argentine democracy in particular, have undergone profound transformations such as the weakening of traditional political identities, electoral fluctuations and the influence of the media in the political dynamics, to name a few. All these changes have had great impact on the linkage between representatives and those represented, which is increasingly characterized by popularity leaders who are supported by the public opinion and establish a direct relationship with citizens. From this perspective, we intend to comparatively inquire about the role of the leaders Luis Juez and Mauricio Macri in building the Partido Nuevo of the province of Cordoba and the party Propuesta Republicana (PRO) in Buenos Aires City, respectively. Both are new political parties that arised in the heat of the previously described transformations and whose emergence has reshaped their local scenes since 2001: while the Partido Nuevo became the third player in a system which was traditionally bipartisan, the PRO has held office since 2007. What strategies did Juez and Macri apply to draw electoral support? How did they antagonize with traditional parties? What networks did they create or resort to with the purpose of founding their own political parties? ; Fil: Mattina, Gabriela Lucía. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina ; Fil: López, Maria Victoria. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Ciencias Sociales. Instituto de Investigaciones "Gino Germani"; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

ABSTRAK Tesis ini menitik beratkan pada pergantian antar waktu ( PAW) yang selama ini tidak dilaksanakan sesuai aturan yang ada. Partai politik adalah pilar demokrasi. Jika pilar ini tidak lagi dipercaya oleh rakyat, maka hal itu merupakan ancaman serius terhadap keberlangsungan demokrasi di Indonesia. Dengan demikian, mengembalikan partai politik kepada jalur yang benar dalam arus demokratisasi di Indonesia menjadi tanggung jawab kita semua. Partai politik juga bukan sekedar organisasi tempat berkumpulnya politisi, tetapi juga dapat menjalankan fungsinya bagi kepentingan masyarakat. Dengan demikian dalam sistem demokrasi, partai memegang peranan yang sangat penting. Bahwa yang menjadi faktor yang melatarbelakangi terjadinya Penggantian Antar Waktu (PAW) adalah Penggantian Antar Waktu (PAW) menjadi alat efektif untuk menyingkirkan anggota dewan yang berseberangan dengan kepentingan penguasa. Pada saat ini sekarang Penggantian Antar Waktu (PAW) menjadi alat efektif untuk menyingkirkan anggota dewan yang berseberangan dengan kepentingan pengurus partai politik.Akibatnya eksistensi anggota dewan sangat tergantung oleh selera pengurus partaipolitik, sehingga menggeser orientasi anggota dewan menjadi penyalur kepentingan pengurus partai politik.Padahal keberadaan anggota dewan karena dipilih oleh rakyat dalam suatu pemilihan umum yang bersifat langsung, bebas, rahasia, jujur dan adil.Bila suatu partai politik mengajukan calon pengganti menurut nomor urut berdasar daerah pemilihan yang kurang jelas dan menimbulkan banyak penafsiran. Ketidakjelasan seperti ini akan menimbulkan konflik internal dalam partai karena sebagian pengurus partai (khususnya tingkat pusat) lebih memilih nomor urut menurut daerah pemilihan, sedangkan sebagian lagi (khususnya tingkat daerah) cenderung memilih nomor urut menurut wilayah yang diwakili.Untuk mengatasi situasi pada Saat ini sudah seharusnya pihak Partai membentuk satu wadah atau lembaga yang sifatnya permanen untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan partai politik sebagaimana yang diamanatkan oleh Undang-undang Nomor 2 tahun 2011 pasal 32 dan pasal 33 tentang Partai Politik. Bahwa dalam pemahaman Penggugat penyelesaian perselisihan partai politik di tubuh Partai itu sifatnya hanya kasuistik, dalam artian bahwa selama ini proses penyelesaian perselisihan partai politik dalam tubuh Partai tentang pedoman penyelesaian perselisihan internal Partai, dimana dalam ketentuan tersebut (pasal 8 ayat 1) menyebutkan "dalam upaya penyelesaian perselisihan, Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai dapat membentuk sebuah Dewan Kehormatan". Padahal dalam amanah UU. No. 2 tahun 2011 maka setiap Partai Politik diwajibkan membentuk suatu wadah/lembaga yang sifatnya permanen untuk menyelesaikan perselisihan partai politik, dengan demikian Dewan Kehormatan itu hanya sewaktu-waktu dapat dibentuk dan dapat pula tidak dibentuk oleh Dewan Pimpinan Pusat Partai, sehingga hal itu dapat menghambat/ memperlama upaya kader baik sebagai pengurus maupun bukan pengurus untuk mempercepat proses penyelesaian perselisihan partai politik. Kata kunci : penggantian antar waktu (PAW) anggota DPRD Kota pontianak, terkait kasus tindak pidana. ABSTRACT This thesis focuses on the recall of legislative members which has not been implemented in accordance with the existing rules. Political parties are the pillars of democracy. If these pillars are no longer trusted by the people, then it is a serious threat to the sustainability of democracy in Indonesia. Thus, restoring political parties to the right path in the dynamics of democracy in Indonesia is our responsibility. Political parties are not only an organization where politicians gather, but they can also perform their functions for the benefit of society. Thus in the democratic system, the party plays a very important role. That the factor behind the occurrence of parliament member recall is an effective tool to get rid of those who are opposed to the interests of the authorities. Nowadays, the recall of parliament members is an effective tool for removing those who are opposed to the interests of political party leaders. As a result, the existence of the members of the parliament depends on the political party's interest, thus shifting the parliament member's orientation into the channeling of the interests of the party's executive