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For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946-2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determine, to a high extent, the fate of rulers as regimes shape internal dynamics and incentives and decisively affect the way rulers are replaced. Due to the lack of regularized succession procedures and to the concentration of power and patronage-based loyalty, personalist leaders are more likely to be killed and to go into exile upon their exit than other autocrats. Military and personalist leaders are also more likely to be imprisoned than monarchs or rulers of single-party regimes. If replaced by democracies, rulers of party and military regimes have a much higher likelihood of not being punished than personalists. It is also found that performance matters for explaining what happens to rulers after the loss of power. Economic crises and defeats increase the likelihood that an authoritarian ruler is imprisoned. Adapted from the source document.

Along with the mobilization of political support, repression is one of the two basic instruments dictators use to stay in power. Yet, there is no systematic investigation analyzing whether repression actually helps dictators retain power. This article fills this gap by addressing the simultaneous relationship between survival and repression. The results reveal that repression certainly increases the likelihood of dictators' survival. Furthermore, this article also analyzes different types of authoritarian leader exit and repression. The article distinguishes between, on the one hand, nonviolent and regular exits and, on the other hand, violent and irregular exits as well as between political terror and restrictions on civil liberties. It argues that terror is effective against threats from organized groups, while restrictions on civil liberties essentially serve to prevent collective action. The empirical evidence confirms that political terror only reduces the likelihood of nonviolent and regular exits. Instead, restrictions on civil liberties are effective in deterring both sorts of threats. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]

This article explores how international sanctions affect authoritarian rulers' decisions concerning repression and public spending composition. Rulers whose budgets are not severely constrained by sanctions will tend to increase spending in those categories that most benefit their core support groups. When budget constraints are severe, dictators are more likely to increase repression. Using data on regime types, public expenditures and spending composition (1970-2000) as well as on repression levels (1976-2001), I show that the empirical patterns conform well to the theoretical expectations. Single-party regimes, when targeted by sanctions, increase spending on subsidies and transfers which largely benefit their key constituencies. Likewise, military regimes increase their expenditures on goods and services, which include military equipment and soldiers' and officers' wages. Conversely, personalist regimes targeted by sanctions reduce spending in all categories and thus increase repression more than other autocracies. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright holder.]

This article tests the hypothesis that group power affects development policy by holding dictators accountable through different mechanisms. New data on dictators' modes of exit for the period 1946-2000 allow us to estimate the predicted likelihood that a given authoritarian head of government will be toppled by the elite, the military or the citizenry. When the predicted odds are used as a measure of group strength, the results of simple growth regressions reveal that a stronger citizen opposition or a greater military threat compels the ruler to improve economic growth rates. In contrast, elite power is negative for growth, although it turns positive when a country reaches a certain level of industrialized development. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright, the International Political Science Association.]

This article studies the impact of economic sanctions on the duration and outcome of intrastate conflicts. Sanctions are argued to foster the convergence of beliefs over parties' capacity, to reduce the utility of victory and to increase the costs of continuing fighting. Using a sample of 87 wars and new data on sanctions and sanction types, the author shows that sanctions and their durations are statistically associated with shorter intrastate conflicts. It is also shown that total economic embargoes are the most effective type of coercive measure in these cases and that sanctions imposed either by international organizations or by other actors have similar negative effects on war duration. In the second part of the article, the dependent variable is disaggregated, and I demonstrate that sanctions imposed by international institutions increase the likelihood of conflict resolution, whereas those sanctions not imposed by such institutions tend to increase the probability of a military victory. Moreover, if the targeted state is a member of the international institution imposing the sanctions, the effect of such coercion is even greater. Economic embargoes are also proven to increase the likelihoods of a military and a negotiated end, whereas international arms embargoes reduce the likelihood of a military victory. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article analyses from a comparative point of view the fate of dictators once they have lost or given power up, in other words, it seeks to explain under what conditions it is possible to punish outgoing rulers & under which ones dictators can exile or remain unpunished in their countries. To do so, we depart from a simple game-theoretic model through which we stress that there are two main factors that explain rulers' fate: The relative strength of the opposition & the international context. New data for the period 1945-2000 on dictators' mode of exiting power & post-power fate have allowed us to put our hypotheses under empirical scrutiny. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

