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Rare earth elements are not rare at all. They are essential for the hardware of contemporary life as we know it, every contemporary industrialized society depends on them, and there are no known alternatives. Yet the geography of their production is strange. In 2009, China accounted for 97% percent of global production, with the majority coming from the Bayan Obo mine operated by the state-owned enterprise Baotou Rare Earth Group on the southern Mongolian steppe. When gradually intensifying export quotas combined with a temporary halt of official exports in 2010, the rest of the world woke up to its near total dependence on China's rare earth monopoly. To address this crisis, a Brazilian firm (Companhia Brasileira de Metalurgia e Mineração) determined to capture rare earths from its niobium mine tailings in the state of Minas Gerais. Betting on the willingness of downstream firms to pay a premium for non-Chinese rare earths and subsidizing the effort with revenues from their niobium sales, they resolved to produce a steady output of rare earth oxides regardless of global market fluctuations. In 2012, CBMM successfully produced high-purity rare earth oxides. In 2013, the US, EU, and Japan won a WTO case against China's rare earth export quotas, restoring some semblance of the global status quo. But the story does not end there.Despite the relative ubiquity of rare earth elements, the abundance of known reserves near existing infrastructure networks, and the dissolution of the 2010 crisis, global prospecting efforts—with the aid of national governments and militaries—have targeted São Gabriel da Cachoeira in the high Amazon and the Western Lunar Highlands on the Moon as the next major points on the global rare earth frontier. This dissertation addresses the question: Given that rare earth elements are both abundant and vital, why is their production driven to so few, seemingly remote places? This question immediately begets three others: through what processes did China's Bayan Obo mine emerge as the single greatest source of rare earth elements worldwide? What provoked changes in China's policy and practice, and how did this precipitate spatial transformations elsewhere? And for what purposes are state, military, and private actors pursuing rare earth mining in São Gabriel da Cachoeira and the Moon? This dissertation proposes that the strange geography of the global rare earth frontier can be explained by world-historical shifts in the global division of toxic labor occurring within a context of state-building and geopolitical contest. It thus advances three claims. First, China's monopoly emerged through a convergence of long-term historical processes shaping northern China in the context of early 20th century imperialism, Cold War politics, and the epochal global economic shifts precipitated by Deng Xiaoping's 1978 reforms and the Reagan/Thatcher revolution. Second, the change in China's political economic priorities from export dominance to conservation has been stimulated by the acute environmental and epidemiological harms generated by rare earth production coupled with China's changing position in the global division of labor. Third, the contemporary geography of the global rare earth frontier is driven by more than geological determinism: although these sites are rich in rare earth elements, they are also historically contested regions and focal points for territorial agendas, for which a nationalist mandate for rare earth extraction provides a convenient pretext. These claims are based in a world-historical analysis of rare earth mining, and draw on political economy, political ecology, transnational theory to examine the convergence of Baotou, São Gabriel da Cachoeira, and the Moon in the production of the global rare earth frontier from the late 19th to early 21st century. I engage scientific literatures, archives, expert interviews and other perspectives across the Anglophone, Sinophone, and Lusophone world which were gathered in China, Brazil, and the United States during 2010 – 2014. The multilingual approach is central to this project. Multiple forms of knowledge are evident in the discourses on the rare earth frontier, and there is a symmetrical inaccessibility to the working rationales across language barriers even as these rationales interpenetrate to shape thought and action across global space. By examining the transnational historical production of the rare earth frontier across these sites, this dissertation refutes three dominant, yet persistent assumptions circulating in contemporary popular, policy, and academic discourse. First, that China's rare earth monopoly emerged because it possesses more rare earth elements than any other country; second, that China and Brazil possess mutually unintelligible histories precluding grounded relational analyses, and; third, that the Moon is a space of exception, beyond the purview of global economic activities and likewise, therefore, of critical concern.The purpose of this work is to demystify the contemporary global rare earth frontier. This work therefore has three aims. The first is to equip the reader with a deeper understanding of rare earth elements—the peculiarities of their geology and production, their political economic significance and their role in geopolitics far beyond what is available in the flurry of reports and opinion pieces generated since 2009. The second is to interrogate the historical origins and ongoing ramifications of the recent 'crisis' not as an exceptional circumstance, but as an episode that can be understood as emerging from and indicative of global development politics. The third and broadest aim is to move beyond entrenched global imaginaries that insist on the mutual unintelligibility of 'China' and 'the West,' or which seek to explain global changes as a series of unidirectional 'impacts' of one place on another, of 'center' on 'periphery,' (Hart 2002) as exemplified by much recent (but important) work concerned with China and Latin America (Gallagher 2008, García-Herrero 2007, Jenkins 2008, Rodriguez 2006). Although these sites differ in many important ways, each demonstrates a particular set of frontier attributes drawing especially from their respective histories at the margins of major imperial and territorial powers. These similarities help explain their convergence as points of extraction along the contemporary global rare earth frontier, while their differences account for the temporal and technological relationalities among these three sites in the global division of toxic labor.

