Suchergebnisse

Taking as a whole, the quality of the drinking water distributed in France was improved thanks to curative and palliative solutions. However, the quality of the water resources used to produce the drinking water keep on deteriorating. The Water Framework Directive (WFD), aiming at a good state of the waters in 2015, constraints the managers of the water resources dedicated to human feeding to integrate regulatory injunctions (health, environmentalist, managerial) and structural imperatives (reassurance of supply), while taking into account economic issues (i.e. facilities rationalisation, cost sharing), political stakes (i.e. institutional, local) and social concerns (i.e. solidarity, acceptability of water price). Two rival managerial logics are facing these injunctions. This first one, based on the watershed, implies to position the Water Agencies at the centre of the planning and funding schemes of water policies. The second logic aims at reinforcing the Department (a French local authority) on these issues. These logics are fully part of a process which main consequences are the increase of the interdependence and co-responsibility of the multiple actors (public and private) involved in the steering of health and environment policies at the multiple levels of governance in Europe. The thesis developed here is that the heterogeneity –of the injunctions, issues and ways to articulate the managerial logics- leads to a reframing of the drinkable water governance, which this work proposes to describe and analyse. The sociological research device relies on a multi-level (i.e. national and the various levels of the French local authorities) understanding of the governance of the drinking water quality, emerging since the 2000s (WFD), and on the analysis of 6 cases: the legislative negotiations of the LEMA (2006), a Departement's management of the AEP process, a reframing of the AEP services during a health crisis, and the implementation of three devices of the drinking water preservation (legislative, experimental ...

This study sheds light on the subject of political development which has come to the attention of Jordan's political leadership during the past decade or so. It also, attempts to probe into the capability of the official Jordanian political insititutions such as the parliament, and the civil society associations such as the political parties and professional associations; and investigates obstacles facing these institutions; and to reflect the impacts of political culture on such development. This study has also been carried out on the basis of the hypothesis which states that the role which the parliament and the civil societies play into political development is still quite weak and ineffective. In addition, traditional political culture and social heritage, and some legislations and laws still pose serious obstacles to the political development in Jordan. To test the validity or invalidity of such hypothesis, the descriptive approach has been adopted. The results of the study confirmed the hypothesis being proposed. They also showed that the process of democratic reform and political development since the early 1990s has not been up to the expectations, and that the objective environment needed for such a process has not been available. The study ascribes the shortcomings of the democratic reform and political development process in Jordan to a number of obstacles, including weak civil society associations and parliament, the presence of some inconvenient laws, and the dominance of traditional culture in society. In light of the results, the study provides a number of recommendations that may enhance the process of politivcal development, the most important of which are constitutional and legal reforms to strengthen the role of civil associations, especially political parties and professional associations, the limitation of the executive branch encrochement upon them; and the adoption of a civil and democratic political culture which insures an active role of such institutions and associations in the process of political development.

Taking as a whole, the quality of the drinking water distributed in France was improved thanks to curative and palliative solutions. However, the quality of the water resources used to produce the drinking water keep on deteriorating. The Water Framework Directive (WFD), aiming at a good state of the waters in 2015, constraints the managers of the water resources dedicated to human feeding to integrate regulatory injunctions (health, environmentalist, managerial) and structural imperatives (reassurance of supply), while taking into account economic issues (i.e. facilities rationalisation, cost sharing), political stakes (i.e. institutional, local) and social concerns (i.e. solidarity, acceptability of water price). Two rival managerial logics are facing these injunctions. This first one, based on the watershed, implies to position the Water Agencies at the centre of the planning and funding schemes of water policies. The second logic aims at reinforcing the Department (a French local authority) on these issues. These logics are fully part of a process which main consequences are the increase of the interdependence and co-responsibility of the multiple actors (public and private) involved in the steering of health and environment policies at the multiple levels of governance in Europe. The thesis developed here is that the heterogeneity –of the injunctions, issues and ways to articulate the managerial logics- leads to a reframing of the drinkable water governance, which this work proposes to describe and analyse. The sociological research device relies on a multi-level (i.e. national and the various levels of the French local authorities) understanding of the governance of the drinking water quality, emerging since the 2000s (WFD), and on the analysis of 6 cases: the legislative negotiations of the LEMA (2006), a Departement's management of the AEP process, a reframing of the AEP services during a health crisis, and the implementation of three devices of the drinking water preservation (legislative, experimental ...

