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The article examines the work of the first modern writer of the Serbian
language, Eustahija Arsic. Undoubtedly, Dositej Obradovic?s student, in her
short ethical treatise, published under the title ?Moral Lessons? (1816),
presented a kind of list of leading virtues. At the beginning of the 19th
century, almost every story about morality responded to the need to shape an
intersubjective, national platform. Moral education aimed to create a better
man, and a better man was necessary by all means. The 19th century will
create it. He or she will appear in the form of an engaged national worker,
liberal and cosmopolitan. The author?s profile of Eustahija Arsic testifies
to the unusual, almost paradoxical modest courage of our first female
writer. In order to illuminate it appropriately, we have firstly considered
the configuration of the notion of beginning in the first decades of the
19th century. According to Eustahija, the beginning is a free act, the
initiation of sharing, and its reflection points to taking the active life
into one?s own hands.

U prvom dijelu članka, autor ispituje pitanje trubadurske subjektivnosti. Subjekt pjesme najavljuje samogubljenje, napuštanje postojećeg stanja stvari i samopredavanje, ali u tome ne vidi tragediju, već izvor istinske radosti. Ljubav zaslužuje žrtvu, ona je vrijedna cjelokupnog ljudskog htijenja, ali nije konvencionalna ljubav, nije ni bračna ni porodična, već je eterična i poetična ljubav prema Gospi. Za sve što može biti vezano uz takvu ljubav smatramo da je daleko prikladniji prijevod radosna nauka jer preciznije označava trubadursku poantu od uobičajenog prijevoda vesela nauka. Ono što posebno začuđuje kod naslijeđenog rješenja potpuno je promašivanje trubadurske posebnosti jer se riječ nauka može dovesti s njom u vezu jedino ako se prethodno stavi pod znakove navoda (što je i Nietzsche izričito učinio). Riječju, autor zaključuje da je demokratski naučnik sretan i optimističan, dok Nietzscheov »radosni« naučnik ne preza svima javno pokazati svoje patničko lice. Trubadurska patnja zbog daleke i neostvarive ljubavi neobično je blizu Nietzscheovoj patnji u suvremenom svijetu koji kao da nije u stanju živjeti u svijetu dalekog i odsutnog Boga. ; In the first part of the paper, the author tackles the question of troubadour subjectivity. The subject of the poem announces the losing of oneself, abandonment of the existing state of affairs and self-surrender, but sees no tragedy in it, for a source of genuine joy. Love deserves sacrifice, it is worthy of all human desire, but it is not a conventional love, neither marital nor family love, rather, it is an ethereal and poetic love for Our Lady. For everything that may be related to such love, we believe that a far more appropriate translation of gaya scienza is a joyful lesson, for it signifies far more to mark the troubadour point than the usual [Croatian/Serbian] translation cheerful doctrine. What is notably striking about the inherited solution is the complete misapprehension of the troubadour point, as the word science can only be associated with the troubadour wisdom if it is previously put in quotes (which Nietzsche explicitly does). In short, the author concludes that a democratic scientist is happy and optimistic, while Nietzsche's »joyful« scientist does not hesitate to show his anguished face publicly. The troubadour's anguish for distant and unrealizable love is peculiarly close to Nietzsche's suffering in a modern world that seems unable to live in a world of a distant and absent God.

Troubadour? mask denotes a figure activated by Nietzsche in order to arrange
a quarrel with his own time. Transformative capacities of its untimilyness
were examined from the perspective of the contemporary instability of
democratic order, recognized by bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev
as an expression of encreasing crisis of the trust in the democratic order.
Unlike Krastev?s thesis, this paper uncovers that the process of
absolutization of trust caracterizes a trajectory from religious faith to
antidemocratical, slave-like totalitarian submission. Its conclusion claims
that maximalized trust leads to a totalitarian subject, who is unevitably
dumb, speechless, deprived of language, explicitly different from all
characteristics of Aristotelian political being whose crucial gift was
logos. Consequently, the ruth of contemporary mistrust is not
antidemocratical, as claimed by Krastev, but reflects an outstanding
democratical orientation and presents a direct consequence of the resistance
towards the cult of leader.

After explaining why phenomenology of the alien cannot be counted among
traditional philosophical disciplines, the author explores why all of
European history can be read as the ?shading of the alien? (Verblendung des
Fremden), although not in the sense of mere disregarding, neglecting or
denying of the alien, but disciplining it, manipulating and exploiting it.
The alien has not been forgotten for centuries, it was always in the
European focus, but only as an instance through which the sense of power was
traditionally constructed. Following the basic presumptions of Bernhard
Waldenfels? phenomenology of the alien the article presents the shading of
the alien as analogous to the process of its naturalization. As if the
tradition of European colonialism can be best understood in the key of
ma?tre et possesseur de?l ?tranger. That is to say, the European legacy
shows, in an extraordinary manner, that the alien can be transformed into a
resource, from which we can appropriate and assimilate everything. A crucial
insight for Waldenfels is also that strangeness is not reducible to a narrow
segment of reality, whether it is culture, religion or art-based, because
strangeness is a radical dimension that transcends all regions.