Part 1: The Age of Lloyd George 1. Introduction: The Old Liberalism and the New 2. The Liberals in Power, 1905-15 3. The Crisis of War, 1915-18 4. The Lloyd George Coalition, 1918-22 5. The Liberal Decline, 1923-29 Part 2: Selected Documents A: The Old Liberalism and the New (1890-1905) a) The Old Liberalism 1. The Newcastle Programme, October 1891 2. Gladstone on the Newcastle Programme, October 1891 3. W. Jenkyn Thomas on Welsh Nationalism, 1895 4. Beatrice Webb on John Morley's Liberalism, October 1897 5. Campbell-Bannerman on 'methods of barbarism' in South Africa, June 1901 6. Lord Rosebery's Chesterfield speech on the 'clean slate' and Campbell-Bannerman's reactions, December 1901 7. J. A. Hobson on the Liberal Party and Imperialism, 1902 8. Lloyd George on the Education Bill, May 1902 9. Joseph Chamberlain's speech on tariff reform, Birmingham, May 1903 b) The New Liberalism 10. Sidney Webb on 'Lord Rosebery's escape from Houndsditch', September 1901 11. Herbert Samuel on the New Liberalism, 1902 12. Leo Chiozza Money on 'Riches and Poverty', 1905 13. R. J. Campbell on the 'New Technology' 1907 14. The Gladstone-MacDonald 'entente', March 1903 15. F. A. Channing on Relations between Liberals and Labour, September 1905 16. Haldane on the 'Relugas Compact', September 1905 17. Rosebery's speech at Bodmin, November 1905 18. Asquith and the new Liberal government, December 1905 B: The Liberals in Power (1905-15) a) Welfare State and Political Crisis 19. Lloyd George at Caernarvon, January 1906 20. Churchill on the 'untrodden field of politics' March 1908 21. Beatrice Webb and Ramsay MacDonald on the Liberal Government, 1910, and on the National Insurance Bill, 1911 22. Asquith's Albert Hall speech on the House of Lords, December 1909 23. Lloyd George's memorandum on a National Government, August 1910 24. The National Review on national 'anarchy', January 1912 25. The Cabinet and Labour Unrest, 1912 b) The Coming of War 26. J. Allen Baker on the Naval Estimates, 1910 27. Lloyd George's Mansion House Speech 29. Lloyd George on the Government's conduct of foreign policy before 1914 30. Bonar Law and the downfall of the Liberal administration, May 1915 C: The Crisis of War (1915-18) a) The Liberal Party and the War, 1915-16 31. Liberal 'ginger group' and the need for conscription, July 1915 32. Lloyd George and his Liberal colleagues, November 1915 33. Simon and Conscription, January 1916 34. Lloyd George's Dissatisfaction with the Asquith Government, April 1916 35. Lloyd George's backbench Liberal Support, May 1916 36. Spender and the Political Situation, September 1916 37. Sir William Robertson, Bonar Law and the maladministration of the war, November 1916 b) The Downfall of Asquith 38. Memorandum presented to Asquith by Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Carson and Beaverbrook, 1 December 1916 39. Asquith's reply to the memorandum and Lloyd George's response, 1 December 1916 40. Edwin Montagu writes to Asquith, 2 December 1916 41. Bonar Law and the Resolution of the Unionist ministers, 3 December 1916 42. Asquith and Lloyd George Exchange Letters on The Times leading article, 4 December 1916 43. Edwin Montagu and the Liberal Ministers, 5 December 1916 44. Bonar Law and Asquith, 5 December 1916 45. Addison on Lloyd George's Liberal backbench supporters 46. Asquith on his own downfall, 7 December 1916 c) Lloyd George as Prime Minister 47. Lloyd George and his relationship to the Liberal Party, January 1917 48. The Remodelling of Lloyd George's government, July 1917 49. The Soldiers and the politicians, November 1917 50. Lloyd George on the future of the Liberal Party 1918 51. Captain Guest on the government and the press lords, February 1918 52. Arthur Henderson on Lloyd George premiership, April 1918 53. Lloyd George on his political creed, April 1918 54. General Maurice's letter in The Times May 1918 55. The Origin of the 'coupon' July 1918 56. Lloyd George secures Liberal support for a post-war Coalition November 1918 57. The Coalition's election manifesto, November 1918 58. J. M. Keynes's verdict on the 'coupon election' 59. Edwin Montagu's verdict on the 'coupon election' D: The Lloyd George Coalition (1918-22) a) The Coalition and Party Politics 60. Edwin Montagu on the new parliament, 1919 61. H. A. L. Fisher on the moves towards a 'centre party' January -- February 1920 62. Lord Birkenhead on the need for a 'National Party' February 1920 63. Bonar Law on the failure of 'fusion' March 1920 64. Lloyd George's swing to the right, March 1920 65. Walter Long on the Lloyd George government, May 1920 66. Sir William Sutherland on the need for a 'New Liberalism' January 1922 67. Fisher on the need for the Liberal Ministers to Resign, March 1922 68. Hilton Young on the need for Lloyd George to Resign March 1922 b) The Decline and Fall of Lloyd George 69. The Appointment of the Geddes Committee, August 1921 70. The Report of the Geddes Committee, February 1922 71. Lloyd George and the 'honours scandal', 1922 72. Montagu on the political situation, November 1921 73. Austen Chamberlain opposes a dissolution, January 1922 74. Lord Salisbury 'on Lloyd George's unfitness for his task' March 1922 75. Grigg on Lloyd George's political decline, March 1922 76. Bonar Law's letter to The Times on the Chanak crisis, October 1922 77. Baldwin's speech at the Carlton Club, 19 October 1922 78. Masterman on Lloyd George's 'betrayal' of Liberalism 79. Lloyd George's defence of his government's Liberal record, December 1922 E: The Liberal Decline (1923-29) a) Liberal Reunion 80. Baldwin's Plymouth speech advocating protection of the home market, October 1923 81. The reunion of Asquith and Lloyd George, November 1923 82. The Liberal Election Manifesto, November 1923 b) The Failure of the Last Crusade 83. Herbert Gladstone and the Liberal finances, August 1924 84. The Nation on the Liberals' plight, December 1924 85. Lloyd George's 'green book' on agriculture, 1925 86. Keynes on the 'new Liberalism' 1927 87. 'We Can Conquer Unemployment' 1929 88. Donald Maclean on the parliamentary Liberal party, July and December 1929 89. Lloyd George's retrospect on the inter-war years March 1940

In March 1906, U.S. forces attacked a group of Moros and killed more than 900 men, women, and children at the top of Mt. Dajo on the island of Jolo in the southern Philippines. Even though the death toll was higher than at well-known massacres committed by American soldiers at Wounded Knee and My Lai, the massacre at Bud Dajo has been all but forgotten outside the Philippines.Recovering the history of this event is the subject of an important new book by historian Kim Wagner, "Massacre in the Clouds: An American Atrocity and the Erasure of History." The book is a masterful reconstruction of the events leading up to the lopsided slaughter on the mountain, and Wagner sets the massacre in its proper historical context during the age of American overseas colonialism at the start of the 20th century. It also offers important lessons about how the dehumanization of other people leads to terrible atrocities and how imperial policies rely on the use of brutal violence.In the years leading up to the massacre, the U.S. had been extending its control over the southern Philippines after it had annexed the northern islands and defeated local pro-independence forces in the Philippine-American War (1899-1902). U.S. relations with the Sultanate of Sulu were initially regulated by the Bates Treaty of 1899, but within a few years the U.S. abrogated that treaty and sought to impose direct rule. The U.S. tossed the treaty aside on the recommendation of Gen. Leonard Wood, who was the local military governor based on Mindanao at the time.The massacre was part of a larger history of violent American expansionism, and it was the result of an imperial policy that sought to impose colonial rule on the Philippines. The U.S. effort to collect the cedula tax provoked significant resentment and opposition among the Moros. (The Moro name was the one given to the Muslim Tausugs of the Sulu archipelago by the earlier Spanish colonizers, and it was the one that the Americans continued to use.) As Wagner explains, Moro opposition to the tax was rooted in a defense of their religious identity, which they believed would be compromised and weakened if they submitted to a tax imposed by non-Muslim rulers.The Moros that sought refuge at Bud Dajo were