The following is a translation of the Nagoya High Court's decision in Mōri v. Japan, a case challenging the constitutionality of Japan's deployment of its Self-Defense Forces ("SDF") to the Middle East in connection with the United States-led occupation of Iraq. Beginning in December of 2003, Japan deployed ground and air forces of the SDF to the Middle East, including three C-130H "Hercules" transport aircraft which were used to airlift coalition forces and supplies between Kuwait and Baghdad. In response, more than 5,700 citizens, represented by over 800 attorneys, filed lawsuits in eleven district courts across the country in one of the largest coordinated litigation efforts in modern Japanese history. In Mōri, the plaintiffs argued that the deployment violated their "right to live in peace" [heiwateki seizonken], provided in the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, which they defined as "the right to live in a Japan that does not engage in war or the use of military force." They also argued that the deployment violated Article 9 of the Constitution, which renounces war and prohibits the use or threat of force. They demanded an injunction against the deployment, a confirmation that the deployment was unconstitutional, and ¥10,000 each (approx. US$100) in damages. The case turned on whether the right to live in peace is a "concrete right" [gutaiteki kenri], meaning a right that can be enforced in court. The plaintiffs argued that the Preamble, Article 9, and the individual rights provided in Chapter III of the Constitution together guarantee the right to live in peace. The government argued that the right to live in peace is merely an abstract concept, not an enforceable right, and therefore the plaintiffs lacked a legal interest in the lawsuit necessary to establish standing. The Nagoya District Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and dismissed the case without addressing the constitutionality of the deployment under Article 9. However, the district court recognized a concrete aspect of the right ...

Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas y Empresariales. Ciencias del Desarrollo Regional ; In the present investigation he/she thinks about to settle down how it influences the human development in the socioeconomic dynamics of the regions of the State of Michoacán to propose politics approaches that impel the regional development of the entity under a territorial perspective of the endogenous development. According to the above-mentioned we can establish that the conception of the Human Development of which leaves is the one outlined by the Program of United Nations for the Development (UNDP 2005) and that an even methodology exists its mensuration that is expressed in the Index of Human (constituted by three dimensions health, education and entrance) Development and that regularly from 1992 the international organism comes calculating and reporting under the format of annual world reports, also this mensuration you is also carried out at level of studies country and knead regions, federative entities or its equivalent (departments, counties, etc.) ones and municipalities in a considerable quantity of countries most of which carry out them in coordination with the own UNDP, however and independent studies also exist in territorial different environments. On the other hand, in accordance with the Latin American Institute of Economic and Social Planeación (ILPES 2005), from the territorial perspective of the endogenous development, the study of the socioeconomic regional and municipal dynamics can be approached starting from considering the population's characteristics, the migration, the health, the education (aspects already considered in IDH of UNDP), housing and services, the employment, the generation of wealth and its distribution (also considered in IDH), the participation of the economic sectors, the localization, the specialization, the space concentration, the restructuring, the association and the geographical (Silva, 2007a) redistribution. ; En la presente investigación se plantea establecer cómo ...

Identity and action : the symbolism of the Navy.
The article aims to offer a preliminary summary of the state of research about naval symbolism, whilst going beyond mere description of the insignia of the various units. In practice the ways in which an armed service shows off the units that comprise it does not grow simly from the folklore of tradition. In the navy's case it is intimately linked to the service's view of how it wants to represent itself and what it wants to be most prominent. The regulation during the 20th Century of badges to go on uniforms, to designate specialists, along with the insignia on certificates and for individual units, is proof positive of this. It also illustrates the tensions that can exist between the aspirations of naval personnel, anxious to mark out their individuality, and the absolute need to maintain homogeneity between different units to preserve the coherence of the navy as a whole. From the end of the 19th Century to the present, the policy of naval leaders has had to compromise with practices and claims that are at times at odds with the unitary model to which they aspire for the fleet as a whole. However, because the navy saw its uni-dimensional nature change rapidly after the end of the First World War, it was obliged to recognise the individual specificities of its branches that operated above the waves and below them, i.e. naval aviation and the submarine service. The recent creation of insignia for the surface fleet forces is not a sign of some further fragmentation of the navy, but is indicative of the pursuit of the goal of unifying the entire service by means of a making a visible acknowledgement of the special competences of every branch.

This work tries to demonstrate through a case-study, that of the United Kingdom, that the study of the authorities in charge of maintaining public order inside the State helps to reveal the great divides, the fundamental characteristics, and the mechanisms, of its political system. The case of the United Kingdom public order system has been approached here through a socio-historical and political analysis. The idea was to identify the principles that govern, over a long period, the structures, features, fields of action and workings of the authorities responsible for public order in the United Kingdom. The search for the historical roots has enabled us to reveal the specificity of these structures of authority. They are both ancient and contradictory in the sense that they are the result, but also the reflection of a major tension within the British polity, the one that exists between the "local" and the "central" levels. Indeed, not only the historical approach helps confirming the persistence of very ancient structures of local government, widely acknowledged as a fundamental feature of the "British model", but it also reveals the importance of the much less well known tradition of a centralised model of authority inside the political decision-making system. It can be asserted, in our opinion, that today as well as in the past, in the field of public order operations and policies, the decision-making process is structured by major tensions : centre-periphery, partisan, ethnic, social, but also inter-services tensions (rivalry between the Police and the Army). These tensions express themselves through power relationships and influences, i.e. in terms of direct or indirect negotiation, conflict, and domination, between the various authorities responsible for public order. They also express themselves through several "doctrines", and are therefore susceptible to be informed by ideologies. That is why the study of what we have called the "public order system" is a privileged point of observation for those who want ...

