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Three different Europes: population and macro-economic behaviour
The convergence criteria that were defined in the Maastricht Treaty apply to macro-economic data. But these data depend upon political, social and economic specificities: they can hardly be described as a unique goal, regardless of time and space. Demanding that they reach the same magnitude in all thejx>untries that want to partake in the single currency in a few years time assumes that all these countries will by then have adopted a single social and economic frame.
Implicitely, this means that some countries will not be able to join EMU in 1 997 nor in 1999. It is impossible for them to identify at such an early period with the virtuous behaviour of those other countries whose virtue is based upon wealth. This is obviously the case for Greece and Portugal, possibly for Spain. Other countries such as Italy have already reached the necessary level of development, but on quite different social and economic structures. Symetrically , some countries that are not members of the the EC could abide by the Maastricht criteria either easily (Austria) or with some structural changes (Sweden). The present article deals with one of the roots of macro-economic behaviour: the population that behaves in a specific way. Indicators describing demography, rates of employment, living standards and so on clearly point to three different zones in Europe: north, south, and the DM zone as it was before the Berlin Wall fell. The Maastricht criteria somehow set as a goal the macro-economic behaviour of that DM zone, which has since started to experience enormous changes.

II: National Accounts Using the methods described in the first part of the paper («manufacturing output»), the second one deals with Gdp cycles. The role of the various components of final internal demand on one hand, of the possibly counter-cyclical agregates (public expenditure and external trade) on the other, are compared through time and space. Once again the USA and the U.K. appear as the most cyclical economies, possibly because countries such as Japan and Germany manage short term fluctuations more efficiently.

International Comparisons of Business Cycles Monique Fouet I: Manufacturing output Theoretical and statistical choices must be made in order to describe business cycles. The present paper explains why it was decided here to define a cycle as the ratio «index/long term moving average». Such cycles are observed from the early 60s to the late 80s for 16 OECD countries. Anglo-saxon economies appear as the most cyclical countries. The sectorial breakdown of manufacturing output confirms the usual assumption that equipment goods behave in a more cyclical way than consumption goods. But it also clearly shows that equipment goods lag behind consumption goods by at least two quarters.

Measured in dollars, the Japanese current account surplus started to decline in 1989. But this is misleading : the actual reversal of the trend started in 1987, when this surplus, measured in yen, started to decline. This is due to a contraction of the trade balance which appears in every bilateral trade account. During the period 1987-1990, the prices of primary products declined while the terms of trade of manufactured goods were almost stable despite the wide fluctuations of the exchange rate. Consequently, the contraction of the current account surplus is due to the movements affecting the volumes of manufactured goods : decelerating exports, accelerating imports. Changes in the dollar-yen exchange rate largely explain those volume movements despite a very active behaviour of Japanese exporting firms on their profit margins. This behaviour is particularly noticeable for equipment goods, and still shows in sectors confronted with quantitative restrictions in importing countries. External trade of manufactured goods is increasingly split between high value added exports and low value-added imports. This is consistent with the long-term trend of appreciation followed by the yen and by direct investments overseas. Direct investments overseas account for only a small fraction of capital outflows. Global outflows largely excède the current account surplus, which explains part of the yen depreciation in 1988-1989. The current account surplus will probably register a small growth in the coming quarters despite the surge of oil prices. But it will eventually drift downwards as the surplus in manufactured goods will diminish, while the yen will follow its appreciation trend.