protesting the encroachment of a new colonial power and resisting interference in their way of life. The U.S. authorities there perceived them and cast them as outlaws, and under the command of the same Gen. Wood, U.S. forces proceeded to wipe almost all of them out. As Daniel Immerwahr comments in "How to Hide an Empire," "Massacres like this weren't unknown in the United States. …Yet Bud Dajo dwarfed them all."The atrocity was initially the cause of some controversy at home, and anti-imperialist critics of American rule in the Philippines tried to use it to attack the Roosevelt administration's policies. The criticism was short-lived, and no one involved with the massacre at any level faced any penalties later. The massacre was quickly rationalized and normalized with the familiar appeals to "necessity" and an exceptionalist belief in America's expansionist mission.The similarities with crimes committed by the military against Native Americans led most Americans to justify the slaughter at Bud Dajo rather than condemn it. The similarities with crimes committed by contemporary European colonial powers didn't cause most Americans to reconsider the expansionist project, but instead it led them to retract their earlier criticisms of European atrocities. Merely exposing an atrocity abroad often has no political effect if most people at home are determined to ignore or excuse it.Wagner details how Wood and the Roosevelt administration tried to control the flow of information about the massacre, but the massacre was never a secret. There was never an attempt at a cover-up because the massacre became so widely accepted as "necessary." The officers and soldiers involved in the killing wrote letters home about what they had seen and done at Bud Dajo, and their correspondence is one of the sources that Wagner uses for reconstructing what happened on the mountain. The dehumanization of the Moros in the eyes of most Americans was so complete that the photographic evidence of the victims was turned into popular postcards for soldiers and tourists to buy.The photograph of the aftermath of the massacre taken by Aeronaut Gibbs stands out in Wagner's account. The photograph shows a trench filled with the bodies of dead Moros with a group of American soldiers posing alongside them. This is the picture that Wagner comes back to several times in the book to capture the brutality of the event and to illustrate how thoroughly the victims of the massacre had been dehumanized. The trench photo is an image of the atrocity "through the eyes of the perpetrators," as Wagner puts it, and he explains that the "image is not just evidence of a massacre—in the way that we might consider a crime-scene photo—but is itself an artifact of violence." American rule over the Philippines had been inspired by the example of European colonialism in Asia and Africa, and the American administrators of the overseas empire looked to copy the methods of European empires in suppressing local opposition by force. Today some proponents of American dominance still look back to this era of direct colonial rule as evidence of America's benevolent imperialism, but this ignores the record of brutal violence that was used to establish and maintain that rule. Bud Dajo was a shocking example of that violence, and it was the product of a system that routinely demanded and justified such violence against the people living under American rule. Though few Americans remember them, the U.S. wars in the Philippines were responsible for the deaths of up to one million people.Americans need to remember this period of U.S. history, but it is also important to recognize that many political leaders today use the same kinds of rationalizations to justify modern atrocities, whether they are committed by U.S. forces or client states acting with U.S. support.As Wagner puts it, "Whereas the actual history of US atrocities in the southern Philippines has been largely forgotten, the racialized logic that underpinned the violence of March 1906 has not." Just as the expansionists did 118 years ago, some supporters of American dominance continue to excuse war crimes by dehumanizing the victims and blaming them for their own demise.

Three Baltic foreign ministers gathered earlier this week to make the case for embracing Ukraine's maximalist war aims and pursuing a total defeat of Russia."Ukraine is not fighting for their own freedom; Ukraine is fighting instead of us," Estonian FM Margus Tsahkna proclaimed when he joined the FMs of Latvia,and Lithuania at the hawkish Hudson Institute think tank on Monday to share their perspectives on security issues in Northern Europe.The Baltic officials also argued for the continuous expansion of NATO to deter Vladimir Putin — including eventually allowing Ukraine to join the alliance—and the necessity for "American leadership" in NATO.Yet many of these talking points are detached from actual reality on the ground in Ukraine and will only perpetuate the cycle of violence in Eastern Europe.The three Baltic FMs said that Ukraine's total victory is imperative for peace in Europe and security for NATO. FM Tsahkna's eight-point plan for Ukrainian victory advocates for further sanctions on Russia, utilizing frozen Russian assets for Ukraine's reconstruction, incorporating Ukraine into both the EU and NATO, and relying on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's peace plan as the only way to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The ministers also agreed that a peace plan without Russia's total defeat would only delay inevitable future invasions from Russia. "Cutting a deal would be great for the autocrats," Latvian foreign minister Krišjānis Kariņš said as he noted that the world is actively observing the war in Ukraine. In the eyes of the Baltic FMs, only a hard power "containment" strategy can deter Vladimir Putin's imperial ambitions. "We will have this Russia problem or challenge for a long time. NATO needs to focus on how to contain them for the next twenty years with strength," Kariņš continued. Peace in Europe depends solely on the threat of force. But Ukraine's prospects of total defeat of Russia are nonexistent. Kyiv has suffered massive losses, as Russia's capture of Avdiivka last month was Russia's most considerable territorial advance since its victory in Bakhmut in May 2023. Furthermore, Ukraine is running out of troops. The Ukrainian military has faced an average personnel shortage of 25% across its brigades and is unlikely to mobilize the required number of men to match Russia's manpower advantage. Draft dodging has become rampant throughout Ukraine as thousands have fled the country. As a result, Ukraine is on the brink of a demographic catastrophe, which would imperil Ukraine's future after the war concludes.Additionally, according to the Baltic FMs, Putin has been the best salesman for NATO expansion, given that both Finland and Sweden ended their many decades of neutrality and joined the alliance. "Russia has erased the idea of a neutral zone. It's either Europe and NATO or Russia," said Kariņš. Therefore, neutrality is not an option for a post-war Ukraine since neutrality serves as a "green light" for Putin to invade as he did in Georgia in 2008. The Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis went as far as to say that "European security architecture will not be whole, secure, or safe without Ukraine."Without a hard power deterrent, countries that have remained neutral, such as Georgia and Moldova, will fall next to Putin's aggression.While the foreign ministers of the Baltic countries made several references to Putin's imperialistic tendencies, they discounted the possibility that NATO expansion fanned the flames of Russian nationalism and expansion. As Dr. Joshua Shifrinson has highlighted, "Russian nationalism and imperialism did not develop in a vacuum." Instead, NATO expansion gave Russian nationalists a cause to rally behind as it reinforced their belief that Moscow's national interests were at stake. The Baltic FMs also insisted that there is no substitute for U.S. leadership. "Without U.S. leadership, I don't think we will have a happy ending," Landsbergis asserted. While the Baltic countries are doing their part by exceeding the 2% spending guideline, the United States must work to defend the "rules-based system" created by the United States following World War II. Russia is