board. Whereas the parliament members are elected by the people in a direct, free, confidential, honest and fair elections. When a political party submits a substitute candidate according to the running number based on unclear electoral wards raises many interpretations.Such ambiguity will lead to internal conflicts within the party because some party executives (especially at the central level) prefer running numbers by electoral wards, while others (especially the local level) tend to choose the running numbers according to the region they represent.To overcome such situation, political parties should form a permanent institution to resolve the dispute as mandated by Law No. 2 of 2011 article 32 and article 33 concerning Political Parties. Whereas in the Plaintiff's view, the settlement of political party disputes in the party's body is only casuistic in the sense that during this process the settlement of political party disputes within the Party concerning internal party dispute settlement guidelines, where in the provisions referred to (Article 8 paragraph 1) mention that in dispute resolution efforts, the Party Central Executive Board may establish an Honorary Board ". Whereas in the mandate of the Law No. 2 of 2011 then every Political Party is obliged to form a permanent institution to resolve the dispute of political party, thus the Honorary Council may or may not be established at any time by the Party's Central Executive Board, so that it may impede the cadre's efforts either as party executive board or not to accelerate the process of settling political party disputes. Keywords: Recall of Pontianak City Local Parliament members related to criminal case

In the course of the research carried out by the authors of the article, it was determined that Belarus has recently been intensively acquiring new stable signs of not only a totalitarian state, but also an authoritarian one. In a state with such a political regime, undesirable values and target orientations are suppressed by political methods by one person in power. The recent metamorphoses of the components of the political system in the Republic of Belarus and their possible consequences are explained by the authors as follows. From a formal point of view, Belarus is a presidential-parliamentary republic. However, an analysis of the degree of influence of different branches of power on political life in the Republic indicates a different situation. In particular, today an unlimited super-presidential system of government is actually operating in this country, which is the basis for the assertion of the sole power of President A. Lukashenko. So, having come to power as a classic, essentially populist politician, A. Lukashenko, at the present time, largely relying on the state-police apparatus, widely uses repressions against his political opponents. The authors of the article summarize that, taking into account the current political situation in Belarus, the modern political regime in this country can be confidently characterized as authoritarian-populist. This is confirmed by the latest events both on the territory of the Republic and abroad. At the same time, the nature of the events taking place indicates their direct connection with the activities of the Belarusian special services. Namely, the direct influence of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KGB RB) on all spheres of activity in the country and the attempts of this special service to control the activities of the Belarusian opposition abroad are traced. The studies carried out by the authors showed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in comparison with other special services of the post-Soviet space, the KGB of the Republic of Belarus avoided radical democratic changes and remained in the form of a small copy of the KGB of the USSR. A feature of this special service and other law enforcement agencies is that today their leaders are appointed directly by the President of the Republic. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that most of these leaders at one time received military education in the Russian Federation. At the same time, based on the assessment of domestic and Western political scientists of the current political situation in Russia, the authors of the article came to the conclusion that its state is also constantly undergoing destructive changes. Thus, the fact that the leadership of the Russian Federation has recently been sharply raising the question of the need to expand the spheres of influence of the Federal Security Service (FSS) outside the country is alarming. Consequently, the Kremlin's desire to control the political situation in its neighbors, including in Belarus, is constantly increasing. According to the authors of the article, at the moment, by all external signs, the integration of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus into the so-called Belarusian-Russian grouping has already taken place. At the same time, cooperation between the KGB RB and the FSS received interstate legislative support and covered almost all spheres of political life in the Republic. Thus, representatives of the FSS of the Russian Federation are officially present in all state bodies of the Republic of Belarus. Thus, given the nature of cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, as well as the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, the authors argue reasonably that Belarus poses a certain military threat to our country. An assessment of the current political situation in the Republic of Belarus and its similarity with the Russian Federation, as well as a deep analysis of the peculiarities of the activities of the special services of this country, made it possible for the authors of the article to develop some practical recommendations in the interests of subjects of competitive intelligence. According