Fighting over peace: spoilers, peace agreements, and the strategic use of violence

Intro -- Dedication -- Acknowledgments -- Contents -- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Introduction: When Peace Begets Violence -- Research Design and Methodology -- Defining Spoiling -- Case Selection -- Data Collection -- Plan of the Book -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 2: Who Spoils and Why -- Objectives -- Capabilities -- Spoiler Types -- Outside Spoilers -- Outside Rebel Groups -- Outside Rebel Factions -- Domestic Opposition Forces -- Inside Spoilers -- The Government -- Inside Rebel Groups -- Spoiling Targets -- International Dimensions of Spoiling -- Conclusion: Who Spoils -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 3: Where Spoiling Occurs -- Grievances and Mistrust -- Capabilities and Opportunity -- Incentives -- Predicting the Emergence of Spoiling -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 4: Termination Spoiling: Sabotage and Obstruction -- Weak Rebels and Rebel Factions: Anticipated and Ineffective -- Weak Domestic Spoilers: Peace in the Face of Opposition -- Weak Rebels and Rebel Factions: Delayed Inclusion -- Strong Outsiders Generate Significant Violence -- Successful Termination Spoiling -- Conclusion -- Note -- Bibliography -- Chapter 5: Modification Spoiling: Bargaining and Enforcement -- Strong Outside Spoilers Force Changes -- Strong Inside Spoilers: Renegotiation and Additional Concessions -- Weak Spoilers Ignored -- Unrealistic Demands by Strong Spoilers Reflect Opposition to Peace -- Resolving Issues and Refining Protocols -- Spoiling as Enforcement -- Spoiling over Implementation Issues and Peace Failure -- Conclusion -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Chapter 6: Conclusion: Implications for Theory and Practice -- Key Findings -- Policy Implications -- Prediction -- Targeted Inclusion -- Continued Negotiation -- Coercion -- Moving Forward -- Note -- Bibliography.

This book presents post-peace agreement violence as a serious, yet predictable and manageable, political phenomenon. Negotiating an end to a civil war is extremely difficult, and many signed peace agreements subsequently unravel, ushering in renewed conflict. In response, important international actors have become increasingly involved in conflict mediation, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction around the globe. Policymakers and scholars alike have identified spoilers-violent actors who often rise up and attempt to challenge or derail the peace process-as one of the greatest threats to peace. Using a mixed-method approach combining quantitative and qualitative analyses of a newly created, global dataset of spoiling, Reiter demonstrates that this type of violence occurs in predictable circumstances and only represents a threat to peace under specific conditions. The book also shows that spoiling often serves to bring agreement flaws and implementation failures to light and in turn forces actors to recommit to an accord, thereby strengthening peace in the long term. Andrew G. Reiter is Professor of Politics and International Relations at Mount Holyoke College. He is the coauthor of Transitional Justice in Balance: Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy(2010) as well as numerous articles and book chapters on the topics of conflict resolution, post-conflict peacebuilding, and transitional justice.