On October 22, 1990 President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990.2 The Senate failed by one vote to override the veto.' The Act embodied the congressional response to a series of 1989 United States Supreme Court cases decided by a new conservative majority of Justices. Finding that these decisions drastically limit civil rights protections, Congress accordingly introduced the Civil Rights Act of 1990 to restore those protections. Congress then spent almost a year refining the controversial bill to make it palatable to the President and the business community. Despite congressional efforts, the President op- posed several aspects of the bill and, in conjunction with his veto, proposed his own version of the legislation for congressional consideration. Because the bill was couched in civil rights terms, its proponents branded opponents of the bill, including the President, as hostile to civil rights. Unfortunately, the rhetoric that accompanied discussion of the bill in both Congress and the media obscured the complex and technical legal issues addressed in the bill. Despite the veto of the bill in 1990, Congress clearly is not ready to concede defeat. Likewise, the President remains willing to enact a civil rights bill if a compromise can be reached. This Note examines the most controversial issues raised by the defeated legislation and proposes compromise solutions that would increase the probability of agreement in the future. Part II analyzes the dispute over the disparate impact theory of discrimination by tracing the evolution of the doctrine in the courts, which culminated in the controversial Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio decision, and identifying the most divisive issues such as allocation of burdens of proof, the definition of business necessity, and specificity requirements. Part II also outlines the responses of Congress and the President to Wards Cove and proposes a restructuring of disparate impact analysis that would serve the interests of both plaintiffs and employers. Part III examines ...

Bibliography: pages 112-130. ; The thesis explores the effects on the wine growing district of Stellenbosch of the transformations in the political economy of the Cape Colony in the late nineteeth century. It is the first in depth study of Stellenbosch District and also contributes to other historical analyses concerned with the impact of industrialisation on rural society. Primary sources used include archival records, newspapers and the annual reports of the district branch of the Standard Bank. Labour legislation passed in the aftermath of slavery was most successful in tying labour to the farms when the labour market was confined to the agrarian sector. The mineral and transport revolutions of the late nineteenth century brought about the first major reformulation of social and economic relations in the Western Cape since emancipation. Between cl878 to 1896 wine farmers were hit by the general recession of the 1880s, by the excise tax on brandy, by phylloxera and by periodic labour shortages. Farmers, especially those capitalising their agricultural production, looked to the Zuid Afrikaansche Boere Beskermings Vereeniging and later the amalgamated Afrikaner Bond to press for state aid to wine farmers. In the late nineteenth century farmers finally experienced the implications of the proletarianisation of the rural underclass. Many labourers left to work in the growing urban sector, on the Public Works or in self employment as market gardeners. Farmers in Stellenbosch, like their peers in other societies confronting the implications of industrialisation, regarded labour mobility as illegitimate. They felt threatened by outbreaks of arson and theft, but also by the labourers' new assertiveness. For a time labour relations on the farms took place in a context where labourers had a measure of leverage against the power of the farmer. By 1910 the farmers' world had been righted and this was no longer the case.

Through the Eastern Alps runs one of the great cultural frontiers of Europe, the zone of contact between the cultural sphere of the Mediterranean and the transalpine cultures to the north. This frontier has shifted back and forth over time, as have the boundaries of language and of various dominant political units. One of the present foci of culture contact in a zone of dispute and discord is the present-day Italian region of Alto Adige or Tiroler Etschland (still called the South Tirol by unreconstructed defenders of the traditional unity of the Tyrol) and the Trentino. Unified in the first part of the 13th century under the Counts of the Tyrol, the region passed into the hands of the Habsburgs in 1363, where it remained until 1918 but for a brief interlude during the Napoleonic period. The Napoleonic occupation divided the region, yielding to Bavaria the largely German-speaking province of Bozen (Bolzano), together with the North Tyrol, while grouping the Romancespeaking portions with Italy. This division became the prototype of later efforts to divorce the Romance Tyrol from the German Tyrol, a division effected again in the provincial separation between Province Bozen and Province Trento after the entire region was yielded by Austria to Italy at the end of World War I. Except for a brief period near the end of World War II (1943 to 1945), when both provinces were grouped as Operationszone Alpenvorland with Gau Tyrol of the Greater German Reich, the region has remained politically part of Italy. It remains also, however, an area of conflict in which Italian political hegemony and cultural influence has been combatted by the German-speaking population, impelled by a desire for greater autonomy or complete separation from the Italian state.

Constitutional Amendment. The Pennsylvania constitution provides: "Any amendment … may be proposed in [either house]; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each … the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same to be published three months before the next general election, in at least two newspapers in every county in which such newspapers shall be published; and if, in the General Assembly next afterwards chosen, such proposed amendment shall be agreed to … the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause the same again to be published in the manner aforesaid; and … submitted to the qualified electors. …" Herman Tausig, suing as a taxpayer, sought to prevent a popular vote on a number of proposed amendments undertaking, among other things, to repeal provisions thought to forbid the levying of graduated income and inheritance taxes and the appropriation of money for old age pensions. In holding that the action was not premature, the court stated: "The law of this state prohibits inquiry into the validity of the steps preliminary to the adoption of an amendment after it has received the approval of the people." Reversing, or at least qualifying, certain earlier rulings discussed in the opinion, it demanded strict compliance with the procedure set out above, but ruled: "The framers did not intend the Secretary of the Commonwealth should be responsible for the actual publication; he has no means of accomplishing this. Nor will the submission of a proposed amendment be frustrated by the neglect or refusal of one or more newspapers to publish within the specified time. … All the section commands is that the secretary transmit the advertisements of the proposed amendment to the proper newspapers within sufficient time to enable them to be published … three months or more in advance of the election."