to the authors, the recommendations presented suggest that the subjects of competitive intelligence should adhere to certain security measures in the course of their professional activities in the territory of the Republic of Belarus in the context of an aggravated political situation in this country (subject to the influence of the FSB of the Russian Federation on the activities of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus). The authors assume that the proposed recommendations will increase the efficiency of the performance of important government tasks by the subjects of competitive intelligence. ; У ході проведеного дослідження авторами статті доведено, що сучасний політичний режим в Республіці Білорусь можна впевнено визначити як авторитарно-популістський. Це підтверджують останні події, які відбуваються як на території Республіки, так і за її межами. Характер цих подій опосередковано вказує на їх прямий зв'язок з діяльністю білоруських спецслужб. Зокрема простежується вплив Комітету державної безпеки Республіки Білорусь (КДБ РБ) на сфери політичного життя в країні. Зафіксовано неодноразові випадки, коли КДБ РБ намагається впливати на білоруську опозицію за кордоном. Дослідження показали, що КДБ РБ після розпаду Радянського Союзу на відміну від інших спецслужб на пострадянському просторі уникнув суттєвих демократичних змін, зокрема залишився, так би мовити, маленькою копією КДБ СРСР. Особливістю КДБ РБ та інших силових відомств є те, що їх керівники призначаються безпосередньо Президентом Білорусі, при цьому більшість з них отримали військову освіту в Російській федерації (РФ). За порівнянням політичного режиму в Білорусі із ситуацією в РФ авторами визначено, що Кремль в сучасних умовах поставив питання щодо необхідності розширити сфери впливу Федеральної служби безпеки (ФСБ) за межі країни. Про це свідчить постійно зростаюче з боку керівництва РФ бажання контролювати політичну ситуацію у «сусідів», зокрема в Білорусі. За основними зовнішніми ознаками на сьогоденні вже відбулася інтеграція збройних сил РБ в так зване білорусько-російське військове угруповання. Порядок співпраці КДБ РБ з ФСБ РФ закріплено чинним законодавством цих країн. Під контролем вказаних спецслужб опинилися всі державні структури, політичні та громадські організації в Республіці. Зокрема представники ФСБ РФ мають право у службових справах офіційно перебувати в усіх державних органах Білорусі. Отже, з огляду на продовження гібридної війни РФ проти України, а також враховуючи характер співпраці між силовими структурами цих країн, можна з впевненістю стверджувати, що сучасний політичний режим в Білорусі становить певну загрозу національній безпеці України та її складовим. Оцінка сучасної політичної обстановки в РБ у порівнянні з РФ, а також глибинний аналіз особливостей діяльності спеціальних служб цих країн, надали можливість авторам статті розробити рекомендації щодо забезпечення безпеки діяльності суб'єктів конкурентної розвідки з огляду на характер співробітництва між ФСБ РФ та КДБ РБ. Очікується, що ці рекомендації сприятимуть суб'єктам конкурентної розвідки якісно та ефективно виконувати важливі державні завдання.

In the course of the research carried out by the authors of the article, it was determined that Belarus has recently been intensively acquiring new stable signs of not only a totalitarian state, but also an authoritarian one. In a state with such a political regime, undesirable values and target orientations are suppressed by political methods by one person in power. The recent metamorphoses of the components of the political system in the Republic of Belarus and their possible consequences are explained by the authors as follows. From a formal point of view, Belarus is a presidential-parliamentary republic. However, an analysis of the degree of influence of different branches of power on political life in the Republic indicates a different situation. In particular, today an unlimited super-presidential system of government is actually operating in this country, which is the basis for the assertion of the sole power of President A. Lukashenko. So, having come to power as a classic, essentially populist politician, A. Lukashenko, at the present time, largely relying on the state-police apparatus, widely uses repressions against his political opponents. The authors of the article summarize that, taking into account the current political situation in Belarus, the modern political regime in this country can be confidently characterized as authoritarian-populist. This is confirmed by the latest events both on the territory of the Republic and abroad. At the same time, the nature of the events taking place indicates their direct connection with the activities of the Belarusian special services. Namely, the direct influence of the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KGB RB) on all spheres of activity in the country and the attempts of this special service to control the activities of the Belarusian opposition abroad are traced. The studies carried out by the authors showed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, in comparison with other special services of the post-Soviet space, the KGB of the Republic of Belarus avoided radical democratic changes and remained in the form of a small copy of the KGB of the USSR. A feature of this special service and other law enforcement agencies is that today their leaders are appointed directly by the President of the Republic. It is also necessary to take into account the fact that most of these leaders at one time received military education in the Russian Federation. At the same time, based on the assessment of domestic and Western political scientists of the current political situation in Russia, the authors of the article came to the conclusion that its state is also constantly undergoing destructive changes. Thus, the fact that