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In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

In this work I'm proving thesis: the Berlin's distinction between two freedoms is legitimate, because the attributes of positive or negative freedom are characteristic to the past thinkers' theoretical thought. In the first part I'm setting forth the main characteristics of Berlin's two freedoms. I'm also investingating the works of Berlin, which are investigating the problems of equality, philosophy of history, pluralism and Romanticism and Enlightenment. I maintain that Berlin is proponent of negative freedom, because the freedom of individual choice is protected in his philosophy, person is comprehended as autonomous subject. Berlin is proponent of value pluralism, he maintains that equal opportunities must be ensured for all. In the second part I'm analysing the concepts of freedom of three past thinkers, I'm arguing that these concepts of freedom have the features of negative or positive freedom. I'm settling that there are certain attitudes of negative freedom which are dominating in the theory of Locke: it is because author states that all individuals are free and can freely choose the ends of life. I attribute the works of Spinoza to the tradition of positive freedom, because author states that only mind following people can be free. I state, that the system of Hegel belongs to those theories of positive freedom, according to which person can only be free if he belongs to the political community. In the third part I'm analysing the criticism to the Berlin's freedom division. Criticism is introduced in the context of the political theories of the XXth century. There are pertinacious controversy between the proponents of negative (individualists) and positive (communals) freedom. I maintain that the division of two freedoms is criticised from the tradition of individualists or communals. Individuals maintain that individual is upper value than the community and communals maintain that individual always belong to the community. I'm investigating two well-known paradigms, which denies the Berlin's division between freedoms – the proponents of "One freedom" and the proponents of "late Republicanism". I'm arguing that the theories of late republicans doesn't introduce "the third way", whereas they stay in the tradition of negative freedom. The criticism of the proponents of "One freedom" isn't motivated, because they judge about validity of division by researching everyday relations, not the history of philosophy.

Spanish 19th Century republicanism was broadly divided into two main political cultures, the leading liberal-progressives and the marginal liberal-democrats. Within this latter liberal-democratic culture, Pi y Margall's federalist project represented an attempt to build a party which was genuinely based on the people, yet ideo-logically sound and well organised. In addition to its leftist social proposals, its main challenge was the definition of a federal State, which arised both of reactions against the «invasión» of bourgeois statism, and of the willingness of popular sectors to gain some control of local politics. Though limited, the relations between these federalists and different regionalist groups seemed to créate an alternative to the hegemonic conservatives. The most coherent project in this direction was no doubt J. M. Valles i Ribot's catala-nist federalism, whose ultímate failure was but a consequence of the global failure of Spanish democratic federalism vis-á-vis the consolidation of the liberal bourgeois Restoration State ; En el republicanismo español del siglo xix, al margen de las divisiones internas acerca de estrategias y programas, actuaron dos culturas políticas de fondo, una simplemente liberal progresista, que resultó a la postre hegemónica, y otra, más invisible y margi-nalizada, liberal democrática. El federalismo pimargalliano representó una de las principales manifestaciones de ésta última, con un proyecto que pretendía construir un verdadero partido de base popular, organizativa e ideológicamente delimitado. Al lado de su apuesta de izquierda social, su gran reto fue el de la definición de un Estado federal, que surgía tanto de las múltiples reacciones sociales de autodefensa ante la creciente «invasión» del estatalismo central de base burguesa, como de la voluntad de afirmación del peso de los sectores populares en los ámbitos locales. A partir de ahí, sus relaciones con las distintas afirmaciones regionalistas, si bien fueron muy fragmentarias, parecieron abrir la posibilidad de una alternativa al protagonismo conservador. Sin duda el proyecto más acabado y coherente en esta dirección fue el del federalismo catalanista impulsado por J. M. Valles i Ribot en Cataluña. Al final, su fracaso político no puede analizarse sino en relación con el fracaso global de la opción federal democrática en el conjunto español y con la consolidación del Estado liberal burgués que, bien que mal, estaba representando el régimen de la Restauración