A new revelation from Bossier City's contracted
city engineer relating to a state grant and a water deal between the city and Port of
Caddo-Bossier may explain why a City Council majority passed the deal despite
numerous red flags at least one of its members seemed to miss, as part of campaign
pursued by the Port, contractor Manchac Consulting Group, and the Republican
Mayor Tommy Chandler Administration.

It's frustrating to me, and perhaps repetitive if
not boring to readers, to have to go through this again, because the facts
outlined below have been discussed time
and time
and time
and time
and time
again,
and well in advance of the Apr. 4 meeting that approved the deal. But it all necessarily
deserves another look as a consequence of statements made at the last, Apr. 18,
Council meeting shedding light on the possibility that a strategy of ambiguity
engaged in by several parties with a vested interest in seeing the deal go
through sought to steer, and seemingly successfully did, skeptical councilors
away from a true and full understanding of the deal's implications.

By now, details of the water deal are familiar:
the Port would issue bonds to pay for a water facility for distribution and
treatment that Bossier City would run, which would commit itself to a long-term
liability equal to the total cost of the bond issue for the right to run it and
keep all revenues past costs once that amount had been reached. While the deal
would last 40 years, the obligation to rebate (legally necessary because of city
ordinances that don't let the city treat customers in the same
water/sewerage class differentially in rates charged) would begin only if and
when the city drew a single drop of water from the plant, which could be years
into it.

The financial information attached to it made its
acceptance on the city's part at best a risky gamble. The Port's executive
director Eric England quoted figures that suggested the entire cost of the deal
(two separate bond issues, one of 20 and the other of 30 years' duration) would
come in around $62 million. Further, given the city's recent history of an 11
percent margin on utility sales and those revenues generated, to reach the
point where enough could be made to keep all revenues would require that the
Port's tenants boost sales by 92 percent or, given typical city daily production,
11 million gallons of water a day from day one of the deal's kicking off (and
would be higher the longer it takes for the deal to begin) – a dubious scenario
(alternatively, the new business could be as little as 5.5 MGD, the level at
which the city could meets its obligation but not keep any revenues, as the
deal states it otherwise keeps half beyond costs up to the amount of bond
payments compiled every quarter while rebating the other half, but past that coupon
it keeps all).

In other words, unless the city sold to the Port a
volume of water so high for so long as to be very unlikely to occur, it would
have to hit up utility reserve funds, if not ratepayers, to fulfill its
obligation. Yet as has become evident since the Council backed deal, with the
full support of the Chandler Administration, at least one councilor, and quite
likely others, didn't see it that way. The clearest articulation of that has
come from the only councilor in support who has appeared willing to address and
has spoken in detail about the deal and his reasons for support, Republican Chris Smith.

In essence, Smith has said he doesn't see the deal
as a cumulative payoff to the Port. In his conceptualization of it, once the
deal starts the city gathers revenues and issues rebates, but once the Port's
bonds are extinguished, the city can leave the deal at any time without full
reimbursement. Thus, the perception of risk to ratepayers would diminish substantially.

The problem with this view – let's call it the noncumulative
– is it runs very much counter not only to the actual wording of the cooperative
endeavor agreement, but also to the public rhetoric of England's. And, as
it turns out, was a view that the Chandler Administration didn't discourage councilors
from adopting, possibly for a reason revealed at the last City Council meeting,
the one after deal approval.

Understanding this requires review of the CEA
sections operative to this task. They are worded as follows (emphases added):

SECTION 1.04: Term. The provisions of this
Agreement shall remain binding upon the respective parties hereto and their
successors in office and shall be in effect for a period of Forty (40) years
commencing on the ___ day of ____ , 2023, and ending on the __ day of _____ ,
2063.

SECTION 3.02: Receipt of Sewerage. Within the
limits and subject to the provisions of Article Ill, Sewer Service of the Code
of Ordinances of the City of Bossier City and this Agreement, Bossier City
shall accept for treatment such wastewater as may be generated by the
Commission and its users. Bossier City will treat all sewerage collected
through the sewerage improvements financed with the proceed of the Bonds discussed
in Section 1.02 above until such time as the Bonds described in Section 1.02 have been
fully repaid, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement.

SECTION 3.05: Invoicing…. Bossier City shall remit
to the Commission no later than the fifteenth (15th) day after the closing of
each quarter an amount equal to the lessor of: an amount equal to fifty percent
(50%) of all collections of revenue by or through the delivery of water and sewer services to the Commission and its users,
less documented treatment expenses of Bossier City; and (ii) an amount equal to
the pro rata amount of the next ensuing scheduled payment of principal and/or
interest (if any interest due) on the Bonds described in Section 1.02 above. In no event shall Bossier City be responsible
for remitting such payments described hereinabove, until such a time as water
is being delivered and consumed by the Commission and its users.

