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History and the emotions linked to the past have been a source of conflicts. In particular, the different interpretations of events – or the impossibility to talk about these "white spots" – bring tensions between groups within society, but also among various countries. Indeed, the past leaves traces on politics. It can also be selected as a tool for legitimising action (cf. Lavabre, 1992 and her distinction between the weight and the choice of the past). In International Relations, the past can be used for various goals (cf. Rosoux, 2001). Memory can also be misused (Lavabre, 2000) or abused (Todorov, 1995). How do states address these uses of the past in bilateral relations and how do they try to limit these actions? To tackle this politicisation of the past, historical commissions have been created – already in the interwar period, but mostly as from the 1950's and especially the 1970's – in order to create a dialogue on history and to appease bilateral relations. This contribution is based on two case-studies: the Polish-German Schoolbook Commission, established in 1972 and the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters, created in 2002 and reactivated in 2008. The corpus, collected within the framework of my PhD, is composed of 54 interviews, archives, as well as additional sources such as participant observations, discourses, the press and opinion polls on reconciliation in Poland. Historical commissions are created in the aim of rapprochement, if not reconciliation. In this paper I want to precise the scope and limits of these commissions and insist on the variables explaining their (non-) continuity and (non-) success on overcoming traumatic historical experiences.

History and the emotions linked to the past have been a source of conflicts. In particular, the different interpretations of events – or the impossibility to talk about these "white spots" – bring tensions between groups within society, but also among various countries. Indeed, the past leaves traces on politics. It can also be selected as a tool for legitimising action (cf. Lavabre, 1992 and her distinction between the weight and the choice of the past). In International Relations, the past can be used for various goals (cf. Rosoux, 2001). Memory can also be misused (Lavabre, 2000) or abused (Todorov, 1995). How do states address these uses of the past in bilateral relations and how do they try to limit these actions? To tackle this politicisation of the past, historical commissions have been created – already in the interwar period, but mostly as from the 1950's and especially the 1970's – in order to create a dialogue on history and to appease bilateral relations. This contribution is based on two case-studies: the Polish-German Schoolbook Commission, established in 1972 and the Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Matters, created in 2002 and reactivated in 2008. The corpus, collected within the framework of my PhD, is composed of 54 interviews, archives, as well as additional sources such as participant observations, discourses, the press and opinion polls on reconciliation in Poland. Historical commissions are created in the aim of rapprochement, if not reconciliation. In this paper I want to precise the scope and limits of these commissions and insist on the variables explaining their (non-) continuity and (non-) success on overcoming traumatic historical experiences.

Japan's right-wing nationalists have launched three major attacks on school textbooks over the second half of the twentieth century. Centered on the treatment of colonialism and war, the attacks surfaced in 1955, the late 1970s, and the mid-1990s. This article examines three moments in light of Japanese domestic as well as regional and global political contexts to gain insight into the persistent problem of the Pacific War in historical memory and its refraction in textbook treatments. There are striking similarities as well as critical di erences in the ways the attacks on textbooks recurred and in the conditions of political instability.

AbstractCalls have been made in recent years for the legal distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts to be removed. Also as of late, confusion regarding the applicable legal regime has been created by so-called transnational conflicts involving non-state entities. These situations do not fit naturally into the two traditional types of armed conflict recognized by IHL from 1949 onwards. The present article centres on how the legal divide that still exists between international and non-international armed conflict can be explained historically. It aims to further the discussion on whether such a distinction is still relevant, as well as on how certain situations could be classified in the existing typology of IHL.

Please note that this article reflects the personal views and reflections of the author and should not be read as a statement of British Government policy.

The author's own work is seen to have been built upon the foundations of Quincy Wright's work. 3 aspects of his concerns & res interests have inspired the author's res: (1) predicting war as a function of att'al factors; (2) predicting the end of war as a function of casualties; & (3) predicting nat'l policies of expansion or withdrawal on the basis of nat'l moods. Here, the focus is on the prediction of nat'l policies as a function of alternative nat'l moods, (a) in terms of apparent cycles in the Amer past reinterpreted within a psychol'al framework, & (b) in terms of Q. Wright's larger concern with world peace & order, esp during the remainder of this cent. An alternation of nat'l introvert & extrovert moods is perceived in US nat'l policies. A study of Amer diplomatic history since 1776 supported tendencies in these directions. Wright agreed on the signif of this evidence. Assuming that these trends might have their sources directly in human nature & historical processes, it was predicted in 1950 that the US, which had already been deeply involved in world affairs for a decade, might maintain this extrovert position for 16 to 18 yrs ahead. Wright accepted the historical conclusions but doubted their applicability to the future. By 1970, Wright felt that there were indeed signs of a shift in the extrovert trend, beginning in 1967. The alternation was clearly not circular in character but spiral. A possible cycle of 'Freudian' moods is postulated & some conjectures are offered re the future. While there are great dangers ahead for mankind, the possibility for a peaceful & just world order by the yr 2000 exists. This projection is based on the notion that the 'super-ego' mood will stimulate a new flowering of the human spirit, & that the Amer people in particular will be able to strengthen their democracy. The importance of Quincy's contribution to these theories is indicated. 2 Tables. M. Maxfield.