In 1787, the idea of placing an amending provision in a constitution was uncontroversial. Popular sovereignty was an assumed doctrine in the colonies; the people retained the unalienable right "to alter or abolish" their system of government whenever they so pleased. How this unquestionable right was to be incorporated into the new federal Constitution, however, was another matter. The delegates who faced each other at Philadelphia had very different views about which body should be entrusted with the power to propose amendments, when that power should be used, and how that power should be defined. Article V, like the rest of the Constitution, reflects a mixture of compromise and ingenuity. The delegates sought a national government strong enough to overcome the problems of the Articles of Confederation, yet with enough of a federal structure to placate Antifederalist fears of de facto "consolidation" of the states. By creating a dual triggering mechanism, one that could be "pulled" by either the states or the federal government, Article V satisfied both nationalist and statist that "amendments of the proper kind" would be put before the people. The polarities in the convention, however, were more than nationalist versus statist, or large state versus small. The debates that swirled within and around Philadelphia reveal competing conceptions of government: Classical Republicanism which presumed a virtuous citizenry who could be expected to sacrifice parochial concerns in the pursuit of a common good, versus the emerging Liberal assumption that society was composed of factions whose competitions could be, and must be, structured so as to achieve a stable form of government. This clash between Liberal and Republican assumptions became especially acute in the debates surrounding the first attempted use of Article V: the Antifederalist call to a second convention. Seeing only "discord and ferment" coming from a second convention, the Federalists articulated a new and darker view of conventions: Is there any guaranty that a national convention will result in the considered judgment of the people? How can the assembly avoid being dominated by faction and demagoguery? The shadow thus cast over the convention clause of Article V has extended far beyond the Founding. It has obscured from view what was to Eighteenth Century Americans the fundamental expression of the "language of democracy," the people's right to assemble apart from established institutions and determine their own form of government.

One of the most important administrative problems in education today is how equitably to finance the school system of a state, since frequently the question of insufficient revenue and disparity between school divisions and states reflects a larger societal problem of commitment to public education. The proposal to restructure, if not refound the present educational system as a quasi~ public marketing entity using educational vouchers now challenges the time- honored common school ideal. This study provides a philosophical rationale for the American common school to aid legislators, jurists, and policymakers in interpreting key terms in the educational provisions of state constitutions. It assumes that the school financing policies of a nation reflect the value choices of a people as well as their priorities in the allocation of resources. The terms selected for analysis: "common," "system," "uniform," and "efficient," are pregnant with meaning in the context of education. Defined etymologically and philosophically, they are "terms of art" because they suggest ethical standards for a common school system. In the process of defining each term, the study examines the intellectual roots of the American common school, an institution its founders believed could unite the nation and ensure the common good. The present movement to privatize public systems, however, reflects a paradigm of laissez-faire individualism that encourages private self interest and a divisive pluralism in contrast with an older, more egalitarian tradition of classical republicanism which has shaped the common school ideal. The phrase "common good," associated with the public interest, is a rubric used to define "common" and other related root terms such as "commonality," "commonwealth," and "virtue." It defines "system" as an aspect of polity and suggests that the terms "efficient" and "uniform" have moral implications for school systems that have a public purpose of effecting a virtuous and enlightened citizenry for the preservation of a republic. This multidisciplinary investigation emphasizes the duty of the state to educate in the republican, civic humanist tradition. It thus serves as a guide to policymakers required to make complex school finance decisions that will ensure equity and equality of educational opportunity for all citizens in every state throughout the commonwealth. ; Ph. D.