SECTION 3.05.1: Prepayment. In no event shall the total payments by Bossier
City to the Commission exceed the principal and interest payments made or to be
made by the Commission on the Bonds described in Section 1.02, unless it is
agreed by and between Bossier City and the Commission that early payment or
payments should be made on the Bonds. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
the total payments by Bossier City to the Commission shall not be less than the
principal and interest payments made or to be made by
the Commission on the Bonds described in Section 1.02.

SECTION 3.06: Termination of Service. Bossier City
may discontinue water service under this Agreement to the Commission or any of
its users for failure to pay monthly bills rendered by Bossier City in
accordance with Bossier City Ordinances.

Here, four words (those in bold) in 3.05.01 make
all the difference. The second sentence of 3.05.01 makes clear that the cumulative
view – that once the deal starts the city owes to the Port the entire estimated
$62 million, one way or the other by, it would appear, April, 2063 – is the one
in effect. And this reflects as well England's rhetoric, who through appearances
to the Council – its regular meetings and the first workshop of two – several
times proclaimed publicly that the Port would have to be "made whole" in any
deal.

Yet by the second workshop, England dropped that
phrasing, perhaps because the cumulative liability to the city was pointed out
in this space and elsewhere, and who instead began saying that questions about
this part of the CEA would have to be referred to the Port's counsel – who,
conveniently enough, never made a public appearance to have to take these kinds
of questions. Still, not once in public did England ever waver from the assertion
that any deal would have to have the Port "made whole" – unmistakably meaning whatever
the Port spent on bonds the city would have to cover and that this was the view
of the Port on the CEA.

In an appearance on a Bossier Watch narrowcast,
Smith tried to discount that ascribed meaning as being reflected in that
section, saying it applied only to the possibility of prepayment. This is
mistaken in triplicate, beginning with the three words "notwithstanding the
foregoing" that negates the interpretation that the rest of the sentence
applies only to 3.05.01 while in fact applying to all of Section 3 addressing
payments.

It's also mistaken in understanding why 3.05.01 is
there. It means that the Port can't force the city to pay more than principal
plus interest due in a period unless the city volunteers. And this leads to the
fourth important word, which entirely invalidates the noncumulative thesis: "prepayment."

"Prepayment" as a concept can't exist unless a total
payment amount already is set in place. If the noncumulative view held, or that
the city paid as it went without any further liability, a prepayment clause would
be irrelevant, for there would be no final amount on which to calculate what
constitutes prepayment, or the excess over the scheduled payment. The very fact
that the CEA has such a clause – much like, for example, a mortgage document may
have such a clause allowing a borrower to prepay in order to save on interest
expenses down the road on the set principal amount – presupposes a fixed
liability the payer can't avoid, validating the cumulative view.

The question now becomes how, and most importantly
why, Smith and perhaps others were led astray from understanding this. Here,
England contributed by alleging that the city could "walk away" from the deal
after extinguishment.

However, in only one place in the CEA is deal termination
discussed, Section 3.06, where if the Port tenants stop paying, the city stops
acting as their utility (even here, it's ambiguous whether the city has pay off
the full $62 million in this instance). Nowhere else does the issue of early
termination arise.

What England appeared to be referring to as "walk
away" is Section 3.02, which states after extinguishment the city can quit
treating sewage, and may have led to Smith's and perhaps others' misunderstanding
that the deal was noncumulative. But that section doesn't address the overall
liability in any way, with it just saying the obligation to treat ends, not the
obligation to pay. The second sentence of 3.05.01 – referred to in 3.02 as "except
as otherwise provided in this Agreement" – confirms that.

That mistaken inference was reiterated by City
Attorney Charles Jacobs, who (after England began refusing to answer questions about
financial obligations) parroted the notion that extinguishment meant deal off.
Still, nothing in the document allows the city unilaterally to terminate the
agreement – which includes paying to the Port an amount of money equivalent to
the "principal and interest payments made or to be made by the Commission on
the Bonds" – except by Port tenant non-payment.

But why would Jacobs do that or, in a larger sense,
not be more diligent in making clearer the actual intent of the CEA insofar as
the city's obligations went? It would have been so easy to ask that, for
example, the second sentence of 3.05.01 be removed, or that additional language
go in that would specify clearly that the city could terminate the deal after
extinguishment without owing anything else – and was something that councilors
could have directed be done had any realized what was going on and had been of
a mind to do that. Yet Jacobs raised no alarms and made no suggestions that
would pivot the document from the cumulative to noncumulative view.

The motives of some who backed the deal were quite
clear. The ordinance's sponsor, Republican Councilor David Montgomery,
since 2008 has made over $600,000 doing business with the Port, on whose governing
Commission sits some of his political allies. The city's contractor for utilities
Manchac Consulting worked both sides of the street, as months prior to deal approval
it had been contracted by the Port to draw up plans for the facility and its
ancillaries, and can be expected to play a major role and rake in millions of
dollars in commissions in the coming buildout.

The Manchac employee seconded as city engineer,
Ben Rauschenbach, throughout the process spoke sympathetically of the deal. As
it turns out, that may have been not only because of the prospect that approval
would bring Manchac future business, but also because Rauschenbach and Manchac,
whether with the initial complicity of Chandler and other administration
officials, apparently committed the city to the deal months before Council
approval in order to secure a grant from the state.