the leadership of the Russian Federation has recently been sharply raising the question of the need to expand the spheres of influence of the Federal Security Service (FSS) outside the country is alarming. Consequently, the Kremlin's desire to control the political situation in its neighbors, including in Belarus, is constantly increasing. According to the authors of the article, at the moment, by all external signs, the integration of the armed forces of the Republic of Belarus into the so-called Belarusian-Russian grouping has already taken place. At the same time, cooperation between the KGB RB and the FSS received interstate legislative support and covered almost all spheres of political life in the Republic. Thus, representatives of the FSS of the Russian Federation are officially present in all state bodies of the Republic of Belarus. Thus, given the nature of cooperation between the law enforcement agencies of the Republic of Belarus and the Russian Federation, as well as the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine, the authors argue reasonably that Belarus poses a certain military threat to our country. An assessment of the current political situation in the Republic of Belarus and its similarity with the Russian Federation, as well as a deep analysis of the peculiarities of the activities of the special services of this country, made it possible for the authors of the article to develop some practical recommendations in the interests of subjects of competitive intelligence. According to the authors, the recommendations presented suggest that the subjects of competitive intelligence should adhere to certain security measures in the course of their professional activities in the territory of the Republic of Belarus in the context of an aggravated political situation in this country (subject to the influence of the FSB of the Russian Federation on the activities of the KGB of the Republic of Belarus). The authors assume that the proposed recommendations will increase the efficiency of the performance of important government tasks by the subjects of competitive intelligence. ; У ході проведеного дослідження авторами статті доведено, що сучасний політичний режим в Республіці Білорусь можна впевнено визначити як авторитарно-популістський. Це підтверджують останні події, які відбуваються як на території Республіки, так і за її межами. Характер цих подій опосередковано вказує на їх прямий зв'язок з діяльністю білоруських спецслужб. Зокрема простежується вплив Комітету державної безпеки Республіки Білорусь (КДБ РБ) на сфери політичного життя в країні. Зафіксовано неодноразові випадки, коли КДБ РБ намагається впливати на білоруську опозицію за кордоном. Дослідження показали, що КДБ РБ після розпаду Радянського Союзу на відміну від інших спецслужб на пострадянському просторі уникнув суттєвих демократичних змін, зокрема залишився, так би мовити, маленькою копією КДБ СРСР. Особливістю КДБ РБ та інших силових відомств є те, що їх керівники призначаються безпосередньо Президентом Білорусі, при цьому більшість з них отримали військову освіту в Російській федерації (РФ). За порівнянням політичного режиму в Білорусі із ситуацією в РФ авторами визначено, що Кремль в сучасних умовах поставив питання щодо необхідності розширити сфери впливу Федеральної служби безпеки (ФСБ) за межі країни. Про це свідчить постійно зростаюче з боку керівництва РФ бажання контролювати політичну ситуацію у «сусідів», зокрема в Білорусі. За основними зовнішніми ознаками на сьогоденні вже відбулася інтеграція збройних сил РБ в так зване білорусько-російське військове угруповання. Порядок співпраці КДБ РБ з ФСБ РФ закріплено чинним законодавством цих країн. Під контролем вказаних спецслужб опинилися всі державні структури, політичні та громадські організації в Республіці. Зокрема представники ФСБ РФ мають право у службових справах офіційно перебувати в усіх державних органах Білорусі. Отже, з огляду на продовження гібридної війни РФ проти України, а також враховуючи характер співпраці між силовими структурами цих країн, можна з впевненістю стверджувати, що сучасний політичний режим в Білорусі становить певну загрозу національній безпеці України та її складовим. Оцінка сучасної політичної обстановки в РБ у порівнянні з РФ, а також глибинний аналіз особливостей діяльності спеціальних служб цих країн, надали можливість авторам статті розробити рекомендації щодо забезпечення безпеки діяльності суб'єктів конкурентної розвідки з огляду на характер співробітництва між ФСБ РФ та КДБ РБ. Очікується, що ці рекомендації сприятимуть суб'єктам конкурентної розвідки якісно та ефективно виконувати важливі державні завдання.

The focus of this paper is on the institutions outside the executive branch that include supreme audit institutions, legislative oversight bodies (such as parliamentary public accounts and budget committees, and ombudsmen), related independent bodies, and civil society organizations. Through their support for accountability, donor countries and international financial institutions seek to help countries: promote voice and accountability as an intrinsic human right, and improve development outcomes in terms of poverty reduction, sustainable development. The report is organized as: first, provide a brief literature review of research on accountability, and how donors and other actors can work to improve it, including a review of the experience of other bilateral and multilateral donors in supporting domestic accountability through their policies, strategies, and behaviors as well as through direct support to accountability actors and systems. Second, briefly review the guidance prepared for Bank staff toward enhancing accountability. Third, review some examples of the Bank's experience in supporting domestic accountability. Finally, we present some conclusions and accountability-related questions for further analysis.