Free Negroes embodied one of the great dilemmas in the ante-bellum history of the state of Illinois. Nominally a free state, Illinois endeavored mightily to suppress, exclude, and dispose of a class of people who were the ultimate result of the anti-slavery movement. While a majority of Illinoisans deemed the peculiar institution undesirable, they had no intention of accepting free Negroes as equal citizens. Free blacks were often regarded as dangerous and a menace to the well-being of the entire society. Yet, Illinois reconciled its apparently contradictory views on slavery and the free Negro to a remarkable degree. The reconciliation of the slavery and free Negro questions involved the use of a dual perception of blacks by whites. This dualism contained a theoretical and a practical plane as a modus vivendi, which allowed the citizens of Illinois to religiously support the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, while simultaneously ignoring the documents' implications regarding free persons of color. In this manner, free Negroes were unapologetically relegated to a subservient role in a racial caste system. Occasionally, the dichotomy was challenged. When this occurred, the theoretical and practical planes, normally split apart by a gulf of silence, were drawn together with disastrous consequences for the advocates of change. Among the victims of this phenomenon in Illinois were the American Colonization Society, the supporters of Article XIV in the Constitutional Convention of 1847, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, and the Negro Immigration Act of 1853. In addition, political catastrophe befell any office-seeker who attempted to exploit the attraction of the two planes for electioneering purposes. Clearly, discussions of altering the dichotomy were to be avoided at all costs. This suppression, however, could not be sustained. By their very presence in Illinois, free Negroes provided the most visible and lethal opposition to the modus vivendi. This was done neither by sheer numbers nor by economic or political strength. Rather, free men of color contradicted the traditional concepts of democracy and republicanism not only in pre-Civil War Illinois, but in the entire nation. Inevitably, the dilemma which existed between theory and practice would have to be resolved, either by reason or force.

El objetivo de este trabajo es examinar el modo en que Kant concibe la relación entre el derecho político, el derecho de gentes y el derecho cosmopolita, en dos de sus textos jurídicos de madurez: Hacia la paz perpetua y La metafísica de las costumbres. El análisis de esta cuestión no sólo permitirá esclarecer principios fundamentales de la filosofía jurídico-política kantiana, sino que aportará asimismo nociones relevantes para la actual discusión acerca de los derechos humanos, el cosmopolitismo y el derecho internacional, temáticas que posicionan a Kant como uno de los autores modernos de mayor presencia en el marco del debate político contemporáneo. Me referiré, en particular, al modo en que Kant concibe el republicanismo como condición para la institución del derecho de gentes, e intentaré mostrar que la relación entre estas dos instancias del derecho público no debe entenderse como una relación entre la condición y lo condicionado. En efecto, se trata aquí de fines ?la constitución republicana, el derecho internacional, el cosmopolitismo, la paz perpetua? a los que debemos aproximarnos en un proceso de perfeccionamiento gradual de las instituciones políticas, fines independientes y, a la vez, íntimamente vinculados. ; The aim of this paper is to analyze Kant's conception of the relationship between political right, international law and cosmopolitan right, in two late texts: Toward perpetual peace and The metaphysics of morals. The analysis of this issue contributes not only to explain fundamental principles of Kant's political and juridical philosophy, but it also provides some relevant notions for the current discussion on Human Rights, cosmopolitanism and international law. These topics place Kant as one of the most attractive modern philosophers within the frame of the contemporary debate. In the first place, I will analyze Kant's position on interventionism, a relevant issue for the discussion on the relationship between political law and international law, since it poses the question about the limits and scopes of the principle of State sovereignty. In the second place, I will focus on the connection between republicanism and the institution of an international juridical community, and I will try to show that we deal here with independent —and yet, deeply connected— ends, which should be promoted, in a gradual process of improvement of political institutions

Ausgehend von Charles Taylors 'republikanischer These' hebt der Artikel eine besondere Stärke der liberalen Demokratie hervor: Aufgrund derjenigen normativen Orientierungen ihrer Bürger:innen, die als funktional notwendige Bedingungen ihrer Existenz vorausgesetzt werden müssen, verfügt sie über eine besondere Quelle gesellschaftlicher Resilienz, durch die sie die gegenwärtigen, durch autoritäre Infragestellungen und Anfeindungen geprägten Herausforderungen bewältigen kann. Hierzu wird ein im Anschluss an Niklas Luhmann sozialtheoretisch reflektierter Begriff gesellschaftlicher Resilienz entwickelt, der normativ-rekonstruktiv im Sinne der Kritischen Theorie Axel Honneths auf die von Taylor als Patriotismus angesprochenen sozialmoralischen Ressourcen angewendet wird. Für diese Ressourcen, erweitert um neorömisch-republikanische Motive, wird der Begriff einer auch für liberale Demokratien notwendigen 'republikanischen Disposition' eingeführt.