Les échanges extérieurs de produits manufacturés américains étaient devenus excédentaires en 1897. Leur taux de couverture a continué à s'améliorer jusqu'à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ; le mouvement de baisse ensuite amorcé a laissé réapparaître un déficit en 1972. Celui-ci a été temporairement comprimé par la dépréciation du dollar des années soixante-dix. La surévalutation des premières années quatre-vingt a assurément aggravé la situation en termes de solde ; en contraignant les entreprises à se rationaliser et à se spécialiser plus encore sur les technologies avancées, elle a toutefois en partie enrayé le processus de déclin industriel à l'œuvre depuis plusieurs décennies. Suivie d'une dépréciation brutale, elle rend bon nombre de produits américains fortement compétitifs au seuil des années quatre-vingt.
Ces mouvements du change ont été tantôt voulus, souvent acceptés, parfois subis. Ils ont joué un rôle important pour façonner la nature de l'industrie et son insertion tant dans les autres activités intérieures que dans l'environnement international. Exerçant leurs effets par le jeu des prix, ils ne peuvent concerner toutefois que les produits ayant des substituts proches. C'est pourquoi ils auraient été peu pertinents durant les décennies cinquante et soixante face à des concurrents européens et japonais qui avaient un retard technologique à combler. C'est pourquoi aussi ils ont atteint aujourd'hui la limite de leur efficacité face au continent asiatique caractérisé par des salaires faibles. Une dépréciation additionnelle du dollar, qui n'est pas impossible, ne permettrait pas à elle seule d'enrayer la perte de vitesse de l'industrie américaine. Le redressement de la situation requiert une inflexion profonde des politiques budgétaire et monétaire, nécessaire pour permettre un ajustement intérieur de la demande et une réorientation géo-sectorielle internationale.

The cities of Hong-Kong and Singapore, of british origin and Chinese population, enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of southern Europe. They have both experimented an exceptionally fast growth over the past twenty years within opposite social and political frames : liberalism in Hong- Kong, interventionism in Singapore.
The manufacturing sector, differing in strategy an sectorial structure, is in both cases almost wholly export-oriented. It accounts for only a third of Gdp. Economic activity mainly relies on international trade and services and therefore cannot be imitated by neighbour economies. Recent macro-economic difficulties are worse in Singapore, linked with Asean countries, than in Hong-Kong, linked with OECD countries and mainland China. They do not mean the end of a miracle. Their growth was no miracle, and is likely to pick up in the near future, although at a slower pace.

L'ampleur des contraintes extérieures pesant sur les zones dites « en voie de développement » fait de leur desserrement une condition nécessaire, mais non suffisante, à toute croissance économique d'ici la fin de la décennie dans des pays qui, par choix ou par nécessité, se sont insérés dans les marchés mondiaux. Au Moyen-Orient la stagnation du pouvoir d'achat du pétrole, en Afrique la régression du pouvoir d'achat des matières premières, en Amérique latine la charge de la dette, en Asie le protectionnisme des pays industrialisés sont autant de risques qui laissent attendre une régression des niveaux de vie durant les années à venir. Pour qu'ils ne se matérialisent pas, il faudrait soit la conjonction — peu vraisemblable — d'hypothèses extrêmement favorables dans le cheminement de la croissance en OCDE, soit une modification de l'attitude du « Nord » face au « Sud ».

L'instabilité potentielle des pétrodollars avait suscité des craintes relatives à leur recyclage. Mais près de 40 % de ces capitaux ont été investis à moyen et long terme dans les pays industrialisés, les États- Unis accueillant à eux seuls la moitié de ces placements. Un montant équivalent a été déposé dans les banques occidentales, qui l'ont transformé en prêts à moyen et long terme. Le reste a été prêté aux organisations internationales ou directement aux PVD. La contraction des pétrodollars amorcée au début de 1982 s'est jusqu'à présent concentrée sur les dépôts dans les banques non américaines. Au cours des trimestres à venir, elle pourrait affecter les autres types de placement. Cela risque d'amplifier les mouvements de change plus que de réellement perturber les financements internationaux.

Structural problems, worsened by the oil shocks, called during the 70's for adjustments that made some degree of recession necessary. But all through the decade, economic policies followed in industrialised countries enabled economic agents to avoid these necessities by increasingly resorting to debt. These policies have gradually become restrictive during the recent years, enabling postponed adjustments to take place. This process is well under way, so that the factors of recession will probably fade away in the coming months ; but there is no reason why they should turn into stimulus for growth. Unless new, dynamic factors suddenly appear, no recovery can be expected in France's foreign environment in 1983. The results of France's expansionary policies in 1981 and of the shift of june 1982 can now be assessed. Household income increased noticeably and then faltered for a while. Employment suffered no important decline as industrial production remained flat and productivity slowly increased. But the trade gap widened, and presently reaches an annual rate of 80 billion francs. As long as a worldwide recovery was expected in the near future, the resulting indebtedness appeared as a temporary nuisance. But it can no longer be considered as such when in most foreign countries economic policies still focus on structural adjustment, nor be acceptable as the price for lonely growth. Should restrictive demand management be used as the only way to curb the trade gap, then industrial production would register a 5 to 10% decline.