At the Apr. 18 meeting, in
conjunction with an ordinance to appropriate funds, Rauschenbach gave details pertaining
to the city having won a long-desired state grant to work on utilities
infrastructure in the city's south. It basically means the city can perform the
work at one-third cost, ponying up $2.5 million to receive $5 million.

It's not the first time Rauschenbach talked about
the project and grant, having brought it up several times over the preceding
few months. In the first round the city applied for it but, he said, according
to the rubric that scored requests had fallen a few points short. He added that
what he thought this time made the difference, even as he noted the project
originated for different reasons, was the port deal which he declared "pushed
it across the goal line" – "the ability to supply water to the Port was
important to getting the five million."

The Water Sector Program grant of which he spoke
comes from a $300 million pot from the American Rescue Plan, the large debt-fueled
package supposedly responding to the Wuhan coronavirus pandemic. At its monthly
meetings, the Water Sector Commission comprised of state legislators makes a
decision, which it then passes on to the Legislature's Joint Legislative
Committee on the Budget for final approval (memberships overlap).

His comments seemed to suggest recent approval, because
the Council only had given the green light to the water deal two weeks earlier.
But, in fact, the grant had been submitted back on Aug. 26, 2022, approved
by the Commission on Dec. 12, and days later by the JLCB. Indeed, the
project scored sixth-highest out of dozens approved. This event even was acknowledged
in Ordinance
180 of 2022 passed by the Council on Dec. 20 in that "Manchac Consulting
Group has assisted the City in the successful recommendation of the water
sector programs $5,000,000 grant award."

How could a deal only approved in Apr., 2023 be
part of a grant application approved in Dec., 2022? Only if the city
prematurely had inserted the deal as part of that, with the Port's blessing but
as yet without the Council's. Keep in mind that at its Oct. 17 meeting the Port
had approved its Resolution
19 of 2022 that authorized pursuit of the bonds to build the facility –
even mentioning that the money would go to "purchasing the necessary right-of
way for constructing and installing a water main, valve, hydrants, and other
appurtenances from the southern edge of Bossier City Water System to the Port's
campus which will be used to service residential customers along the route, in
addition to future industrial tenants of the Port" – six months before city
approval ever came.

In other words, the city had to approve the
deal in order to make good its promise to the state that the project the state
had funded would include the deal. And if that meant the Chandler
Administration joining with Manchac and the Port to downplay that the city was
making a hard $62 million commitment in order to cultivate the impression that this
wasn't so as a strategy to convince skeptical councilors, so be it.

So, who was in on it? Obviously Rauschenbach and
Manchac, whose behind-the-scenes maneuvering on this should become a serious
talking point when the firm's contract expires next year. That means at some
point Chandler and the rest of his administration had to have known and given
assent. And as obviously Montgomery, who receives invitations to Port
Commission meetings and when
the measure first came up, perhaps unaware of what he was letting slip, to
the Council delivered an impassioned plea not to delay a matter that "we've
been working on for quite some years."

Clearly not were Montgomery's fellow graybeards no
party Jeff
Darby and Democrat Bubba Williams,
who voted against it. Smith's dogged pursuit of workshops to explore the topic suggests
he wasn't, nor another councilor who like Smith has a short but clear history
of fiscal probity, Republican Brian Hammons,
who seemingly unaware that the grant had gone through despite his voting on
#180 actually asked Rauschenbach at the last meeting whether the Port deal had
contributed to the grant win.

In his Bossier Watch interview, Smith voiced
optimism that the decision had been made in an open and deliberative fashion,
contrary to the reputation the city has had for its elected officials making
backroom deals prior to the election that brought Smith onto the Council. On
this deal, that desire seems entirely misplaced. That Smith and perhaps others apparently
unwittingly supported a fiscally-suspect done deal isn't so much reflective of
a lyric from the rock band The Who, "Meet the new boss/Same as the old boss," but
an inability to achieve what the line previous to that counsels: "We don't get
fooled again."