Versión abreviada del artículo : « Aux origines du républicanisme quiténien (1809-1812) : la liberté des Romains », dans Véronique Hébrard et Geneviève Verdo (éd.), Las independencias hispanoamericanas. Un objeto de historia, Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2013, pp. 49-63. ; International audience ; Con el fin de deshacernos de toda "ilusión retrospectiva" en el examen de los orígenes del republicanismo quiteño, nos parece necesario recurrir a dos operaciones intelectuales. La primera, retomando la intuición de Hippolyte Taine con respecto a la Revolución Francesa, es la consideración de un más-allá de la Ilustración: ¿Acaso no deberíamos tener en cuenta el rol de un "patrón clásico" en la génesis del republicanismo en Quito? La segunda operación propone que se den varios pasos de lado y que se considere a esta Ciudad capital en su contexto regional, a medio camino entre Lima y Santafé. Una historia cultural de lo político que prescindiera de este tipo de juego de escala considerando únicamente la circulación de las ideas entre los continentes, haría aún más hincapié en la teleología. En esta perspectiva, se trata primero de aclarar las razones que llevaron a que muchos historiadores ecuatorianos confundiesen los conceptos de Ilustración, Luces y neoclasicismo. Luego, de manera más concreta, es preciso interrogarse sobre lo que pudo significar el retorno de la elocuencia y de la enseñanza del latín durante el último cuarto del siglo XVIII en Quito. Por último, se hace pertinente examinar cómo el "templo de Minerva" pudo promover la edificación de su homólogo, el templo de la amistad republicana.

Versión abreviada del artículo : « Aux origines du républicanisme quiténien (1809-1812) : la liberté des Romains », dans Véronique Hébrard et Geneviève Verdo (éd.), Las independencias hispanoamericanas. Un objeto de historia, Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2013, pp. 49-63. ; International audience ; Con el fin de deshacernos de toda "ilusión retrospectiva" en el examen de los orígenes del republicanismo quiteño, nos parece necesario recurrir a dos operaciones intelectuales. La primera, retomando la intuición de Hippolyte Taine con respecto a la Revolución Francesa, es la consideración de un más-allá de la Ilustración: ¿Acaso no deberíamos tener en cuenta el rol de un "patrón clásico" en la génesis del republicanismo en Quito? La segunda operación propone que se den varios pasos de lado y que se considere a esta Ciudad capital en su contexto regional, a medio camino entre Lima y Santafé. Una historia cultural de lo político que prescindiera de este tipo de juego de escala considerando únicamente la circulación de las ideas entre los continentes, haría aún más hincapié en la teleología. En esta perspectiva, se trata primero de aclarar las razones que llevaron a que muchos historiadores ecuatorianos confundiesen los conceptos de Ilustración, Luces y neoclasicismo. Luego, de manera más concreta, es preciso interrogarse sobre lo que pudo significar el retorno de la elocuencia y de la enseñanza del latín durante el último cuarto del siglo XVIII en Quito. Por último, se hace pertinente examinar cómo el "templo de Minerva" pudo promover la edificación de su homólogo, el templo de la amistad republicana.