The article examines three crucial implications of the term ?classical?. The
first meaning is defined as epochal, and it is primarily presented in view
of the brief history of the concept of classicus, but also considering the
Baudelaire?s idea of ?universal beauty?. The characteristics of the
classical art are confronted with Friedrich Schlegel?s criticism of the
romanticism, which reminds that the idea of a time-resistant art form is
nothing realistic, but rather a mere fantasy or a chimera of abstraction.
For a romanticist, being out of touch with the present no longer had a
particular merit, but rather was a symptom of the absence of awareness what
the crucial sense of the works of art really is. If the classical divulged
the cosmic harmony, the integrity of the natural order, the romanticism
prefers to be the art of mediation, the dynamic transition, the unstoppable
process. In the second part of the article, the author analyzes the motives
of anti-classical tendencies in the European art, demonstrating that
onslaught on the classical could have primarily been expected in the
environment where it was neither too strong nor too weak.

In the first part of the article, the author discusses the basic outlines of
romantic and avant-garde anthropology. The crucial concept is related to the
motives that drove the romantics in their journey toward individuation,
whereas the members of avant-garde movement brought new visions of community
into being. Unlike the romantics, early avant-garde movements advocated for
ideals of general, globalized man mediated by technology and media. In the
second part of the paper, the author analyses Husserl?s concept of
all-community (Allgemeinschaft) bearing in mind the attempts of his
phenomenology to extend our idea of community as much as it is possible by
means of including everything that discloses the very foundations of our
lifeworld into the concept of community. By doing so, Husserl encompassed not
only the real and the past, but the possible intersubjectivity as well.

The first part of this paper explores the kinship in diagnosis of
contemporaneity of Hugo Ball and Martin Heidegger. Both thinkers recognize
leveling as an important trait of their age. In Ball?s terms, leveling is
identified with the apocalyptic abolishment of humanity. That happens by
equalizing all of human creation, which becomes possible only after the
abolishment of the hierarchy of values, thanks to which it was previously
possible to distinguish a work of art from an average work. With Heidegger,
leveling is equated with the perverted forms of curiosity. Unlike the former
forms of curiosity, coupled by the common desire for deeper insight, modern
curiosity is fairly superficial, let loose with no boundaries to all the
impressions which supersede the expected and already seen. In the second part
of the paper, Husserl?s term of passive synthesis is examined, so we can
observe the intervention of phenomenology from the perspective of
deconstruction of the effects of leveling. I conclude with a warning that we
cannot protect ourselves from the world to which we are exposed by natural
subjectivity and conventional forms of knowledge. Which insight leads us to
revert to the sources of subjectivity, the idea common to both the
avant-garde and the phenomenologists.

In the first part of the paper, the author displays the specificities of the
romantic concept of subjectivity. Based on the assumption that the Man is but
a minute part of what he might be, the romantics emphasize on the imperative
of infinite subjectivity. Giving up on the division of philosophical
disciplines, the romantics request a unity of spirit in history. The
relationship between Kant and romanticism is mostly deliberated under the
auspices of the terms of anarchy and the nomadic spirit, which are pointed
out by Kant in the beginning of the foreword to the first edition of the
Critique of Pure Reason as the symptoms of the crisis of metaphysics. What
Kant sees as a crisis, the romantics embrace as constitutive moments of
subjectivity which aspire to soften the modern rifts by breaking up with all
substance. Trying to develop a sketch of the ontology of existence, Friedrich
Schlegel evokes Plato?s term ontos on, but ties it with the process of
establishing the individual ideal, as opposed to the former link with the
objective being. The author concludes that the ontology of existence with
romantics is at the same time the metaphysics of subjectivity which cares
mostly about originality, selfness and authenticity, about the integration of
Kant?s term of dynamically sublime in the midst of the philosophical speech
about the true being.

The author describes the first decade of the philosophical journal Arhe,
founded by the Department of Philosophy, University of Novi Sad in 2004. From
the very beginning, the editorial policy has put a strong emphasis on topics
related to the current curriculum, in order to broaden and deepen the present
bibliography with original contributions mostly written by university
professors and instructors. A recognizable feature of the journal is that it
gives an opportunity to young authors to publish their first articles, and
does so in a great number of languages. By means of a problem oriented
critical outline of the general idea of the journal Arche, the author
presents the leading topics, the choice which has guided the works in
translation, guest lectures, round tables and other activities recorded
within the journal?s sections.

Peter Sloterdijk is one of the rare contemporary philosophers who insist on the relevance of Hegel's thesis that philosophy is its own time apprehended in thought. Philosophy's duty to reflect on contemporary phenomena, according to him, is primarily concerned with the necessity of the adequate reflections of the media. Philosophy of the media, inter connected with the metadisciplinary cultural thought, could be acknowledged as Sloterdijk's contribution to the philosophical project of the enlarged mind. Unlike his predecessors, Sloterdijk will no longer possess confidence in the academic aura of spiritual sciences, unless they have managed to distance themselves from the stigma of their Eurocentrically motivated origin. There fore Sloterdijk's reflection on the media is in a unique relation to the analysis of the European tradition in the light of new integrations. Arguing for the necessity that Europe breaks up with the imperialistic in hesitance, the author examines the contemporary tendencies, especially the productivity of the tertium datur logic which reflects it self in the abandoning of the radical attitude either/or, and turning to the more integrative and/and: which means both an extensive critique and a inherent confidence into the existent world.