Abstract:Since the 90s, after the crisis of the mass representation model characteristic of the Welfare States, and the arrival of the so-called audience democracy, typical of the States of the Global Era, several Latin American countries undertook constitutional reforms in which, among other changes, incorporated citizen participation and control mechanisms associated with participatory and direct conceptions of democracy, such as: the popular initiative, the popular consultation, the participatory budget and the recall, among others. This last tool of vertical societal accountability allows the citizens to dismiss the representatives elected by them through the vote in a referendum, which is called after their promoters have managed to gather the minimum number of signatures required to carry out the initiative. Colombia incorporated it in its 1991 Constitution, but only to dismiss governors and mayors. That is, executive authorities at the subnational level, thus excluding the president and legislators at all levels. In 1994 two laws regulated its exercise: law number 131 and 134. In the years 2002 and 2015, modifications were approved tending to diminish its requirements: law number 741 and 1.757, respectively. However, having submitted numerous applications in its more than 20 years of validity, no ruler was revoked until now. This article focuses on analyzing, first, the institutional design of the recall in Colombia, to determine if it has tended to facilitate or hinder its use by the population. In the same sense, the successive modifications carried out through the aforementioned laws were studied, which were aimed at reducing key requirements such as: the number of signatures needed to accompany the request, the minimum participation required in the referendum to validate the vote, the number of votes needed to dismiss the president, among others. Likewise, the empirical performance of this tool is studied during the period 1997-2015. The results obtained indicate that, despite the regulatory reforms that progressively reduced their implementation requirements, and having submitted numerous requests, no agent was revoked. Among its causes is identified the political incentive that the replacement of the revoked rulers via elections implies for its opponents interested in arriving in advance to power. However, the electoral political use of this mechanism, at the hands of former and future candidates for office, has not been accompanied at the polls with sufficient popular support to reach the minimum adhesions required for the revocation. In this way, the recall in Colombia would work less as a mechanism of citizen control than as an instrument of intra-elite political dispute. ; Resumen:Desde los años 90, tras la crisis del modelo de representación de masas característico de los Estados de Bienestar y el arribo de la llamada democracia de audiencia, propia de los Estados de la Era Global, varios paísesde América Latina emprendieron reformas constitucionales en las que, entre otros cambios, incorporaron mecanismos de participación y control ciudadano asociados a las concepciones participativa y directa de democracia, como ser: la iniciativa popular, la consulta popular, el presupuesto participativo y la revocatoria de mandato, entre otros. Esta última herramienta de accountability societal vertical permite a los ciudadanos destituir a los representantes por elloselegidos a través del voto en un referéndum, el que es convocado luego de que sus promotores hayan logrado reunir la cantidad de firmas mínimas requeridas para dar curso a la iniciativa popular de solicitud. Colombia la incorporó en su Constitución de 1991, pero solo para destituir a gobernadores y alcaldes. Es decir, autoridades ejecutivas del nivel subnacional, excluyendo por tanto al presidente y a los legisladores de todos los niveles. En el año 1994 dos leyes reglamentaron su ejercicio: la ley número 131 y la 134. En los años 2002 y 2015 se aprobaron modificaciones tendientes a disminuir sus requisitos: la ley número 741 y la 1.757, respectivamente. No obstante, habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes en sus más de 20 años de vigencia, ningún gobernante fue revocado hasta ahora. Este artículo se aboca por tanto a analizar, en primer lugar, el diseño institucional de la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia, para determinar si el mismo ha tendido a facilitar o a dificultar su uso por parte de la población. En igual sentido, se abordaron las sucesivas modificaciones realizadas a través de las mencionadas leyes, las que se orientaron a reducir requisitos claves como: la cantidad de firmas necesarias para acompañar la solicitud, la participación mínima exigida en el referéndum para validar la votación, el número de votos necesarios para destituir al mandatario, entre otros. Asimismo, se estudia el desempeño empírico de esta herramienta durante el período 1997-2015. Los resultados obtenidos indican que, a pesar de las reformas reglamentarias que redujeron en forma progresiva sus requisitos de implementación, y habiéndose presentado numerosas solicitudes, ningún mandatario fue revocado. Entre sus causas se identifica el incentivo político que el reemplazo del revocado vía elecciones implica para sus opositores interesados en arribar anticipadamente al poder. Sin embargo, el uso político electoral de este mecanismo, a manos de ex y futuros candidatos al cargo, no ha sido acompañado en las urnas de un apoyo popular suficiente para alcanzar las adhesiones mínimas requeridas para la revocación. De este modo, la revocatoria de mandato en Colombia funcionaría menos como un mecanismo de control ciudadano que como un instrumento de disputa política intra-élite. Summary:I. Introduction. II. Brief Definition of the Recall. III. The Recall In Colombia: Institutional Analysis 1. Political Constitution of Colombia, 1991. 2. Law No. 131 «By which the programmatic vote is regulated and other provisions are enacted», 1994. 3. Law No. 134 «By which are dictated norms on citizen participation mechanisms», 1994. 4. Law No. 741 Reforming Laws 131 and 134, 2002 5. Statutory Law No. 1,757, 2015. IV. Performance of the Recall in Colombia: its Application Between 1997 and 201. V. Conclusions Abstract:Since the 90s, after the crisis of the mass representation model characteristic of the Welfare States, and the arrival of the so-called audience democracy, typical of the States of the Global Era, several Latin American countries undertook constitutional reforms in which, among other changes, incorporated citizen participation and control mechanisms associated with participatory and direct conceptions of democracy, such as: the popular initiative, the popular consultation, the participatory budget and the recall, among others. This last tool of vertical societal accountability allows the citizens to dismiss the representatives elected by them through the vote in a referendum, which is called after their promoters have managed to gather the minimum number of signatures required to carry out the initiative. Colombia incorporated it in its 1991 Constitution, but only to dismiss governors and mayors. That is, executive authorities at the subnational level, thus excluding the president and legislators at all levels. In 1994 two laws regulated its exercise: law number 131 and 134. In the years 2002 and 2015, modifications were approved tending to diminish its requirements: law number 741 and 1.757, respectively. However, having submitted numerous applications in its more than 20 years of validity, no ruler was revoked until now. This article focuses on analyzing, first, the institutional design of the recall in Colombia, to determine if it has tended to facilitate or hinder its use by the population. In the same sense, the successive modifications carried out through the aforementioned laws were studied, which were aimed at reducing key requirements such as: the number of signatures needed to accompany the request, the minimum participation required in the referendum to validate the vote, the number of votes needed to dismiss the president, among others. Likewise, the empirical performance of this tool is studied during the period 1997-2015. The results obtained indicate that, despite the regulatory reforms that progressively reduced their implementation requirements, and having submitted numerous requests, no agent was revoked. Among its causes is identified the political incentive that the replacement of the revoked rulers via elections implies for its opponents interested in arriving in advance to power. However, the electoral political use of this mechanism, at the hands of former and future candidates for office, has not been accompanied at the polls with sufficient popular support to reach the minimum adhesions required for the revocation. In this way, the recall in Colombia would work less as a mechanism of citizen control than as an instrument of intra-elite political dispute.