The article examines the peculiarities of the denouncement of Communist heritage in Eastern Europe. The practical cases of the Anti-Communist legislation of the Czech Republic and Poland were chosen as the basis for research, their value of their experience for Ukraine was analyzed. The political practices of Romania, Hungary, and the Baltic States were studied as well; their legislation and the reasons for De-Communization are considered.According to the critique of Ukrainian De-Communization legislation in the United States and Europe, the study considered foreign "analogues" to Ukrainian laws, determining whether they differ and in which ways. In the scope of the study, differences in the starting conditions for De-Communization and lustration in the countries were identified. A peaceful, negotiated form of transit of power dominated, leaving the perpetrators of criminal actions of the old regimes largely still a part of the society which was experiencing a transition to democracy, and in many cases they even retained the status of political elite, now responsible for abandoning the old political system, in which the former communists were active participants. Both radical (Czech) and moderate (Poland) approaches to lustration were imperfect, due to the lack of documents of the old regime, or incorrect data in these documents. Subsequently, lustrations became an instrument of the political struggle of the right-wing parties against the "new left", the former communists who were able to remain in politics (similar to the political situation in Ukraine).The research has shown that the process of De-Communization and lustration began with the democratization of public life. Among the factors that affect the success of these processes are: the presence of representatives of the old elite in power, the level of legitimacy of the old regime in the eyes of the population, the level of control over society by the secret police. Most of the studied governments were set up to quickly eliminate the remnants of the "legacy" of Communist dictatorships, while acquitting the members of the resistance to the regime.Depending on the success and scope of Anti-Communist policies, three groups of countries were identified: full, partial and formal De-Communization. It has been proved that with the delegitimization of the communist past, the first group will expand. ; У статті досліджено особливості проведення ліквідації комуністичної спадщини в державах Східної Європи. За основу дослідження обрані практичні кейси антикомуністичного законодавства Чехії та Польщі, проаналізовано їх досвід для України. Опрацьовані й політичні практики Румунії, Угорщини, країн Балтії, розглянуте законодавство та причини декомунізації.Відповідно до критики українського декомунізаційного законодавства в США та Європі, розглянуті іноземні «аналоги» українським законам, визначено, чим вони відрізняються. Під час дослідження були виокремленні відмінності стартових умов проведення декомунізації та люстрації у країнах. Домінувала мирна, переговорна форма транзиту влади, через що винуватці недобросовісних дій старих режимів залишилися великою мірою частиною суспільства, яке переживало перехід до демократії, і в багатьох випадках навіть зберегли свій статус політичної еліти, яка тепер мала відповідати за відхід від тієї політичної системи, в якій колишні комуністи були активними учасниками. Як радикальні (Чехія), так і помірковані (Польща) підходи до люстрації були недосконалими, через брак документів старого режиму, або невірні дані в цих документах. Згодом, люстрації перетворилися на інструмент політичної боротьби правих партій проти «нових лівих», колишніх комуністів, які змогли залишитися в політиці (подібно до політичної ситуації в Україні).У ході дослідження було визначено, що процес проведення декомунізації та люстрації бере початок з демократизації суспільного життя. Серед факторів, які впливають на успішність цих процесів: наявність представників старої еліти при владі, легітимність попереднього режиму в очах населення, рівень контролю суспільства таємною поліцією. Більшість з досліджених держав була налаштована на швидку ліквідацію залишків «спадщини» комуністичних диктатур, на виправдання учасників опору режимові. Відповідно до успішності та обсягу проведення антикомуністичної політики було виділено три групи країн: повної, часткової та формальної декомунізаці. Доведено, що з делегітимізацією комуністичного минулого перша група розширюватиметься.

The purpose of the article is to analyze the structural and dynamic characteristics of the investment resources of the regions of Ukraine. The main objectives of the study are: analysis of the process of regional formation of investment potential and its realization in the form of capital investments; assessment of investment potential at the level of regional and national economy using dynamics and structure of gross accumulation and use of capital; analysis of the processes of formation of investment potential in the economy of regions of Ukraine in terms of institutional sectors, as well as external sources of financing investment projects.The use of methodological approaches to the assessment of investment potential is substantiated, the main elements of which will contribute to maximizing the opportunities of the regional economy for its stable growth, modernization and ensuring competitiveness in the domestic and international markets.According to the research, the process of regional formation of investment potential and its realization in the form of capital investments is directly dependent on the development of the national economy, the stage of its life cycle and the effectiveness of financial and credit mechanisms. It is also found that the amount of foreign investment in Ukraine depends primarily not so much on the stage of the economic cycle, but on the state of the investment climate, the determining factors of which are: political stability, the state of the institutional environment, the level of human potential development, the development of the internal market, and regulatory support for investment activity.It is noted that the dynamics and structure of gross accumulation and use of capital is an important indicator of investment potential at the level of regional and national economy. According to the regional norm of gross investment, the economy of all regions should be considered stagnant, except for the Kyiv region and Kyiv.The processes of formation of investment potential in the economy of the regions of Ukraine in the context of institutional sectors, as well as external sources of financing investment projects, are analyzed. According to results of the analysis, profit and depreciation are the main source of investment resources of real sector enterprises. The researched dynamics of profitability of the real sector enterprises confirms the growth of the balance sheet profit in 2016-2017, which gives grounds to predict the increase of the capital investments in the enterprises of the studied industries. ; Метою статті є аналіз структурно-динамічних характеристик інвестиційних ресурсів регіонів України. Основними завданнями дослідження є: аналіз процесу регіонального формування інвестиційного потенціалу та його реалізація у формі капітальних інвестицій; оцінювання інвестиційного потенціалу на рівні регіональної та національної економіки використовуючи динаміку та структуру валового нагромадження й використання капіталу; аналіз процесів формування інвестиційного потенціалу в економіці регіонів України у розрізі інституційних секторів, а також зовнішніх джерел фінансування інвестиційних проектів.Обґрунтовано використання методичних підходів до оцінки інвестиційного потенціалу, основні елементи яких сприятимуть максимізації можливостей регіональної економіки для її стабільного зростання, модернізації та забезпечення конкурентоспроможності на внутрішньому та міжнародному ринках.Проведені дослідження показали, що процес регіонального формування інвестиційного потенціалу та його реалізація у формі капітальних інвестицій знаходиться у прямій залежності від розвитку національної економіки, стадії її життєвого циклу та ефективності фінансово-кредитних механізмів. Дослідженнями також встановлено, що обсяг іноземного інвестування в Україну залежить насамперед не стільки від стадії економічного циклу, скільки від стану інвестиційного клімату, визначальними чинниками якого є: політична стабільність, стан інституційного середовища, рівень розвитку людського потенціалу, розвиток внутрішнього ринку та нормативно-правове забезпечення інвестиційної діяльності.Зазначено, що важливим показником інвестиційного потенціалу на рівні регіональної та національної економіки є динаміка та структура валового нагромадження та використання капіталу. За показником регіональної норми валових інвестицій, економіку всіх регіонів необхідно вважати стагнуючою, окрім Київської області та м. Києва.Проведено аналіз процесів формування інвестиційного потенціалу в економіці регіонів України у розрізі інституційних секторів, а також зовнішніх джерел фінансування інвестиційних проектів. Результати аналізу показали, що основним джерелом інвестиційних ресурсів підприємств реального сектору виступає прибуток та амортизаційні відрахування. Досліджена динаміка прибутковості підприємств реального сектору підтверджує зростання обсягів балансового прибутку у 2016-2017 роках, що дає підстави прогнозувати збільшення обсягів капітальних інвестицій на підприємствах досліджуваних галузей.