Version abrégée de l'article : « Aux origines du républicanisme quiténien (1809-1812) : la liberté des Romains », dans Véronique Hébrard et Geneviève Verdo (éd.), Las independencias hispanoamericanas. Un objeto de historia, Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2013, pp. 49-63. ; International audience ; Afin d'échapper à toute illusion rétrospective dans l'examen des origines du républicanisme quiténien, deux opérations intellectuelles semblent nécessaires. La première consiste à envisager un au-delà des Lumières, en reprenant l'intuition d'Hippolyte Taine à propos de la Révolution française : ne faudrait-il pas envisager à Quito le rôle d'un « moule classique » dans la genèse du républicanisme ? La seconde propose d'effectuer plusieurs pas de côté en envisageant cette Cité-capitale dans son contexte régional, à mi-chemin entre Lima et Santafé de Bogotá. Une histoire culturelle du politique qui se priverait d'un tel jeu d'échelle, en n'envisageant la circulation des idées qu'entre les continents, donnerait matière, plus encore, à la téléologie.Dans cette optique, il faut d'abord clarifier les raisons qui ont conduit de nombreux historiens équatoriens à confondre les concepts d'Ilustración, de Luces et de néoclassicisme. Il convient ensuite de s'interroger sur ce qu'a pu signifier à Quito le retour de l'éloquence et de l'enseignement du latin dans le dernier quart du XVIIIe siècle. Enfin, il s'agit d'examiner la façon dont le « temple de Minerve » a pu susciter l'édification de son homologue, celui de l'amitié républicaine.

Version abrégée de l'article : « Aux origines du républicanisme quiténien (1809-1812) : la liberté des Romains », dans Véronique Hébrard et Geneviève Verdo (éd.), Las independencias hispanoamericanas. Un objeto de historia, Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2013, pp. 49-63. ; International audience ; Afin d'échapper à toute illusion rétrospective dans l'examen des origines du républicanisme quiténien, deux opérations intellectuelles semblent nécessaires. La première consiste à envisager un au-delà des Lumières, en reprenant l'intuition d'Hippolyte Taine à propos de la Révolution française : ne faudrait-il pas envisager à Quito le rôle d'un « moule classique » dans la genèse du républicanisme ? La seconde propose d'effectuer plusieurs pas de côté en envisageant cette Cité-capitale dans son contexte régional, à mi-chemin entre Lima et Santafé de Bogotá. Une histoire culturelle du politique qui se priverait d'un tel jeu d'échelle, en n'envisageant la circulation des idées qu'entre les continents, donnerait matière, plus encore, à la téléologie.Dans cette optique, il faut d'abord clarifier les raisons qui ont conduit de nombreux historiens équatoriens à confondre les concepts d'Ilustración, de Luces et de néoclassicisme. Il convient ensuite de s'interroger sur ce qu'a pu signifier à Quito le retour de l'éloquence et de l'enseignement du latin dans le dernier quart du XVIIIe siècle. Enfin, il s'agit d'examiner la façon dont le « temple de Minerve » a pu susciter l'édification de son homologue, celui de l'amitié républicaine.

This book presents an important new account of Johann Gottlieb Fichte's Closed Commercial State, a major early nineteenth-century development of Rousseau and Kant's political thought. Isaac Nakhimovsky shows how Fichte reformulated Rousseau's constitutional politics and radicalized the economic implications of Kant's social contract theory with his defense of the right to work. Nakhimovsky argues that Fichte's sequel to Rousseau and Kant's writings on perpetual peace represents a pivotal moment in the intellectual history of the pacification of the West. Fichte claimed that Europe could not t

Zahlreiche bürgerliche Revolutionäre haben im 18. Jahrhundert die Demokratie begrifflich aufgewertet. Mit diesem Wandel ging aber ein zweiter einher: Die Demokratie wird zur repräsentativen Form umgedeutet, was dem demokratischen Prinzip jedoch entgegen steht. Repräsentationssysteme sind mit einer aristokratischen Rekrutierung des Amtspersonals per Wahl und der Abgabe politischer Macht an Repräsentanten nur eine elitäre "Alternative". Der Autor analysiert diese fundamentale Umdeutung der Demokratie, die mit einem aristokratischen Republikkonzept verbunden ist und keine Weiterentwicklung der klassischen Demokratie mit der direkten, freien und gleichen Selbstgesetzgebung der Bürgerschaft darstellt.