(nemacki) Von Heideggers Standpunkt aus wirkte der Mechanismus der Idee von der einheitlichen Geschichte der Menschheit trotz der proklamierten emanzipatorischen Absichten als Bef?rw?rter in der Nivelierung des eigentlichen Daseins, und damit diente er eher seiner Versklavung als seiner Befreiung. Heideggers Abhandlung ?ber die Geschichtlichkeit beruht auf der Ablehnung des Begriffs der Geschichte, beziehungsweise Hegels Begriffs der Weltgeschichte. Die Rechtfertigung dieser Korrektur wurde in unverzichtbarer Opposition zwischen der Erkentnnis der Geschichte und der Befragung des geschichtlichen Seins gefunden, wessen eigene Struktur in der egsistentiell-zeitlichen M?glichkeit des Geschehens liegt. In der Behauptung, dass das urspr?ngliche Verst?ndnis keine allgemeine Kentnnis f?r alle darbieten kann, ?ffnet sich die ganze Problematik der Heideggers Position. Sie beruht n?hmlich auf der These, dass die Welt der ?ffentlichkeit keine Rationalit?t bietet und das Dasein im Bezug auf die ?ffentlichkeit hat nichts, worauf es sich st?tzen k?nnte.

This article discusses Heidegger's thesis that one cannot talk about Hegel's essential advancement from the inherited notion of time. Due to the ambivalent interpretation - according to which Hegel's notion of time was both not respected enough, but also vulgar; that from him one should not learn about temporality, but that his standpoint can still serve as a proper example of everyday time - Heidegger opted for the reciprocal historical-philosophical reflection with the goal to show the direct interdependence between Aristotle's and Hegel's understanding of time. The problematic assumption in that interpretation consists of Heidegger's emphasis on the constructive, and thus pronouncedly controversial link between history and spirit, which tries to deny the unique, historical movement of the spirit. Heidegger's diagnosis might not be problematic if his interpretation of Hegel's philosophy were not directed to a concrete perspective of thought, focused on the mechanism which in a way completes the spirit of the new-age ontology. Moreover, historical fulfillment of the epoch-making model of ontology is closely related to the dominance of the natural understanding of time which also reached its peak in Hegel. In other words, regardless of the issue about its foundedness, Heidegger's conviction that Hegel indicates a peak in the vulgar interpretation of time implies nothing else but the idea of the historical development of spirit. With misunderstandings which inevitably follow when the interpretation of natural time of finite beings is proclaimed to be a ?natural?, i.e. everyday and philosophically irrelevant attitude to time - one should recognize why Hegel's phenomenology of time is being fundamentally-ontologically deformed with Heidegger.

(nemacki) Heideggers Abhandlung ?ber die Geschichtlichkeit beruht auf der Ablehnung des Begriffs der Geschichte, beziehungsweise Hegels Begriffs der Weltgeschichte. Die Rechtfertigung dieser Korrektur wurde in unverzichtbarer Opposition zwischen der Erkentnnis der Geschichte und der Befragung des geschichtlichen Seins gefunden, wessen eigene Struktur in der egsistentiell-zeitlichen M?glichkeit des Geschehens liegt. Die Voraussetzungen dieser Rechtfertigung verlegen sich auf zwei Richtungen. Die erste bezieht sich auf die Destruktion der ontologischen Gleichberechtigung der Geschichte und Zeit, die im Standpunkt ausgesagt wurde, dass das Dasein nicht zeitlich sei, weil es in der Geschichte zentriert wurde, sondern es sei geschichtlich, weil der Grund seines Seins zeitlich ist. Die zweite Richtung der Rechtfertigung hat als Ziel die Absurdit?t des traditionellen Nachdenkens ?ber die Geschichte zu zeigen, das auf den unakzeptablen Modalit?ten der Ineinandersetzung der Gegenwart und der Vergangenheit beruhte, aus denen die Zukunft ausgeschlossen bleibt, oder nimmt das Stigma des Planens an beziehungweise der unauthentischen Antitipation. Nach Heideggers Meinung sind die Differenzen zwischen der geerbten Bestimmungen der Geschichte tats?chlich fiktiv und philosophisch irrelevant, da in ihrem Hintergrund dieselbe Uneigentlichkeit der linearen Zeitfolge liegt, welche die Zeitlichkeit des Daseins ignoriert, und auf diese Art und Weise den Zugang zum Deisen angemessene Artikulation des geschichtlichen Seins blockiert. Der Aufsatz thematisiert die innere Grenzen solchen Standpunkt.