Suchergebnisse

Since the mid 1970s, the international discussion of nuclear proliferation has come into a state of flux. Intensive efforts were made in the 1960s, especially on the part of the super-powers, to prevent further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons via a maintenance of the status quo in the area of strategic nuclear capability. The appropriate means to this end were seen at that time in the renunciation of nuclear weapons construction by non-nuclear weapons states, accompanied by a general freedom in the field of peaceful use of nuclear energy, even with active support and assistance by the nuclear powers. This carefully weighed compromisewas cristallized in 1968 in the form of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The USA have commented on this treaty: "In the history of international diplomacy it is hard to recall a treaty more painstakingly negotiated, in due recognition of the interests of so many governments and of its worldwide impact and importance. " /1/ In the following years the Treaty was ratified by more than one hundred countries. A satisfactory consolidation became thus apparent in a situation generally recognized within the international community as being very threatening. Five years after the coming into force of the NPT, however, this development was to obtain a new direction which would basically call into question the consensus that had been achieved with such great difficulty. The initiation for this turn of events was, above all, the nuclear explosive test by India in 1974. Although India had not ratified the NPT, Canada, Australia and above all, the United States took this explosion as grounds for a reappraisal of the consensus expressed in the NPT. As a result of this re-thinking in the interest of strengthened proliferation resistance, the dividinq line for non-nuclear weapons stateswas no langer to be drawn between peaceful and military use of nuclear energy but rather within the field of peaceful application itself, at that Point where a potential military misuse becomes ...

Die internationale Diskussion um die Proliferation von Atomwaffen ist seit Mitte der 70er Jahre in Bewegung geraten. In den 6oer Jahren zielten intensive Bemühungen, insbesondere durch die Großmächte, darauf, die weitere horizontale Proliferation von Atomwaffen durch ein Festschreiben des Status quo im Kernwaffenbereich zu verhindern. Der angemessene Weg zu diesem Ziel wurde damals darin erblickt, daß die Nichtkernwaffenstaaten auf den Bau von atomaren Waffen verzichten, hingegen im Bereich der friedlichen Nutzung der Kernenergie frei bleiben und sogar von den Kernwaffenstaaten unterstützt werden sollten. Im Nichtweitergabevertrag aus dem Jahre 1968 hat dieser sorgfältig ausgewogene Kompromiß seinen Niederschlag gefunden. Von seiten der USA hieß es zu diesem Vertrag: "In the history of international diplomacy it is hand to recall a treaty more painstakingly negotiated, in due recognition of the interests of so many governments and of its worldwide impact and importance' /1/. Der Vertrag wurde in den folgenden Jahren zwar nicht von allen, aber doch von mehr als hundert Staaten ratifiziert. Damit zeichnete sich eine erfreuliche Konsolidierung der international als so bedrohlich empfundenen Situation ab. Gleichwohl sollte diese Entwicklung fünf Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des NV-Vertrages eine neue Richtung erhalten, welche den zuvor mühsam erzielten Konsensus grundsätzlich in Frage stellte. Ausgangspunkt dieser Wendung war insbesondere die Explosion des indischen nuklearen Sprengsatzes im Jahre 1974. Obgleich Indien den NV-Vertrag nicht ratifiziert hat, nahmen Kanada, Australien und insbesondere die Vereinigten Staaten diese Explosion zum Anlaß, den im Rahmen des NV-Vertrages erreichten Konsens zu überdenken. Zugunsten einer verstärkten Proliferationshemmung soll nach dem Ergebnis dieser Überlegungen nunmehr für die Nichtkernwaffenstaaten die Trennlinie nicht mehr erst zwischen der friedlichen und der militärischen Nutzung, sondern schon innerhalb der friedlichen [.]

This study is concerned with mechanisms for intergovernmental planning in the international uranium market. Particular aspects of a possible supply system are presented in the form of an emergency network in the case of failure of delivery in the uranium supply sector. The primary idea of a uranium network is based (in the first instance) on the perception that on the one hand nuclear energy plays a significant role in world energy supply but on the other hand only a few nations have sufficient uranium deposits at their disposal. Those nations operating nuclear energy who do not have their own uranium supplies are therefore justifiably interested in assuring their uranium supply in the case of emergency. On the other hand, it is in the interest of the international community to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons with the aid of generally accepted NP principles. We are therefore concerned with the realization of institutional possibilities with respect to cooperation which can increase confidence, at the sametime affering an effective control of non-proliferation, and make a considerable contribution to assuring the supply of participants as determined at that time by CAS and demanded in the INFCE. At the front end interruptions in the production of natural uranium, conversion, enrichment and in fuel element fabrication, as well as in the necessary transportation between the individual stages, can occur if uranium is no longer available in sufficient quantities for various reasons. The reasons for failure of the uranium supply can be of a technical, politicalor commercial nature. They can however also be brought about by natural catastrophes. Furthermore, technical deficiencies, strikes, a sudden change in the uranium exporting or importing countries' policy, a tightening of the expert or investment policy of the supplier countries can also lead to interruptions in supply. [.]