This article is about the well-being of Afrikaans as a constitutionalist language. The adjective "constitutionalist" is meant to be a translation of the Afrikaans "grondwetmatig" as opposed to "constitutional" which is the English word for "grondwetlik". The question inspiring this contribution is whether the larger contours as well as the finer nuances of constitutionalist democracy can successfully be verbalised in Afrikaans. The possibility is considered that Afrikaans as potentially a language of constitutionally democratic discourse might have suffered irreparable damage as a consequence of its close association with Apartheid, but the author gives short shrift to this misgiving pointing out that languages such as English and German that were also "oppressors' languages" some time in history, are nowadays very adequate and eminently respectable languages of constitutionaldemocratic discourse. During the prevalence of a Westminster system in a pre-democratic South Africa Afrikaans was a disadvantaged constitutional language compared to, for instance, English. The latter lent direct access to the escalating post-World War II discourse on human rights. The question thus is whether Afrikaans has (or can develop) a constitutional or, more particularly, a constitutionalist register. The author turns to constitutional literature and jurisprudence to look for examples of how Afrikaans can be relied on to give creative expression to constitutionally democratic concepts, ideas and principles. He points out that the Constitution is a genre text, unique as supreme law, but sharing certain attributes with other enacted law-texts such as statutes. All of these texts should, for instance, be respected as products of legislative action meant to be of effect. To read and apply such texts is more like performing music than like reading a newspaper. This process is adequately expressed by the Afrikaans terminology "vertolk(-ing)" which recognises that elements of an interpreter's own personality and skill go into the process of interpretation and are reflected in the interpretive outcome. In the English language "construction" probably verbalises the process more accurately and adequately than "interpretation". The author proceeds to explain why, in certain instances where the term "grondwetlikheid" is usually used (in Afrikaans), he prefers the term "grondwetmatigheid" instead. He also reflects on the possible meanings of "constitutionalism" and the consequences of labelling the constitutional dispensation in South Africa since 1994 with the tag of "constitutionalism". The second part of the article deals with the consequences of constitutional supremacy and the concomitant need for judicial self-restraint. It is shown that section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution read with section 2 provides for the constitutional review of legislation and administrative action in a rather peremptory vein. Section 172(1)(b), however, leaves room for the mitigation of the absoluteness of section 172(1)(a) by authorising any court order which is just and equitable. Specific orders in this category (explicitly mentioned in the section) are orders limiting the retrospective effect of declarations of invalidity or suspending the effect of such declarations in order to give a legislature or organ of the executive the opportunity to rectify the unconstitutional state of affairs complained of. This result can also be achieved by, for instance, severing unconstitutional words and phrases from a text and striking them down or by reading words and phrases into an impugned provision in order to render it constitutional thus safeguarding them against annulment. Various interpretive strategies commensurate with judicial self-restraint are then discussed. The first of these is the interpretation of statutes in conformity with the Constitution which can take the form of either a restrictive or an extensive reading of a statutory provision in the light of the Constitution and its demands. It is pointed out that this reading strategy is to be distinguished from reading in which a court may order as a form of relief in terms of section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. Subsidiarity, another strategy commensurate with judicial self-restraint, is also discussed. Subsidiarity mainly has to do with deciding on an appropriate forum to decide a case (jurisdictional subsidiarity) or choosing an appropriate legal norm to resolve an issue (adjudicative subsidiarity). It is pointed out that subsidiary constitutional legislation (giving detailed and concrete effect to provisions of the Constitution) has in recent years played an increasingly important role to help put constitutional issues on the agendas of judicial and political discourse. Some observations are also made about how a constitutional neologism, co-operative government, can serve to induce self-restraint in the actions of the various arms of government (legislative, executive and judicial) in the national, provincial and local spheres. The author concludes with the observation that the speakers of South Africa's eleven official languages have a duty to explore the potential of their own language as constitutionalist language not just for the sake of the languages themselves, but also to preserve and promote the treasure of constitutionalism ; http://www.scielo.org.za/pdf/tvg/v52n3/01.pdf

This paper is one of several case studies prepared for the World Bank. The objective of the case studies is to provide the Commission on Growth and Development insights on the policy reform process in developing countries that give rise to economic growth. In contrast to other countries where economic reforms ushered in a long period of sustained growth, there is no such episode in Philippine economic history. Since the restoration of democracy in 1986, the Philippines under the Ramos administration came closest to breaking out of its 'sick man of Asia' image. The confidence generated by the administration among local and international players and analysts resulted from wide-ranging reforms rooted primarily in a sound macroeconomic and investor-friendly regime as well as global competitiveness. This study is not intended as a scorecard of the Ramos Administration. Rather, it concentrates on three specific sector reforms during the Ramos administration that demonstrate the elements of successful reform processes. These reforms not only helped to free up demands on public finances then- considered, in today's parlance, the 'binding constraint' on needed public investment and reduced risk premium to encourage private investments-but over time brought gains, some unforeseen and broader in terms of positive spillover effects on the rest of the economy, and linkage to overall growth today.