actively posing a "direct challenge to U.S. power and authority," as FM Kariņš puts it. Thus, the war in Ukraine is not only a regional problem but a global problem. Additionally, the way of life enjoyed in NATO countries, including in the Baltics, is also under direct threat.Despite NATO's technological and military superiority to Russia, the Baltic FMs worry that Putin expects the West to be politically unprepared. Russia's economy is geared toward war, given that nearly 40% of its budget is spent on defense. Russia's regular army is also expanding, signaling Russia's refusal to end the war effort and its potential to challenge the NATO alliance. Therefore, NATO must get up to speed and unite against the Russian threat. Lastly, the Lithuanian FM proposed that NATO members should restrict themselves when referring to the Russian missile that recently briefly entered Polish airspace. "I'm a proponent of not drawing red lines for ourselves. If we say specifically that we're not going to do A, B, C and make a whole list of things we are not going to do, it sounds like an invitation for Putin to try," Landsbergis said. But adopting an aggressive strategy is not the best path forward for NATO. Expanding the member base will not make its participants safer. Finland and Sweden's ascension into NATO ended many decades of neutrality, under which both countries have become prosperous democracies. It also elongated NATO's border with Russia by 820 miles. Adding more countries to the alliance, including Ukraine, will be more of a liability than an asset.Moreover, an aggressive force posture from NATO spearheaded by the United States is unnecessary to satisfy a "containment" strategy toward Russia. Despite its ability to adapt throughout the war, Russia has still fallen far short of its maximalist aims to subjugate Ukraine as a vassal state. U.S. aims in Europe have historically been counter-hegemonic. The current realities suggest that no European state can establish itself as a regional hegemon. Thus, Russia has little to no hope of defeating NATO through conventional means. There is an alternative option. Washington and Kyiv should pursue a diplomatic path to preserve Ukraine's sovereignty while avoiding a NATO-Russia conflict. There remain reasons for Russia to come to the negotiating table, given that Moscow wants to establish a "demilitarized zone," de facto Western acquiescence to Russian control of Crimea and the Donbas, and a legitimate role to play in Europe's security order. However, Kyiv and its allies should pursue this path urgently, as Ukraine's leverage will inevitably decrease over time.

The end of the Cold War caused the creation of a new security architecture on the European continent. However, at present it should be said that the attempt to include the Russian Federation in cooperation with Western countries initiated since the 1990s has been unsuccessful, what is more Russia refused to join the western structures on neo-liberal principles. One can assume that the pragmatic cooperation of the Russian Federation under the rule of Boris Yeltsin with the USA and the countries of Western Europe was dictated by the impossibility of implementing its own vision of international relations, especially in terms of security. It resulted from the political and economic crisis after the collapse of the USSR – and thus the lack of tools to influence the international arena – as well as the secessionist movements in the Caucasus, including in Chechnya.The undermining of the position of the Russian Federation as a world power by the United States in the international arena intensified the dissatisfaction of this state, and thus referred to the past and mythologized the concepts of the empire of the nineteenth-century tsarist Russia and the USSR, which were given positive traits. Many Russians today also feel the heirs of the great imperial tradition. Nostalgia for the empire causes voices in Russian political and scientific circles to state that this is the only right way for the development of modern Russia. The international identity of the Russian Federation has been shaped as imperial.The implications of the activities of the Russian Federation on the Crimean Peninsula and in the east of Ukraine in March 2014 led to the destruction of the security system in Europe, which was shaped after the Cold War, which was undoubtedly a turning point and will have long-term consequences in the European security architecture. In addition, it has contributed to the change of relations between the Russian Federation and the United States and western European countries, which may pose a threat to European and global security as well as a possible new Cold War. The purpose of this article is to analyze the activity of the Russian Federation in terms of Russian security concepts relating to Europe. These activities are part of the security architecture that they want to impose on other countries Russian weight, considered as a «geopolitical game», which aims to consolidate its own influence. The central point of the publication is the thesis that the feeling of danger in the political elite of the Russian Federation by the events in Ukraine (the wave of major manifestations and protests overflowing in Ukraine since the country gained independence in 1991) was perceived as a threat to the geopolitical influences of this state. For this reason, for Russia, military operations in the Crimea and in the east of Ukraine were perceived as indispensable defensive actions in order to thwart the expansion of the influence of the United States and NATO on the Russian border. Currently, the conflict in Ukraine is undoubtedly one of the most important geopolitical challenges in terms of security in the 21st century in Europe. The conflict in Ukraine is undoubtedly a challenge for the Western countries and a test of unity. The strategy of the Russian Federation is to destroy the unity of actions of the NATO and European Union states. The new security architecture presented by the authorities of the Russian Federation with its superpower status and the return to the «concert of powers» is unacceptable for European countries. However, Russian imperialism causes an increase in instability in Europe.Key words: international relations; security policy; political concepts; world order; foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation. ; Zakończenie «Zimnej Wojny» spowodował stworzenie nowej architektury bezpieczeństwa na kontynencie europejskim. Jednak obecnie należy stwierdzić, że niepowodzeniem zakończyła się próba włączenie Federacji Rosyjskiej we współpracę z państwami zachodnimi zapoczątkowana od lat 90. XX wieku, co więcej Rosja odrzuciła przyłączenie się do struktur zachodnich na neoliberalnych zasadach. Można przyjąć, że pragmatyczna współpraca Federacji Rosyjskiej za rządów Borys Jelcyna z USA i państwami zachodniej Europy podyktowana była niemożliwością realizacji własnej wizji stosunków międzynarodowych, zwłaszcza pod względem bezpieczeństwa. Wynikało to z kryzysu politycznego i gospodarczego po rozpadzie ZSRR – a tym samym brakiem narzędzi umożliwiających oddziaływania na arenie międzynarodowej – a także secesjonistyczne ruchy na Kaukazie m.in w Czeczenii.Podważanie pozycji Federacji Rosyjskiej jako mocarstwa światowego przez Stany Zjednoczone na arenie międzynarodowej potęgowało niezadowolenie tego państwa, a co za tym idzie odwoływano się do przeszłości i mitologizowano pojęcia imperium dziewiętnastowiecznej carskiej Rosji i ZSRR, którym nadawano cechy pozytywne. Wielu Rosjan także dzisiaj czuje się spadkobiercami wielkiej tradycji imperialnej. Nostalgia za imperium powoduje, że w rosyjskich kręgach politycznych i naukowych pojawiają się głosy, które stwierdzają, że jest to jedyna słuszna droga dla rozwoju współczesnej Rosji. Tożsamość międzynarodowa Federacji Rosyjskiej została ukształtowana jako imperialna.Implikacje działań Federacji Rosyjskiej na półwyspie krymskim oraz na wschodzie Ukrainy w marcu 2014 roku doprowadził do destrukcji systemu bezpieczeństwa w Europie, który został ukształtowany po «Zimnej Wojnie», co niewątpliwie było punktem zwrotnym i będzie miało swoje długoterminowe konsekwencje w europejskiej architekturze bezpieczeństwa. Dodatkowo przyczyniło się do zmiany stosunków Federacji Rosyjskiej ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi i państwami Europy zachodniej, co