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Azerbaijani national identity emerged in post-Persian Russian-ruled East Caucasia at the end of the nineteenth century, and was finally forged during the early Soviet period. After the fiasco of the short-lived independence period of 1918–20, Azerbaijan became Soviet. Soviet power then instrumentalized Azerbaijan for political and ideological penetration into Iran by galvanizing local separatist movements. Azerbaijani Iranology was shaped within Soviet oriental studies and put into service of Azerbaijani nation-building. Exiled Iranian communists found asylum in Baku, joined local research institutions, wrote the first Persian academic and school textbooks, and contributed to the translation of classic Persian poetry into Azerbaijani. Soviet Azerbaijani Iranologists were sent as translators to the Soviet missions to Iran and Afghanistan. After Azerbaijan regained independence in 1991, its Iranological infrastructure was represented by several departments at the National Academy of Sciences and the Iranian Studies Program at Baku State University. While the number of Persian classes at schools during the last three decades diminished, a new generation of post-Soviet Iranologists—those who studied in Iran—emerged. While Soviet Azerbaijani Iranologists never created a solid bilingual dictionary of Persian, several Persian–Azerbaijani and Azerbaijani–Persian dictionaries were published in the 2010s. Post-Soviet Azerbaijani Iranology is still trying to find its place within humanities in the transitional nation.

Usbekistan ist mit mehr als 33 Millionen Einwohner:innen das bevölkerungsreichste Land Zentralasiens. Die postsowjetische Gegenwart des Landes ist durch die 25 Jahre lange, autoritäre Präsidentschaft von Ex-Präsident Islom Karimow geprägt. Karimows Nachfolger Schawkat Mirsijojew hat die Außenpolitik Usbekistans neu ausgerichtet, was auch der Entwicklung der iranisch-usbekischen Beziehungen neue Möglichkeiten eröffnete. Im Hinblick auf die Dynamik der Beziehungen zwischen Taschkent und Teheran können in der gegenwärtigen Gemengelage sowohl Konflikt- als auch Kooperationsfelder ausgemacht werden, deren Darstellung das Ziel dieses Beitrages ist.

Usbekistan ist mit mehr als 33 Millionen Einwohner:innen das bevölkerungsreichste Land Zentralasiens. Die postsowjetische Gegenwart des Landes ist durch die 25 Jahre lange, autoritäre Präsidentschaft von Ex-Präsident Islom Karimow geprägt. Karimows Nachfolger Schawkat Mirsijojew hat die Außenpolitik Usbekistans neu ausgerichtet, was auch der Entwicklung der iranisch-usbekischen Beziehungen neue Möglichkeiten eröffnete. Im Hinblick auf die Dynamik der Beziehungen zwischen Taschkent und Teheran können in der gegenwärtigen Gemengelage sowohl Konflikt- als auch Kooperationsfelder ausgemacht werden, deren Darstellung das Ziel dieses Beitrages ist.

Along with the Crimean Peninsula and the Romanian region of Dobrugea, Istanbul became an important center of Crimean Tatar culture and political activity from the end of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. Crimean Tatar activists promoted the idea of Crimea's cultural and then political autonomy and protested against the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatar population by the Soviet authorities in 1944. Cafer Seydahmet, the brothers Ismail and Ibrahim Otar, Abdullah Zihni Soysal, Sabri Arikan, Yusuf Uralgiray and many others launched publicist and political campaigns for the promotion of the Crimean Tatar cause. The aim of this article is to analyse the numerous networks and interrelations between Crimean Tatar exiles with their compatriots and other Turkic and European intellectuals, orientalists and other scholars between Crimea, Constanta, Istanbul, Paris, Warsaw and other parts of the world. The study is based on the investigation of several Crimean Tatar emigrant archives in Istanbul, mainly the Otar-Collection (the archive of Ismail Otar), and the private collections of Bilge Otar and Kaan Öztürk. ; Along with the Crimean Peninsula and the Romanian region of Dobrugea, Istanbul became an important center of Crimean Tatar culture and political activity from the end of the nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century. Crimean Tatar activists promoted the idea of Crimea's cultural and then political autonomy and protested against the mass deportation of the Crimean Tatar population by the Soviet authorities in 1944. Cafer Seydahmet, the brothers Ismail and Ibrahim Otar, Abdullah Zihni Soysal, Sabri Arikan, Yusuf Uralgiray and many others launched publicist and political campaigns for the promotion of the Crimean Tatar cause. The aim of this article is to analyse the numerous networks and interrelations between Crimean Tatar exiles with their compatriots and other Turkic and European intellectuals, orientalists and other scholars between Crimea, Constanta, Istanbul, Paris, Warsaw and other parts of the world. The study is based on the investigation of several Crimean Tatar emigrant archives in Istanbul, mainly the Otar-Collection (the archive of Ismail Otar), and the private collections of Bilge Otar and Kaan Öztürk.

Turkey does not recognise Russia's annexation of Crimea. In particular, diaspora Crimean Tatar intellectuals, who play an important role in the Turkish public arena, advocate forthright criticism of Russia. Also, trade between Turkey and Ukraine has clearly grown in the past decade, and Ankara is ascribing greater importance to its immediate neighbours after the cooling of relations with the European Union. But because Turkey does not want to jeopardize its relations with Russia, Ankara's reaction so far has not been very harsh. Adapted from the source document.

Die 2007 gegründete Stiftung Russkij mir ist offiziell für die Förderung der russischen Kultur im Ausland zuständig. Wie der Name "Russische Welt" schon andeutet, ist sie aber nur bedingt mit den Auslands-Kulturinstituten anderer Länder vergleichbar: Das Konzept des russkij mir geht auf die Slawophilen des 19. Jahrhunderts und die Bewegung der Eurasier zurück. Deren Ideen verbanden sich nach dem Ende der Sowjetunion mit anderen antiwestlichen Strömungen zu einem ideologischen Konglomerat, das heute offenbar die Basis der internationalen Kulturpolitik Russlands darstellt. Sie ist im Kern konservativ und neo-imperial. Insbesondere im postsowjetischen Raum verfolgt die Stiftung auch direkt politische Ziele. (Osteuropa (Berlin) / SWP)