Yerel demokrasi kavramı ile bağlantılı kavramlardan biri olan ve literatürde kimi zaman yerel demokrasi ile eşdeğer anlamda kullanılan "yerel özerklik" kavramı, en genel anlamıyla; bir yerel topluluğun, yerel nitelikteki işleri, kendi başına, kendi organları eliyle görebilmesi ve buna olanak verecek kaynaklara sahip olabilmesidir (Keleş, 2000: 49). Avrupa Yerel Yönetimler Özerklik Şartı'nın üçüncü maddesi, "özerk yerel yönetim" kavramını, "yasalar çerçevesinde kamu hizmetlerinin önemli bir bölümünü yurttaşlarının yararı doğrultusunda ve kendi sorumluluğunda yerine getiren, hukuki ve yönetsel yeteneklere sahip yerel tüzel kişilik" olarak tanımlamaktadır. Aynı maddenin ikinci fıkrasında ise bu hakkın, üyeleri serbest, gizli, eşit, doğrudan ve genel seçimle oluşturulan konseyler ya da meclisler tarafından kullanılacağı ifade edilmektedir (Mengi, 1998: 70).halkın karar alma süreçlerine katılımını çok büyük oranda sınırlayan katı merkeziyetçi yapılardan uzaklaşarak yerel yönetimlerin yetkilerinin artırılması ve katı, hantal, bürokratik bir anlayış yerine üretken, gerçek anlamda eşitlikçi halk katılımına dayanan bir anlayışın hâkim kılınması, küreselleşmenin ve neo-liberalizmin yıkıcı etkilerine karşı bir alternatif oluşturabilecektir. Öte yandan, yerel yönetimlerin yetkilerinin artırılması ve güçlendirilmesi özellikle Türkiye'nin en önemli sorunlarından biri olan Kürt sorununun çözümüne de önemli ölçüde katkı sunabilecek bir potansiyel taşımaktadır. Cumhuriyet tarihi boyunca yerel yönetimler, özellikle de belediyeler, yerel demokrasinin sağlanmasından ziyade, yerel hizmetlerin etkin, verimli ve daha az maliyetle sağlanmasının aracı olarak görülmüştür. Ancak bu yaklaşım yerine, Fransa'nın 1951'den itibaren yaptığı gibi, ulus-devletin katı merkeziyetçi sistemini gevşeterek yerel yönetimlere anlamlı oranda yetki devri yapmak yoluyla hem ülke içinde eşitlikçi bir bütünleşme sağlanabilecek, hem bölgeler arası sosyo-ekonomik dengesizlikler aşılabilecek, hem de farklı yerelliklerin kendi farklılıklarını korumalarına olanak tanıyacak çoğulculuk sağlanabilecektir. Bu yolla halkın yönetimde yer alma olanaklarının geliştirilmesini sağlayacak mekanizmaların kurulması, yerel yönetimlerin toplumun bütün sorunları ile ilişkilendirilmesi, sosyal, ekonomik, tarihsel ve kültürel varlığın korunması ve geliştirilmesinde yerel yönetimlerin bir özne olarak değerlendirilmesi mümkün hale getirilebilecektir. Bu anlayışa ek olarak ise, söz konusu yerelliklerin hem gelişmişlik oranlarına göre denge sağlayıcı bir biçimde merkezi bütçe tarafından desteklenmesi, hem de kendi ekonomik kalkınmalarını sağlayabilmelerine imkân tanıyan olanakların (kooperatifleşme gibi) verilmesi, yani bir nevi ortaklaşma ve ürettiğini tüketebilme, kendine yetebilme imkânı tanınması, neo-liberal sistemin halk için değil sermaye için esas aldığı "küreselleşmeci yerelleşme" anlayışının alternatifi olabilecektir. Bu esaslara dayanan bir "yerel özerklik" anlayışı ile liberal yaklaşım tarafından savunulan yerel yönetimlerin merkezi yönetimin müdahalesinden uzak olması ile sınırlandırılmış olan "yerel özerklik" anlayışı arasındaki fark ise ortadadır. ; The concept of -local autonomy-, frequently used synonymously with local democracy, is broadly defined as `the possibility of a local community to independently handle its local tasks using its own means` (Keles, 2000: 49). The third entry in the European Charter of Self-Government defines the concept of self-government as `a local legal entity that owns legislative and governing capability to perform a significant quantity of public services within legal boundaries and under its own responsibilities in line with its public's interests`. The second article of the same entry, on the other hand, states that this capability is used by councils or assemblies whose members are elected via independent, confidential and direct general elections (Mengi, 1998: 70) As one of the frequently debated issues, the demand for more autonomous local governments is restricted to being repressed and independent of the central government by liberal approaches which aim to privatize local services, to increase the power of global capital flows by distributing public services, and to provide suitable conditions for the implementation of neo-liberal policies. In addition to ignoring general public participation, such an autonomy demand of localism seeks to adapt democracy to fit the needs of sovereign powers and to create a local governing platform where everything is subcontracted, transferred to the global capital via neo-liberal policies, and then left to the conscious of capitalism which, referring to Marx; -. cuts down the tree if its shadow cannot be sold-. Particularly today, an increasing promotion of global localization is witnessed while being moved away from the central government often equals to giving in to the wheels of the global capitalism and entering into a competitive localism with its global companies. However, this should threaten neither the existence of a local government as a self-governing unit nor the local public's right to participate in decision-making processes. The firm centralist approach, more or less like the neo-liberal approach, is an obstacle against local governments to become participatory autonomous units. Throughout the human history, all communities have been organized according to their