stanowić może zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego jak i globalnego oraz możliwą nową «Zimną Wojną».Celem niniejszego artykułu jest analiza aktywności Federacji Rosyjskiej pod względem rosyjskich koncepcji bezpieczeństwa odnoszących się do Europy. Działania te wpisują się w architekturę bezpieczeństwa jaką chcą narzucić innym państwom wadze rosyjskie, rozpatrywanej jako «gra geopolityczna», której celem jest utrwalenie własnych wpływów. Centralnym punktem rozważań publikacji jest teza iż poczucie zagrożenia w elitach politycznych Federacji Rosyjskiej wydarzeniami na Ukrainie (fala największych manifestacji i protestów przelewających się na Ukrainie od momentu uzyskania przez ten kraj niepodległości w 1991 roku) było postrzegane jako zagrożenie dla geopolitycznych wpływów tego państwa. Z tego względu dla Rosji działania militarne na Krymie oraz na wschodzie Ukrainy postrzegane były jako nieodzowne działania defensywne w celu udaremnienia poszerzenia się wpływów Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz NATO przy rosyjskiej granicy. Obecnie konflikt na Ukrainie jest niewątpliwym jednym w ważniejszych wyzwań geopolitycznych pod względem bezpieczeństwa w XXI wieku w Europie. Konflikt na Ukrainie niewątpliwie dla państw Zachodnich jest swego rodzaju wyzwaniem i testem jedności. Strategią Federacji Rosyjskiej jest burzenie jedności działań państw NATO i Unii Europejskiej. Nowa architektura bezpieczeństwa zaprezentowana przez władze Federacji Rosyjskiej z jej mocarstwowym statusem i powrotem do «koncertu mocarstw» jest nie do zaakceptowania dla państw europejskich. Natomiast imperializm rosyjski powoduje wzrost niestabilności w Europie.Słowa kluczowe: stosunki międzynarodowe; polityka bezpieczeństwa; koncepcje polityczne; ład międzynarodowy; polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej.

Britain had emerged from the Second World War victorious and willing to take its place in the post-war world alongside other great powers, the US and the USSR. However, the war had taken its toll on the British Empire, and its resources along with its international prestige were wearing thin. The newly elected Labour Government was not about to allow Britain's status as a great power to fade. Instead it attempted to secure the country's rank in the international community by directing its imperial aspirations towards strengthening Britain's position in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. In the Potsdam Conference of 1945 a Council of Foreign Ministers was established to prepare the necessary post-war peace treaties. Britain along with the US, the USSR and France were responsible for the Italian peace treaty which included settling the fate of the former Italian colony of Libya. Libya consisted of three separate regions: Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. From early on, Britain had its eyes set on acquiring a UN trusteeship of Cyrenaica where it had been the occupying power since 1943. The trusteeship would make Britain the formal administrative power there, and thus support its great-power ambitions in the Middle East. The Labour Cabinet decided to pursue this trusteeship but was met with more obstacles than it had expected. In the end, Britain was unable to obtain the trusteeship. This research study focuses on analysing what the Labour Cabinet's pursuit for a British trusteeship of Cyrenaica reveals about Britain's status as a great power during the immediate post-war years from 1945 to 1949. The issue is explored through three main themes: Cyrenaica's strategic meaning for Britain, Britain's relations with the US and the USSR, and Britain's imperialistic nature. The final assessment of Britain's great-power position is based on the four requirements for a great power set in this research study, and on evaluating what the failure to acquire the trusteeship meant for Britain's status. The aim of this research study is to offer a new perspective on Britain's post-war great-power position by examining it through this particular case of Britain trying to obtain the trusteeship of Cyrenaica, and to demonstrate that Cyrenaica deserves more attention in the research of British history. The main primary sources for this research study are selected Cabinet conclusions, Cabinet memoranda and the Cabinet Secretary's notes from July 1945 when Labour took Office, to November 1949 when the UN decided that Libya would become an independent state. The Cabinet papers were screened by using a wide keyword search on the online database of the National Archives. The keyword search was essential for finding the relevant documents for this research study from the vast amount of material. The focus in studying the material was on Libya, the Council of Foreign Ministers and its parties, British Middle Eastern policy especially in Egypt, British imperialism, and the most significant Cabinet members in this case: Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. The two represented opposing views on whether a trusteeship of Cyrenaica would be beneficial for Britain. Attlee remained unenthusiastic but Bevin was determined to obtain the trusteeship. The Cabinet papers provide an overall picture of the main events, discussions and decisions, spiced with occasional intriguing details found in the Secretary's notes. The problem with the Cabinet papers as source material is that even if differing opinions are expressed in the memoranda, the conclusions are designed to portray unity, and can therefore be very vague. To be able to make good use of the Cabinet papers requires extensive knowledge of their historical context, as well as support from such research that has been able to access more detailed departmental documents, such as papers from the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. The findings of this research study support the generally accepted view that Britain was no longer a considerable great power after the Second World War. In the case of trying to acquire a British trusteeship of Cyrenaica, Britain fails to meet three out of the four set requirements for a great power: its military resources were underwhelming, it was not equal to the undeniable great powers - the US and the USSR - in either military capacity or prestige, and it was not acknowledged as a great power by the international community. The one requirement that Britain does meet is that it kept on acting as if it still was a great power, and conducted its policies accordingly. The stubborn belief expressed especially by Bevin that Britain could and would obtain the trusteeship it so greatly desired by relying on its old imperial great-power strategies is evidence of this. This research study continues to argue, that not only does the case of the Cyrenaican trusteeship reveal Britain's lost great-power status, it does it better than the major imperial events of that time which are usually at the forefront of studies regarding this topic. The situation in both India and Palestine was such that it would have been impossible for any great power to keep them under control. Withdrawing help from Greece and Turkey for the US to take over, can be seen as a strategic move to cut overseas expenditure while making sure that the US was tied up in world affairs and thus unable to pull back into isolationism, which would have left Britain to face the USSR alone in Europe. Cyrenaica, on the other hand, was an underdeveloped area that mostly consisted of inhospitable desert. Its only value was its location by the Mediterranean and on the western border of Egypt - and it had paramount strategic value only to Britain. This issue has been deemed so insignificant that it is tragically underrepresented in research of history and barely mentioned in the history books - and no wonder since much bigger events were taking place at the same time as the Cold War realities began to set in. However, by failing to acquire the trusteeship of this small and next to unknown territory where it was already the occupying power, Britain truly fell flat on its face. It had been a dominant power in the Middle East for a long time and was one of the victorious Three Powers in Potsdam - this rather humble objective was something it should have easily accomplished. Yet it did not. Failing in small world affairs rather than in the major ones speaks volumes of a country's great-power status - or the lack of it.

