The exit option in the treaty of Lisbon: more harm than good?

In: Global risks: constructing world order through law, politics and economics, S. 183-199

Abstract

"In the first chapter, Susanne Lechner introduces the triad of law, politics and economics in this part by analysing a legal provision with a tool usually found in economics to ask whether a political goal can be achieved. More precisely, Lechner examines whether the right to withdraw from the European Union, the exit-option, which has been established by the Treaty of Lisbon enhances the stability of the EU by furthering flexible integration. Prima facie, this seems to be a contradictory claim: how can a legal provision allowing for a withdrawal from the EU at the same time increase the stability of the very same organisation? By using a game-theoretic approach, Lechner critically examines the options member states now have in negotiations and bargaining situations. She concludes that on the one hand, the exit-option bears significant potential as a threatening instrument to serve the interests of member states because they gain bargaining power. On the other hand, the exit-option can also be regarded as a stabilising factor since the option for a legal withdrawal allows for flexible integration through the formation of clubs within the EU. Thus, the risk of either costly struggles for secession or a deadlock in the integration process or both is diminished by a legal provision that, prima facie, seems to have the contrary effect." (extract)