own needs. Today, it is clear that self-governments are vital for the top-down expansion of democracy and the coordination of social development. In this respect, moving away from firm centralist bodies that cause obstructions and restrict the possibility of public participation in decision-making processes seems crucial to create an alternative against the destructive effects of globalization and neo-liberalism. This can be achieved by empowering the authority of local governments and by adapting a true egalitarian participatory approach rather than a firm, clumsy, bureaucratic method. However, increasing and empowering the authorization of local governments has the potential of contributing greatly to the solution of Kurdish issue as one of the important knots in Turkey. Throughout the history of the Republic, local governments and municipalities have been considered as effective tools in providing cost-efficient and prevalent public service rather than maintaining local democracy. Nevertheless, instead of adapting this approach, transferring significant amount of authority to local governments and loosening the firm centralist system of nation-state, as France has been doing since 1951, will not only create an integration in the country and reduce the unbalanced socio-economic conditions among the regions but it will also sustain the plurality by maintaining the differences of each local community. It will then be possible to establish mechanisms to enable public participation, to relate local governments with the problems of the whole society, and to include local governments in the protection and the development of social, economic, cultural, and historical assets. In addition, supporting local governments by the central budget in line with their growth rate, providing them with the autonomous possibilities of improving economically (e.g. becoming a cooperative); that is, giving them the opportunity to cooperate, consume what they produce, and be self-sufficient, could be an alternative for neo-liberal system's -global localization- approach adapted not for public but for the capital. The difference between such a -local government- and the one advocated by liberal approach repressed from central government is self-evident.

How a new breed of dictators holds power by manipulating information and faking democracyHitler, Stalin, and Mao ruled through violence, fear, and ideology. But in recent decades a new breed of media-savvy strongmen has been redesigning authoritarian rule for a more sophisticated, globally connected world. In place of overt, mass repression, rulers such as Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Viktor Orbán control their citizens by distorting information and simulating democratic procedures. Like spin doctors in democracies, they spin the news to engineer support. Uncovering this new brand of authoritarianism, Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman explain the rise of such "spin dictators," describing how they emerge and operate, the new threats they pose, and how democracies should respond.Spin Dictators traces how leaders such as Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Peru's Alberto Fujimori pioneered less violent, more covert, and more effective methods of monopolizing power. They cultivated an image of competence, concealed censorship, and used democratic institutions to undermine democracy, all while increasing international engagement for financial and reputational benefits. The book reveals why most of today's authoritarians are spin dictators—and how they differ from the remaining "fear dictators" such as Kim Jong-un and Bashar al-Assad, as well as from masters of high-tech repression like Xi Jinping.Offering incisive portraits of today's authoritarian leaders, Spin Dictators explains some of the great political puzzles of our time—from how dictators can survive in an age of growing modernity to the disturbing convergence and mutual sympathy between dictators and populists like Donald Trump

Strengthening the rule of law is widely regarded among traditional donors, multilateral institutions, and a growing number of middle income and fragile states as a necessary precondition for sustainable peace, poverty alleviation, and development. Crime and violence deter investment and lower employment, undermine social institutions, and divert resources through direct and indirect costs, all of which hinder development. It is likely to disproportionately affect poor and marginalized populations by limiting access to basic services. The formal criminal justice system is seen in many environments as failing to deliver justice. Most states experiencing fragility do not have the capacity to effectively prevent crime, enforce laws, or peacefully resolve disputes across the whole of their territories. There is another powerful deterrent for communities to seek redress through state criminal justice institutions: they are frequently a primary instrument for the government and elites to maintain power and control through the perpetration of injustice. The informal system, however, is alone insufficient to handle the pressing justice requirements of fragile states, not least for preventing and responding to inter-communal conflict, to serious organized and cross-border crime, and to public corruption and other 'white collar' crime.