This is the first and most concise biography of a Russian émigré gay poet, Valerii Pereleshin (1913-1992). The biographer, Olga Bakich, takes on the self-described role of an "accompanist" (xiv) to this prolific, yet understudied poet by painstakingly illuminating the joys and sorrows of his spiritual journey over eight decades. This work causes the reader to reconsider how a biography could be written. The key historical events surrounding his personal life are mentioned but not discussed in the context of historiographical theory. To do so would only distract the reader from the humble existence of Pereleshin as a biographical figure. His unique talent, personality, and literary footprint span vast distances from China's northeast to Brazil. This rather atypical biography consists primarily of the artist's aesthetically subjective testimony- his own poetry.As a former resident and survivor of war-time Harbin, Bakich herself is well aware of the backdrop of turbulent historical events in the 20th century Far East: Imperial Russia's eastward expansion, the forced and voluntary settlement of migrants from Eastern Europe, the Korean peninsula and Japanese archipelago, Qing China's semi-colonization and its subsequent collapse, the encroachment of Western and Japanese imperialism, the establishment of Japan's puppet state of Manchukuo, World War II and the USSR's advance into the region followed by civil war and the establishment of the People's Republic of China. The poet is a witness, survivor, and victim of these events.Bakich lets Pereleshin speak through letters, poems and photographs, a testimony of White Russians fleeing from the Eurasian Continent. Part One of Life of a Silkworm covers the period 1920 – 1952 in China, following Pereleshin's intellectual development from childhood to young adulthood. Each of the six chapters in this part is divided into multiple subtopics, covering periods of four to five years: the noble roots of the Salatko-Petrishche family, its relocation to Siberia amidst the chaos of revolution and horrors of civil war, education under the tsarist Russian system in Harbin, and most importantly his growing love for poetry and philosophy.The personal events of Pereleshin's early years document the still understudied but rich history of Russian Orthodox Ecclesiastical Mission in the Far East. Pereleshin, being sensitive and deeply religious, enrolled in the Mission's Theological Faculty in 1937, was ordained a Monk Herman(in honour of St. Herman of Kazan' and Sviiaga) in 1938, and a Priest-Monk Herman in 1941.Harbin émigré literary circle "Churaevka" and the lively interaction among its intellectuals also add new cultural dimensions to the study of Russian émigré society in Asia.Pereleshin began publishing his books of poetry in 1937.The poet, however, was rather a dissonance in his own conservative community. For example, as a monk, his participation in public poetic activities was limited. Moreover, he was inclined toward Catholicism and admired St. Francis of Assisi and St. Thérèse of Lisieux- a liberal expression of his spiritual interest. He began to travel and preach in Chinese cities with foreign concessions such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin with a determination to live his life to the fullest by serving God. But Pereleshin had difficulty finding inner peace with his vow of celibacy. While his poetry is infused with divine inspiration, passion and kindness, he was often tormented by the social stigma of his sexuality.In addition, the volatile political situation in the Far East made Pereleshin mistaken at times for a Japanese spy, a Fascist spy, a Soviet spy, and a Communist. Adversity, however, ignited his poetic creativity, especially after his departure to a third home, Brazil.Part Two consists of seven chapters covering 39 years of Pereleshin's life in Brazil during the period 1953-1992. The main focus shifts towards his growth as a poet. As a polyglot, he engaged in translations of poetry to and from Russian, Chinese and Portuguese languages. He also wrote some pieces in an avant-garde style, the so-called futurism, as well as preserving his lyrical poetic style. There were some bright moments: émigré scholars and critics in the US, such as Alexis Rannitand Simon Karlinsky recognized Pereleshin as an authentic Russian poet, and offered praise and support. It is an important gesture by Bakich to highlight this aspect of Pereleshin's life. Otherwise, his portrayal as a "tasteless" émigré poet from the east who lacked "Parisian culture" (171), according to one US literary professor, G. Struve, might be accorded more weight than it should. Pereleshin's animosity toward I. Brodsky is also interesting from the perspective of literary history. Whether the result of his jealousy toward this Nobel Prize winner or his anti-Semitic sentiment is unclear; yet in any case, a careful reading of the text reveals that the core issue originated in the poetic language itself, not ethno-religious identity. Even the last country he could have called home offered no respite. Pereleshin faced many financial difficulties and the pain of unrequited love. In the end,he had three homelands, and experienced three exiles. Yet, before his departure for Brazil, he had already sensed that for him, Kitai (China in Russian) should be his place to die, because of his fascination with the vivacious and affectionate people who "understood [him] and reciprocated [his] love." (139)The title of this work is drawn from Pereleshin's own words: "A tender, sticky web, /a fine material, /is produced by a silkworm/ twisting like an invisible snake/from its own self/ (There is nothing else)." (Silkworm, 29.12.1967, xiii) Pereleshin spun more than two thousand poems in his life. Bakich has re-entered his world and has woven a veritable tapestry of his life and art, using the poet's creative work as the warp, and personal events as the weft. The author's effort to present this complex poet in an approachable way using short chronological intervals may, to a certain extent, sacrifice the attractive depth of thematic components expressed in his poetry, namely, Russian émigré identity, religion, philosophy, homosexuality, and poetic inspiration. These topics would be worth pursuing more intensively in Pereleshin's anthology in the near future. For the present, it is the author's willingness to embrace the poet's extremes that is most impressive here. Bakich causes the reader to consider a life lived at the margins of ethnicity, citizenship, spirituality and sexuality – all prominent themes today as we seek to build an inclusive society. For Pereleshin, who was not a social activist, poetry was his only means of self-advocacy. Thankfully, Bakich's work introduces it to us: gentle, lonely, yet so brilliantly strong.