European economies have been diversely hit by the shocks of the past ten years owing to structural differences. Initial reactions resulted in a great variety of economic policies. More recently, external constraints have induced adjustment policies in all countries. The process is unevenly underway, so that economic growth can not yet resume everywhere. Signs of recovery will strengthen during the second half of 1983, but no real generalised recovery can be expected in Europe before mid-1984. In the early 1970's, France experienced particularly fast growth whose driving forces were household consumption and residential building. More recently, the latter has been severely hit by the economic crisis. As it declines, so does a powerful incentive to save. As savings are not completely reoriented towards financial assets, the fall of consumption is limited. Export competitiveness calls for a balanced judgment : it is neither good nor bad but, rather, slowly improving. Although market shares are slightly increasing, exports are weak because world demand is contracting at a pace often underestimated. The trade deficit will not vanish with a recovery abroad, but it could very well be halved in a year's time.

Western economies have been undergoing a recession over the past two years. Though in a more favourable cyclical phase when hit by a second oil shock, less severe than the first, they had been structurally weakened. Moreover, international competition was more fierce while there was less scope for adaptation in policy. The recession now seems to be bottoming out. A fall in interest rates will allow activity to pick up slowly in the United States, though it might rekindle inflation. The depreciation of the Dollar against the Deutschmark which will probably ensue, would loosen restrictions on European economic policies. Any resulting upturn in activity will however be moderate, strong growth in world imports being unlikely since demand from non-industrialised countries will fall off. French performance in reaction to the external shocks of the seventies compares poorly with that of partner countries. The squeeze on profits which had followed the first oil crisis was reinforced by the second. Up to spring 1981, tight fiscal policy accentuated the sluggishness of activity. Compared with other countries, a less restrictive monetary stance enabled firms to use a greater degree of external funding. The new policy, implemented from mid-1981 onwards, has slightly increased personal incomes and thereby consumer spending. However, despite improvements in activity and profitability, firms have reduced their investment levels. In the absence of better growth prospects, these are unlikely to rise in the coming months, particularly if external circumstances necessitate continued high interest rates while inflation remains higher than in other industrialised countries.

It seems that we have reached the trough of the recession. None the less, a revival of world economic activity can hardly be expected in the coming months. Owing to the financial adjustments undertaken in many countries, the ground lost over recent months will only be recovered slowly. Moreover, economic policies must remain tight in the face of fierce competition on sluggish world markets. Domestic demand in OECD countries is therefore unlikely to be buoyant while the austerity imposed on developing countries will continue to curb their imports. France is particularly handicapped by present exchange rates which simultaneously increase the cost of imports and reduce competitivity. Economic policy has recently moved towards redressing certain weaknesses in the structure of foreign trade brought to light by the devaluation in June. The rise in production costs has been stemmed and the freezing of both prices and incomes should prevent any sudden worsening of the financial difficulties of the corporate sector. Recently adopted measures should rectify the pattern of income distribution and reduce the foreign trade deficit, though activity may suffer. However, in the present environment, the end result is more likely to be a breathing-space than a return to full industrial competitivity.

L'accroissement rapide de la population active américaine est principalement dû à l'élévation du taux d'activité des femmes. Il va de pair avec une forte création d'emplois qu'il suit et suscite tout à la fois. En Europe par contre la population active s'accroît moins rapidement encore que la population d'âge actif tandis que l'emploi diminue. Parallèlement la progression de la masse salariale réelle, comparable en ampleur, obéit à deux logiques très différentes aux Etats-Unis d'une part, en Europe de l'autre — eř tout particulièrement au Royaume-Uni — . Elle est assurée dans le premier cas par la progression du nombre des emplois, ceux-ci étant assortis d'un pouvoir d'achat déclinant ; et dans le second cas par la progression du pouvoir d'achat attaché à des emplois de moins en moins nombreux.