How do voters behave in two-dimensional political spaces? Are voters pure Downsians or do they instead engage in strategic electoral behavior? Do voters behave similarly within both axes of electoral competition? In this article, I apply two different spatial models of voting, Downs' Proximity model (1957) & Orit Kedar's Compensational model (2003), to the Catalan autonomous elections of 1999 & 2003 in order to analyze the nature of the vote in two-dimensional spaces. I observe that while the Proximity model better predicts the vote won by "non-nationalist" parties (PSC & PP), Compensational model predicts better the vote for "nationalist" parties (CiU & ERC) & "small parties" (ICV). I also observe that the Compensational model predicts a higher increase in nationalist vote as a result of movements of the individuals along the nationalist scale, suggesting that this model better explains why parties such as Convergencia i Unio (CiU) do not moderate their nationalist messages. In general, I observe that the Compensational model provides a new spatial explanation to the nationalist vote & to the polarization in the nationalist dimension that takes place in political contexts like that of Catalonia. Tables, References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper discusses the circumstances & incentives that lead some dictators to create or maintain judicial institutions in their regimes. A game theory model is thus developed with partial data in which it is assumed that dictators are agents seeking to maximize revenues by means of taxes. The model reveals that there are two key factors accounting for the creation of parliaments: a greater share of mobile capital in the economy & a dictator with a high discount factor. They both increase the likelihood of creating such an institution. There are two other implications resulting from the model & which are confirmed in the empirical part: dictatorships with parliaments levy lesser tax rates & increase investment levels. 5 Tables, 1 Figure, 2 Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

Do human rights prosecutions deter dictatorships from relinquishing power? Advances in the study of human rights show that prosecutions reduce repression in transition countries. However, prosecuting officials for past crimes may jeopardize the prospects of regime change in countries that have not transitioned, namely dictatorships. The creation of the International Criminal Court has further revitalized this debate. This article assesses how human rights prosecutions influence autocratic regime change in neighboring dictatorships. We argue that when dictators and their elite supporters can preserve their interests after a regime transition, human rights prosecutions are less likely to deter them from leaving power. Using personalist dictatorship as a proxy for weak institutional guarantees of posttransition power, the evidence indicates that these regimes are less likely to democratize when their neighbors prosecute human rights abusers. In other dictatorships, however, neighbor prosecutions do not deter regimes from democratizing. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines how authoritarian parties and legislatures affect regime survival. While authoritarian legislatures increase the stability of dictators, political parties -- even when devised to quell internal threats -- can destabilize dictators. The main argument is that authoritarian parties influence the distribution of power in a subsequent new democracy by helping to protect the interests of authoritarian elites. These institutions thus increase the likelihood of democratization. Using a dataset of authoritarian regimes in 108 countries from 1946 to 2002 and accounting for simultaneity, the analysis models transitions to democracy and to a subsequent authoritarian regime. Results indicate that authoritarian legislatures are associated with a lower probability of transition to a subsequent dictatorship. Authoritarian parties, however, are associated with a higher likelihood of democratization. Adapted from the source document.

In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970-1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines whether economic sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers. We argue that the effect of sanctions is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Because personalist regimes and monarchies are more sensitive to the loss of external sources of revenue (such as foreign aid and taxes on trade) to fund patronage, rulers in these regimes are more likely to be destabilized by sanctions than leaders in other types of regimes. In contrast, when dominant single-party and military regimes are subject to sanctions, they increase their tax revenues and reallocate their expenditures to increase their levels of cooptation and repression. Using data on sanction episodes and authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 1997 and selection-corrected survival models, we test whether sanctions destabilize authoritarian rulers in different types of regimes. We find that personalist dictators are more vulnerable to foreign pressure than other types of dictators. We also analyze the modes of authoritarian leader exit and find that sanctions increase the likelihood of a regular and an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup, in personalist regimes. In single-party and military regimes, however, sanctions have little effect on leadership stability. Adapted from the source document.