As late back as 1993, Ahmed noted that many Muslims voiced concern of the negative representation of Islam and Muslims by the Western media. However, following on from such incidents as the Rushdie affair, the first Gulf War and 9/11, interest in media representations of Islam have grown. An ever‐increasing body of research has argued that the images, representations and discourses relating to Islam and Muslims in mainstream Western media tend to be negative and hostile (Poole and Richardson 2006). Various studies have examined the specific relationship between media and Islam (Ahmed 1993; Runnymede Trust 1997); the representations of Muslim minorities in the West (Allen 2005; Poole 2002) and others on Muslims and Islam in the global media (Poole and Richardson 2006; Zelizer and Allan 2002). Ideologically, these constructions can be traced back the expansion of Western imperialism where a dichotomy of 'West' versus 'East' was constructed (Said 1978).The following suggested reading list provides a starting point for researchers that are interested in exploring issues of representation and minority groups. This is not an exhaustive list but provides some of the fundamental texts that help us to understand the relationship between one minority group in the West (i.e. Muslims) and their representations in the media.The reading list is constructed in the following way. First, it presents key cultural theory (i.e. Orientalism) and relates this to issues of 'race'. Second, it examines the link between media research on minority groups and representations of Muslims/Islam. Finally, it provides some background knowledge on Muslims/Islam within the West.Suggested textsCultural theorySaid, Edward 1978. Orientalism. London, UK: Penguin (republished, 2003 and 2005).Edward Said's Orientalism (1978) is a theory that has transformed the ways in which power relations between West and East can be understood. This explores the ideas that have become embedded in Western culture through history that justify imperialism/colonialism on the basis that the West is viewed as superior to the East. Within the book, Said offers three major claims. First, he describes Orientalism as an objective, disinterested and esoteric set of ideas, the overall function of which is to serve political ends. These, for example, provided an ideological justification for Orientalist scholars to allow Europeans to take over Oriental lands. Second, Said looks at how these tools are important in helping Europe to define its image and to establish and maintain opposites and others. On this basis, Europe was given its own cultural and intellectual superiority over Islamic cultures, and this led the West to see the Islamic culture as static both in place and time. Third, Said points out that Orientalism has produced a false description of Islamic cultures, including a belief that that it is possible to unconditionally define the essential qualities of a whole Islamic culture and the people within it. The qualities of this culture are usually defined in negative terms.The following link provides a summary by Said on the new edition of Orientalism: http://books.guardian.co.uk/review/story/0,12084,1010417,00.html (last accessed 24 June 2008)Ferguson, Robert 1998. Representing 'Race': Ideology, Identity, and the Media. London, UK: Arnold.The operations of ideology in the media are also discussed in Representing 'Race'. Ferguson argues that the study of 'race' and the media cannot be seriously undertaken without engaging with theories of ideology and without an awareness of contemporary theoretical work, such as approaches to Orientalism, hegemony and critical discourse analysis. Ferguson also highlights the danger of accepting at face value socially constructed and ideologically charged notions such as 'race'. The book also provides a useful summary and critique of Orientalism and applies various concepts to case studies within the media.For a good analysis of how hegemony, representation and notions of 'race' are intertwined that draws upon Ferguson's work, see the following: Can Gramsci's theory of hegemony help us to understand the representation of ethnic minorities in western television and cinema? By Reena Mistry at http://www.theory.org.uk/ctr‐rol6.htm (last accessed 24 June 2008).Media and 'race'Cottle, Simon 2000. Ethnic Minorities and the Media: Changing Cultural Boundaries. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press.This key text brings together international researchers who have investigated some of the latest issues, debates and examples informing the field of ethnic minorities and the media. It provides a useful opening chapter that reviews the developments within this field. It also explores changes in media representations as well as different approaches that examine discourse, production and identity and debates within broader media theory such those about the media' role as the public sphere.Van Dijk, Teun 1991. Racism and the Press. London, UK: Sage.Van Dijk notes that most white people have very little contact with ethnic minorities and that their attitudes towards ethnic groups are therefore influenced on this basis by the media. He states that the media play a central role in the reproduction of racism in Western countries. Using discourse analysis, his book investigates the nature of the existence of racism through an analysis of statements on racial/ethnic relations found within the Dutch and British press. Van Dijk links the idea of 'primary definers' to the notion that the media constitute an 'elite' in society. Whilst accepting that the media represent conflicts over these ideas that include the voices of other social actors, he argues that in terms of race and ethnicity, an ethnic consensus is prevalent here. Van Dijk notes that the media constitute a cultural elite, and as the experts in matters of 'formulation' (and re‐formulation), the media produce the dominant discourse environment of a racist society.A collection Van Dijk's work on racism, discourse analysis and media can be found on the following web site: http://www.discourses.org Representations of Islam/muslims in the mediaPoole, Elizabeth 2002. Reporting Islam: Media Representations of British Muslims. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.Poole examines the claim that Muslims are negatively represented in the British press. She argues that media images of Muslims are informed by official definitions of Islam that serve elite interests and that these change over time to suit political purposes. Orientalist discourses, it is argued here for example, maintain the view of Islam as a coherent, trans‐national monolithic force that has been engaged in a confrontational relationship with the West throughout history. The book makes clear and concise connections between theory and representation and provides excellent examples to illustrate this.Poole, Elizabeth and John Richardson (Eds) 2006. Muslims and the News Media. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.This book examines the role and representations of Muslims in the news media in context of the current discussions of the 'War on Terror'. It includes chapters by both academic authorities and media practitioners and demonstrates how theory can be exemplified in practice. Furthermore, it is set in both a British and international context and recognizes similarities and differences present within coverage from around the globe. From a media perspective, the book clearly explores the connections between national/global context, content, production and different audiences (Muslim and non‐Muslim) and looks also at how Muslim media is organized and structured.Muslim minorities in the WestModood, Tariq 2006. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.In Multicultural Politics, Tariq Modood explores how much of the 'blame' for the failure of multiculturalism has been attached to Islamic culture's incompatibility with the 'democratic' principles of the West. Arguing that the old 'racial' division of black–white has been complicated by factors such as cultural racism and the rise of Islamophobia, the book moves to chart these developments within the British context whilst also paying attention to global political developments. The book has an impressive range of topics covered such as 'race', racism, Islamophobia, the multicultural debate and even summarizes broader relevant cultural theory.Films, videos and on‐line sourcesVisual sources are an excellent teaching method that can be employed to explain theories of 'race' and media representation. Rather than concentrate on 'actual' films, videos online material that may considered Islamophobic the following provides academic and more critical sources that may be useful for teaching issues of Islam, Muslims, minority representation and even 'race'.Edward Said: On Orientalism (1998)In this documentary, Said talks about the context within which his book was conceived, its main themes and how its original thesis and ideas still relate to a contemporary understanding of 'the Orient' that is represented in the mass media and wider public politics.A brief version of the documentary can be found here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xwCOSkXR_Cw http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BjlRR‐qRkcc (last accessed 26 June 2008)Reel Bad Arabs: How Hollywood Vilifies a People (2008)Race, the Floating Signifier: Featuring Stuart Hall (2006)Stuart Hall discusses the concept of 'race' and how race is represented and naturalized in the media. This interview gives relevant examples to help to understand the concept of mediated representations. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7cxBOdBoxpg&feature=related (last accessed June 26 2008)A documentary supported by the Media Education Forum based on academic research on how Muslims/Islam/Arabs are represented (and treated as a homogenous group) by Hollywood. It builds upon media representations of various minority groups and then looks specifically at similarities and differences in Arab portrayalsThe trailer and a brief version of the documentary can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ko_N4BcaIPY http://www.democracynow.org/2007/10/19/reel_bad_arabs_how_hollywood_vilifies (both last accessed 26 June 2008)Online sourcesRace, racism and ethnic minority affairs http://www.cre.gov.uk/ The home page for the Commission for Racial Equality provides up to date information on news and current affairs. It also provides links to a variety of other relevant sources form the media to black history groups. http://www.irr.org.uk The Institute of Race Relations (IRR) was established as an independent educational charity in 1958 to carry out research, publish and collect resources on race relations throughout the world. This website contains links to academic research, policy research and also media stories that are relevant to anyone interested in the area of 'race' and ethnicity. It also published the highly respected journal 'Race and Class'. http://www.islamophobia‐watch.com/islamophobia‐watch/ The above link also provides useful information on examples of racist and Islamaphobic sources that maybe useful for teaching or illuminating theories. I have purposefully not included the original links to many of these because they are, in my opinion, racist. http://www.guardian.co.uk/race The Guardian has a link to a database of back issues of relevant race articles. These include information on media representations and provide links to a variety of other sources as well as events/topics such as 9/11 and Asylum Issues. http://www.johnpilger.com/ This site contains articles on a variety of opinions from the respected author John Pilger. Much of this is relevant to issues of 'race' and ethnicity. http://www.insted.co.uk/islam.html The above links to a full text of the commission's 2004 report, plus also some extracts from it, including Islamophobia and Race Relations and Debate and Disagreement. http://www.fairuk.org/ Useful range of recent newspaper articles and several valuable fact sheets.Sample SyllabusModule justificationIt is clear that as issues of race, ethnicity and religion are as crucial to the 21st century as at any time in human history. We need to build clear understanding of these topics as well as an awareness of how they have evolved into present debates. Many of these debates and issues have invoked the use of racial, ethnic or national terminology but the discussion is not always fashioned around theories of 'old' racism but around concepts of 'new' racism.Whilst traditional notions of racism may have been challenged, these have been replaced in the West by fears of minority cultures, especially fear of Muslims. Following the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the subsequent War on Terrorism has in some quarters been debated in terms of a clash of civilisations invoking representations of the 'Others' and based on historical conceptions of the 'Orient'.Furthermore, the European community as a whole is now debating issues of asylum seekers and refugees in what could be argued to be ethnic and racial terms. Thus, there is a need for a module that examines issues of race and ethnicity by linking media representations with theoretical and historical considerations.Section 1 Theories of 'race', racism and the 'other'This reading looks at how the concept of 'race' has been ideologically constructed. This will be done by examining race theory and applying this to historical and contemporary examples.Donald, James 1992. Cultural Identity. London, UK: Sage/Open University.Dyer, Richard 1997. White. London, UK: Routledge.Fryer, Peter 1984. Staying Power: History of Black People in Britain. London, UK: Pluto Press.Gilroy, Paul 1993. Small Acts: thoughts on the politics of black cultures. London, UK: Serpent's Tail.Gilroy, Paul 1987. There Ain't No Black In The Union Jack. London, UK: Hutchinson.Hiro, Dilip 1991. Black British, White British, 2nd edn. London, UK: Grafton Books.Mason, David 1995 Race and Ethnicty in Modern Britain. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Modood, Tariq 1997 Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage. London, UK: PSI.Solomos, John 1993. Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain. Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan.Solomos John and Les Back 1996. Racism and Society. Basingstoke, UK: MacMillan. Possible Seminar discussion Is racism about class or colour? Would you consider yourself racist? Section 2 'Race' history and imperialismThis reading examines how representations of race and culture are mediated through ideological power and explain this through historical and contemporary examples.Bhabba, Hommi 1990. Nation and Narration. London, UK: Routledge.Fanon, Frantz 1986. Black Skin: White Masks. London, UK: Pluto.Gandhi, Leela 1998. Postcolonial Theory: A Critical Introduction. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.Said, Edward 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London, UK: Penguin Books.Said, Edward 1997. Covering Islam. London, UK: Vintage.Section 3 Islam, Islamophobia and cultural racismThese readings look at how constructions of religion in popular media are increasingly racialised and consider at the case study of Western media representations of Islam and Muslim communities.Ahmed, Akbar 1992. Postmodernism and Islam. London, UK: Routledge.Anthias, Floya and Yuval‐Davis, Nira 1992. Racialized Boundaries. London, UK: Routledge.Ballard, Roger (Ed.) 1994. Desh Pradesh, The South Asian Presence in Britain. London, UK: Hurst and Co.Conway, Gerald 1997. Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. London, UK: Runnymede Trust.Modood, Tariq 2006. Multicultural Politics: Racism, Ethnicity and Muslims in Britain. London, UK: I.B. Tauris.Said, Edward 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. London, UK: Penguin Books.Said, Edward 1997. Covering Islam. London, UK: Vintage.Note
* Correspondence address: Department of Media and Cultural Studies, University of Sunderland, St Peters Campus, SR6 ODD. Email: amir.saeed@sunderland.ac.uk