The article examines the peculiarities of the denouncement of Communist heritage in Eastern Europe. The practical cases of the Anti-Communist legislation of the Czech Republic and Poland were chosen as the basis for research, their value of their experience for Ukraine was analyzed. The political practices of Romania, Hungary, and the Baltic States were studied as well; their legislation and the reasons for De-Communization are considered.According to the critique of Ukrainian De-Communization legislation in the United States and Europe, the study considered foreign "analogues" to Ukrainian laws, determining whether they differ and in which ways. In the scope of the study, differences in the starting conditions for De-Communization and lustration in the countries were identified. A peaceful, negotiated form of transit of power dominated, leaving the perpetrators of criminal actions of the old regimes largely still a part of the society which was experiencing a transition to democracy, and in many cases they even retained the status of political elite, now responsible for abandoning the old political system, in which the former communists were active participants. Both radical (Czech) and moderate (Poland) approaches to lustration were imperfect, due to the lack of documents of the old regime, or incorrect data in these documents. Subsequently, lustrations became an instrument of the political struggle of the right-wing parties against the "new left", the former communists who were able to remain in politics (similar to the political situation in Ukraine).The research has shown that the process of De-Communization and lustration began with the democratization of public life. Among the factors that affect the success of these processes are: the presence of representatives of the old elite in power, the level of legitimacy of the old regime in the eyes of the population, the level of control over society by the secret police. Most of the studied governments were set up to quickly eliminate the remnants of the "legacy" of Communist dictatorships, while acquitting the members of the resistance to the regime.Depending on the success and scope of Anti-Communist policies, three groups of countries were identified: full, partial and formal De-Communization. It has been proved that with the delegitimization of the communist past, the first group will expand. ; У статті досліджено особливості проведення ліквідації комуністичної спадщини в державах Східної Європи. За основу дослідження обрані практичні кейси антикомуністичного законодавства Чехії та Польщі, проаналізовано їх досвід для України. Опрацьовані й політичні практики Румунії, Угорщини, країн Балтії, розглянуте законодавство та причини декомунізації.Відповідно до критики українського декомунізаційного законодавства в США та Європі, розглянуті іноземні «аналоги» українським законам, визначено, чим вони відрізняються. Під час дослідження були виокремленні відмінності стартових умов проведення декомунізації та люстрації у країнах. Домінувала мирна, переговорна форма транзиту влади, через що винуватці недобросовісних дій старих режимів залишилися великою мірою частиною суспільства, яке переживало перехід до демократії, і в багатьох випадках навіть зберегли свій статус політичної еліти, яка тепер мала відповідати за відхід від тієї політичної системи, в якій колишні комуністи були активними учасниками. Як радикальні (Чехія), так і помірковані (Польща) підходи до люстрації були недосконалими, через брак документів старого режиму, або невірні дані в цих документах. Згодом, люстрації перетворилися на інструмент політичної боротьби правих партій проти «нових лівих», колишніх комуністів, які змогли залишитися в політиці (подібно до політичної ситуації в Україні).У ході дослідження було визначено, що процес проведення декомунізації та люстрації бере початок з демократизації суспільного життя. Серед факторів, які впливають на успішність цих процесів: наявність представників старої еліти при владі, легітимність попереднього режиму в очах населення, рівень контролю суспільства таємною поліцією. Більшість з досліджених держав була налаштована на швидку ліквідацію залишків «спадщини» комуністичних диктатур, на виправдання учасників опору режимові. Відповідно до успішності та обсягу проведення антикомуністичної політики було виділено три групи країн: повної, часткової та формальної декомунізаці. Доведено, що з делегітимізацією комуністичного минулого перша група розширюватиметься.