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Argues that the ICRA has neither improved fundamental rights of American Indians nor promoted tribal self-determination.

Inhalt -- Einführung -- Teil 1: Überblick und Einordnungen zum Präventionsgesetz -- 1 Entstehungsgeschichte -- 1.1 Internationale Prozesse -- 1.2 Deutschland bis 1998: Erste Annäherungen an Gesundheitsförderung und Prävention -- 1.3 Die 14. Wahlperiode: Anpassung des 20 und Einführung des "Leitfadens Prävention" -- 1.4 Die 15. Wahlperiode: Erster Aufschlag für ein Präventionsgesetz -- 1.5 Die 16. Wahlperiode: Stärkung betrieblicher Gesundheitsförderung ( 20a) -- 1.6 Die 17. Wahlperiode: Zweiter Aufschlag für ein Präventionsgesetz -- 1.7 Das Präventionsgesetz in der 18. Wahlperiode (ab 2013) -- 2 Der Inhalt des Präventionsgesetzes -- 2.1 Definitionen und Leitbegriffe -- 2.1.1 Eigenverantwortung und Eigenkompetenz -- 2.1.2 Legaldefinitionen -- 2.2 Soziallagen- und Geschlechtsorientierung -- 2.2.1 Geschlechtsbezogene Ungleichheiten -- 2.2.2 Soziallagenorientierung -- 2.3 Drei Leistungsbereiche der Prävention -- 2.3.1 Verhaltensbezogene Prävention -- 2.3.2 Gesundheitsförderung in nicht-betrieblichen Lebenswelten -- 2.3.3 Betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung -- 2.4 Einheitliche Handlungsfelder und Kriterien -- 2.4.1 Handlungsfelder und Kriterien der GKV -- 2.4.2 Bundeseinheitliche Rahmenempfehlungen -- 2.4.3 Landesrahmenvereinbarungen -- 2.5 Ausgaben für Gesundheitsförderung und Prävention -- 2.5.1 Ausgaben für Maßnahmen in Lebenswelten -- 2.5.2 Ausgaben für betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung -- 2.5.3 Ausgaben für verhaltensbezogene Präventionsleistungen -- 2.6 Strukturbildung und Gremien -- 2.6.1 Nationale Präventionskonferenz -- 2.6.2 Präventionsforum -- 2.6.3 Neue Rolle der BZgA -- 2.6.4 Landesarbeitsgemeinschaften für Rahmenvereinbarungen -- 2.6.5 Arbeitsgemeinschaften für Koordinierungsstellen -- 2.6.6 Arbeitsgemeinschaften für betriebliche Gesundheitsförderung -- 2.7 Neue Prozesse -- 2.7.1 Nationale Präventionsstrategie

Public pollution data & socioeconomic statistics are drawn on to clarify the independent relations among environmental quality & a variety of demographic characteristics at the county level throughout the US. Multivariate analyses are conducted of (1) the relations among these variables & (2) the demographic characteristics of counties exposed to multiple pollutants at relatively high levels. The model as a whole is strongly significant & several of the independent variables show a strong correlation with the presence or absence of pollution. Race & ethnicity are strongly associated with a lack of environmental quality, with both nonwhite & Hispanic populations experiencing disproportionately high pollution levels, & there is a strong positive relationship between population density, manufacturing activity, & pollution. Somewhat surprisingly, higher levels of income are often associated with lower levels of environmental quality, although the relationship is often unclear. A strong negative relationship is also found between political mobilization & pollution levels. Results suggest that a variety of political & socioeconomic factors explain the distribution of environmental quality. While results tend to support the claim that race is significantly correlated with pollution distribution throughout the nation across a wide range of measures of environmental quality, they also show the importance of a variety of other demographic variables including political mobilization, population density, manufacturing activity, & income. 2 Tables, 1 Appendix, 28 References. Adapted from the source document.

Scholars of civil wars have long argued that non-state actors can use selective punishment to reduce collaboration with state adversaries. However, there is little systematic evidence confirming this claim, nor investigation into the mechanisms at play. In this paper, we provide such evidence from the drone war in Pakistan. Militants in Pakistan's tribal areas engaged in a brutal counterespionage campaign with the aim of reducing collaboration with the United States. Our analysis combines a novel dataset of collaborator killings with data on drone strike outcomes. We find that strikes killed half as many militant leaders and fighters following collaborator killings and that this suppressive effect likely works by deterring spying in the future. Beyond providing an empirical confirmation of the selective punishment hypothesis, our paper suggests an unacknowledged vulnerability of the drone program to reprisals against local allies and collaborators that limits its effectiveness as a long-term tool of counterterrorism.

Scholars of civil wars have long argued that non-state actors can use selective punishment to reduce collaboration with state adversaries. However, there is little systematic evidence confirming this claim, nor investigation into the mechanisms at play. In this paper, we provide such evidence from the drone war in Pakistan. Militants in Pakistan's tribal areas engaged in a brutal counterespionage campaign with the aim of reducing collaboration with the United States. Our analysis combines a novel dataset of collaborator killings with data on drone strike outcomes. We find that strikes killed half as many militant leaders and fighters following collaborator killings and that this suppressive effect likely works by deterring spying in the future. Beyond providing an empirical confirmation of the selective punishment hypothesis, our paper suggests an unacknowledged vulnerability of the drone program to reprisals against local allies and collaborators that limits its effectiveness as a long-term tool of counterterrorism.

Does the religious calendar promote or suppress political violence in Islamic societies? This study challenges the presumption that the predominant impact of the Islamic calendar is to increase violence, particularly during Ramadan. This study develops a new theory that predicts systematic suppression of violence on important Islamic holidays, those marked by public days off for dedicated celebration. We argue that militant actors anticipate societal disapproval of violence, predictably inducing restraint on these days. We assess our theory using innovative parallel analysis of multiple datasets and qualitative evidence from Islamic insurgencies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan from 2004 to 2014. Consistent with our theory, we find that important Islamic holidays witness systematic declines in violence—as much as 41%—and provide evidence that anticipation of societal disapproval is producing these results. Significantly, we find no systematic evidence for surges of violence associated with any Islamic holiday, including Ramadan.